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Do we need empathy as moral agents? Some philosophers think not. Some also 
deny that we benefit from empathy, and some go as far as to argue that empathy impairs 
our ability to make sound moral judgments. These doubts about empathy call into 
question its place in moral life. The aim of my dissertation is to remove these doubts by 
showing that empathy is indispensible to moral agents. Empathy helps us to appreciate 
others’ thoughts and feelings such that we are in a better position to make, correct, and 
recognize moral judgments. Empathy, however, is not just a helpful resource; it is not 
something optional that agents can choose to disregard. Instead, for those who can take 
advantage of it, empathy is required as a resource that enables more sophisticated 
participation in the moral community. 
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Our lives are full of social interaction. On a daily basis we engage in activities 
such as joking, cursing, intimidating, insinuating, praising, gossiping, flirting, promising, 
complimenting, insulting, and manipulating. Although these sorts of activities are 
commonplace, they can be incredibly subtle. They can involve layers of subtext, embody 
ambivalent sentiments, and have unintended consequences. Moreover, these activities can 
make a significant impact on the quality of our lives. It is normal to identify ourselves in 
terms of our relationships with our family, friends, lovers, colleagues, peers, and enemies, 
and social interaction is a central way in which we participate in these relationships. As a 
result, these activities can cause us to experience benefit and harm, and they can alter 
how we think about ourselves.  
 Given the role of interpersonal relationships in our lives, it clearly matters 
whether we are able to track what is going on in social interactions. This tracking, it 
seems, often depends on how well we understand others’ thoughts and feelings. For 
example, in many cases we need to recognize how another person sees a situation in 
order to discern how her actions express her will or intentions. Similarly, we need to 
understand how her actions express her will or intentions in order to know how best to 




difference whether he is being sincere or whether he is just being polite. His attitudes 
partially determine the nature of the interaction. Interpersonal understanding involves 
appreciating this sort of nature, and it thereby equips us to better navigate the social 
setting. The better we understand what others are trying to say and do, the more clearly 
we can evaluate their attitudes and actions, and the more sophisticated and nuanced we 
can make our responses.  
 So how can we effectively gain understanding of others’ thoughts and feelings? 
Which psychological resources should we rely on to discern and navigate social 
interactions? At first glance, empathy looks like a promising candidate. Empathy is often 
described as something that makes us sensitive to the mental lives of others and that helps 
us to recognize differing points of view. For example, Atticus Finch praises the value of 
empathy in To Kill a Mockingbird. He states, “If you can learn a simple trick, Scout, 
you'll get along a lot better with all kinds of folks. You never really understand a person 
until you consider things from his point of view, until you climb inside of his skin and 
walk around in it” [Lee 1960/2010: 39]. The author Azar Nafisi offers a similar 
endorsement of empathy. She claims that it makes possible genuine dialogue: 
I believe in empathy. I believe in the kind of empathy that is created 
through imagination and through intimate, personal relationships… 
Through imagination and our desire for rapport, we transcend our 
limitations, freshen our eyes, and are able to look at ourselves and the 




others, the ability to put ourselves in their shoes, and the will to enter their 
world through the magic of imagination, creates this shock of recognition. 
Without this empathy there can be no genuine dialogue, and we as 
individuals and nations will remain isolated and alien, segregated and 
fragmented [Nafisi 2007: 171-72]. 
Another reason to think that empathy helps us to interact with others is that people 
sometimes point to the absence of empathy as an explanation for why people fail to 
understand or act appropriately in social settings. For example, autistic individuals can 
struggle with recognizing others’ mental states, and they often feel at a loss regarding 
what they ought to do given those mental states. Jeannette Kennett describes the 
experiences of autistic individuals as follows:  
High-functioning adults with Asperger’s syndrome and autism often report 
a sense of alienation and aloneness, as well as a greatly reduced need for 
human contact. Temple Grandin describes herself as like an anthropologist 
on Mars in her attempts to understand other people: an Asperger’s 
syndrome couple say ‘they beamed us down from the transporter 
together’. Another autistic man, Jim Sinclair, writes ‘In some ways I am 
terribly ill equipped to survive in this world, like an extra-terrestrial 




The social struggles of high-functioning autistics are commonly attributed to a deficiency 
in their empathic abilities. It is also common for people to explain the moral apathy 
demonstrated by psychopaths in terms of their failure to empathize with others. Because 
they do not empathize, they do not see others interests and ends as mattering in the same 
way as their own interests and ends.1 
 Empathy, however, has come under fire in recent philosophical literature. In 
particular philosophers have raised criticisms about the role of empathy in moral life. For 
example, some philosophers deny that we need empathy when making moral judgments. 
Some also deny that empathy provides understanding that helps us to make moral 
judgments, and some go as far as to argue that empathy impairs our ability to make sound 
moral judgments. These criticisms cast doubt on the idea that empathy is a beneficial 
resource for moral life; they suggest that perhaps moral agents could do just as well (or 
better) if they didn’t empathize when interacting with others.  
There are several putative reasons to doubt that empathy is an indispensible 
resource for moral agents. One such reason is that there are moral agents who appear 
incapable of empathy but who nevertheless make accurate moral judgments. For 
example, Jeannette Kennett argues that autistic individuals cannot empathize but they 
learn principles that correctly guide their moral judgments [2002]. Another putative 
reason is that empathy can produce feelings that distract us from understanding others’ 
attitudes. Heidi Maibom argues that empathizing causes feelings of personal distress 
                                                




[2010]. These feelings, she claims, turn our attention inwards and prevent us from 
appreciating others’ experiences. A third putative reason is that we cannot precisely 
replicate what others experience when we take their perspectives. For example, Peter 
Goldie argues that empathizing only provides a distorted representation of others’ 
attitudes [2011]. A fourth putative reason is that empathy is susceptible to bias. Jesse 
Prinz argues that this susceptibility makes empathy an unreliable resource for 
understanding others’ attitudes [2011b]. Taken together, these putative reasons build a 
case against empathy as something that has an indispensable role in moral life.  
 In this dissertation I contest this case. The philosophical literature, I argue, fails to 
adequately account for the normative and psychological role of empathy in moral life. 
Morality demands that we aim for soundness in making moral judgments. Empathy 
supports this aim by helping us to appreciate the nature of others’ thoughts and feelings, 
and it does so in a way that alternative resources do not. Empathy is not something that 
we can justifiably choose to stop using; rather, those of us who are capable of empathy 
need to include it amongst the resources with which we navigate the social domain. In 
this way empathy is an indispensible resource for moral agents.  
 The term “empathy” is used in different ways in the philosophical and 
psychological literature. In this project “empathy” refers to a process in which we 
imaginatively take up another person’s standpoint and reenact how she thinks and feels 
about a particular situation. Reenacting how another thinks and feels about a situation 




previously overlooked, and it can cause us to construe features as having a different 
evaluative significance. For example, when I empathize with a friend who is angry I 
imagine being in her circumstances and having her relevant beliefs, values, and 
expectations. I come to see a feature of the situation as offensive, and I experience an 
echo of her anger about that feature. It is easy to confuse empathy with other 
psychological phenomena that share similar qualities. For example, emotional contagion 
is another process by which we come to experience affective states that resemble 
another’s affective states. Although empathy and emotional contagion both involve 
affective-mirroring, they do not have the same benefits for interpersonal understanding. 
Because they do not have the same benefits, it is important that we distinguish the two 
when trying to clarify the merits of empathy. In Chapter 1 I explain how empathy in 
particular helps us to understand social interactions and the nature of others’ attitudes. 
Towards this end I conceptually distinguish empathy from phenomena such as sympathy, 
empathic concern, mimicry, neural mirroring, emotional contagion, emotional 
identification, self-oriented perspective-taking, and inferential thinking. I show that 
empathy supports interpersonal understanding by helping us to appreciate how another 
person views a situation, how she thinks and feels about that situation, and how her 
affective attitudes are a rational response to features of the situation.  
My account of empathy and interpersonal understanding points to several ways in 
which empathy is beneficial for moral agents. One way is that empathy helps us to 




another. These expressions are often relevant to the moral worth of others’ conduct. 
Empathy enables us to better take these expressions into account and thereby make sound 
judgments that respond to the moral worth of others’ conduct. In a closely related way 
empathy also helps us to disqualify and dispel our inappropriate judgments about others’ 
conduct and to affirm and sustain our judgments that are appropriate. A third way in 
which empathy is beneficial for moral agents is that it helps us to appreciate and be 
moved by others’ moral judgments. I explore these three ways in Chapter 2 by looking at 
moral judgment in terms of the reactive attitudes. I show that empathy improves our 
dealings with the reactive attitudes, and in doing so it makes possible a more 
sophisticated participation in the moral community. 
 However, as mentioned, some researchers doubt that empathy is a beneficial 
resource for moral agents. These researchers, however, tend to focus on moral judgment 
in terms of judgments of right and wrong. Therefore, in Chapter 3 I extend my account by 
showing how empathy also helps us to make judgments of right and wrong. I then defend 
this extended account by responding to three putative reasons to doubt that empathy 
produces understanding that helps us to make moral judgments. These putative reasons 
are found in the work of Goldie, Maibom, and Prinz. I show that we should reject each of 
these reasons, and therefore, they do not create a problem for my account of empathy as a 
beneficial resource for moral agents.  
In Chapters 1-3 I show that empathy has a constructive role to play in regards to 




whether we need empathy. Several philosophers attempt to answer this question. For 
example, Prinz [2011a], Maibom [2010 and 2009], Kennett [2002], and Snow [2000] all 
argue that moral agents do not need empathy. They do this in part by pointing to 
examples of individuals who cannot empathize but who purportedly make moral 
judgments. In Chapter 4 I argue that these accounts are correct in separating the concept 
of empathy from moral judgment and in recognizing that we can make some judgments 
without empathy. However, I claim that the accounts still fail to adequately characterize 
the significance of empathy for moral agents. For those of us who are capable of 
empathy, it helps us do what we ought to do. It provides understanding of others’ 
thoughts and feelings such that we are in a better position to make and correct judgments 
that respond directly to morally relevant features of situations. It is not a resource that is 
simply beneficial or instrumentally valuable for those who can take advantage of it; 
rather it is required as a resource that enables agents to participate in the moral 
community in more sophisticated ways. Therefore, empathy is not a resource that we can 
justifiably choose to disregard; rather, it is an indispensible resource for moral agents.  
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Chapter 1: The Nature of Empathy 
What is empathy? Empathy is a psychological process by which we imaginatively 
adopt another’s perspective and experience an echo of her thoughts and feelings. In later 
chapters I argue that this process plays a constructive role in moral life. However, before 
doing so, it is important to clarify what empathy is and how it functions. We need to see 
how empathy helps us to better appreciate and respond to others’ attitudes in order to 
evaluate its merits. One challenge in doing so is that empathy resembles other 
psychological phenomena. These other phenomena, however, do not provide benefits in 
the same way for interpersonal understanding. Therefore, in order to identify and evaluate 
the merits of empathy, we need to conceptually set it apart from the other phenomena. In 
this chapter I provide this conceptual separation. I outline the nature of empathy and I 
show how that nature distinguishes it from related phenomena. The nature of empathy is 
such that empathizing helps us to better appreciate the nature of others’ attitudes and 
actions. More specifically, it helps us to appreciate how another person views a situation, 
what she thinks and feels about that situation, and how those attitudes are a rational 
response to features of the situation.  
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1.  ‘EMPATHY’ 
One problem that arises when discussing empathy is that researchers use the term 
in different ways. As Alvin Goldman states, “The term ‘empathy’…does not mean the 
same thing in every mouth” [2011: 31]. For example, in some mouths “empathy” refers 
to the neurological event of mirroring in our own brain someone else’s neural states 
[Iacoboni 2011]. In other mouths it refers to the experience of perceiving that a person 
has certain mental states [Zahavi 2014], and in still others it refers to imagining things 
from another’s perspective [Coplan 2011].2 Moreover, we cannot solve this problem by 
appealing to people’s pre-theoretical use of the term. As Heather Battaly observes, people 
use “empathy” to refer to “a process of caring, or sharing, or knowing, or some 
combination thereof” [2011: 278]. The equivocal use of the term creates a problem 
because the different phenomena that people call “empathy” have different benefits for 
understanding and interacting with others. If we want to assess the merits of empathy, 
then it matters to which phenomena we are referring. I address this problem by isolating 
one of the phenomena and reserving the term “empathy” exclusively for it. My aim in 
this project is to show, contra the criticisms in the literature, that this particular 
phenomenon is a valuable psychological resource. Critics of the phenomenon refer to it 
as “empathy,” so I follow their dialectical lead and also refer to it as “empathy.” 
                                                
2 See Stueber 2014, Coplan 2011, and Batson 2011 for helpful overviews of the different ways in which 
researchers use the term “empathy.”  
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In this project “empathy” picks out a process in which we imaginatively adopt or 
take up another’s perspective.3 We take up another’s perspective by imagining being in 
her position with her relevant beliefs, values, experiences, and character traits.4 In a 
limited sense we imagine being her as she thinks and feels about a particular situation.5 
This imagining can cause us to view a situation in the same way as another person and 
have states that resemble the other’s states.6 In this way, empathy is an other-oriented 
form of perspective-taking.7 For example, when we attempt to empathize with someone 
who is afraid, we try to see the situation as she sees it, and this can cause us to experience 
an “echo” of what she feels. If she feels afraid about the stock market starting to decline 
because of her financial portfolio, then thinking about things from her perspective can 
                                                
3 It is possible that all things considered some other phenomenon has a better claim to the term “empathy.” 
For example, Dan Zahavi [2014] identifies several historical reasons for using “empathy” to refer to a 
phenomenon in which we directly perceive and experience others’ mental states.  However, this does not 
create a problem for my project. My project is about identifying and defending the merits of a particular 
phenomenon. This is consistent with referring to the phenomenon by another name. Amy Coplan makes a 
similar point when justifying her focus on a particular phenomenon. She claims, “it is less important that 
we call this process empathy than that we stop conflating it with several related processes for it is the 
conflation that has led to so much ambiguity and confusion, making it difficult to analyze and evaluate 
empathy researchers’ work and threatening to hamper both philosophical and empirical efforts to study the 
significance of all of these processes” [2011: 5]. 
4 Other theorists who use “empathy” in a similar way include Coplan 2011, Morton 2011, Goldie 2011, 
Prinz 2011a, Prinz 2011b, Stueber 2006, Kennett 2002, Snow 2000, Hoffman 2000, Sherman 1998, and 
Deigh 1995. 
5 The qualifier, as I explain below, refers to the fact that we that we do not fully identify with the other 
person. We do not lose sight of the fact that we are imaginatively adopting another’s way of seeing the 
world.  
6 Goldie describes the phenomenon as follow: “Very roughly speaking, what I am against is what I will call 
empathetic perspective-shifting: consciously and intentionally shifting your perspective in order to imagine 
being the other person, and thereby sharing in his or her thoughts, feelings, decisions, and other aspects of 
their psychology” [2011: 303].  
7 When empathizing we are not trying to determine how we would see or respond if we—holding fixed our 
psychology—were in the other’s circumstances. This would be a form of self-oriented perspective-taking. 
We are also not trying to determine what is the appropriate way to see and respond to the situation based on 
an idealized subject’s view of the situation. When empathizing we do not correct for epistemic failures in 
the other’s perspective. I say more about these distinctions in §6. Also see Goldie 2011, Coplan 2011, and 
Hoffman 2000 for more on self versus other-oriented perspective-taking. 
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cause us to feel something similar about the declining market. When we experience 
resembling states while empathizing, we attribute those states to the other person. We 
recognize that the states we experience are a reenactment of her thoughts and feelings 
about the situation.8  
Three terminological points are worth clarifying. First, “empathy” does not refer 
to an emotion; it refers to the imaginative process of taking up another’s perspective and 
reenacting how she is thinking and feeling about a situation. This process can cause us to 
have affective states. If we empathize with someone feeling angry, then we see from her 
perspective how a feature of the situation is offensive and we experience states 
resembling her anger.9 When we experience these states, our experience is not identical 
with the other’s experience, but it is nevertheless similar. The states we experience 
resemble the other’s states in terms of their object, appraisal, valence, and affective 
tone.10 Second, “empathize” is a success term. When we empathize with another person 
we come to see the situation as she sees it from her perspective. If we try but fail to see 
the situation from another’s perspective, then we are not empathizing but trying to 
empathize. Empathizing produces attitudes such as belief, appreciation, or knowledge 
about how the other thinks and feels about the situation [Battaly 2011: 283, Eisenberg 
and Strayer 1987: 8-9]. Third, “perspective” refers to a standpoint that we have in virtue 
of our psychology and our position in a physical, social, and cultural setting. This 
                                                
8 For more on how we maintain a distinction between our self and the other see Coplan 2011: 16; Hoffman 
2000: 62-64; and Sober and Wilson 1998: 233. 
9 This is not to deny that so-called “bottom-up processes” such as emotional contagion can also play a 
causal role in producing resembling mental states [Coplan 2011]. 
10 For more on how empathizing produces resembling but not identical mental states, see Morton 2011: 
319, Snow 2000: 69, Sober and Wilson 1998: 233, and Smith 1790/2002: I.i.4.7. 
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standpoint affects what we see when we view a situation. It makes salient some features 
while causing us to overlook other features. It also causes us to view certain features as 
having evaluative and normative significance. When we empathize, we imaginatively 
adopt the other’s standpoint in order to view her situation as she views it. 
This section offers an initial sketch of the nature of empathy. Although it is only a 
sketch, my account already separates the phenomenon in question from other phenomena 
that researchers label as empathy. For example, consider an oft-cited definition by 
Frédérique De Vignemont and Tania Singer: 
There is empathy if: (i) one is in an affective state; (ii) this state is 
isomorphic to another person’s affective state; (iii) this state is elicited by 
the observation or imagination of another person’s affective state; (iv) one 
knows that the other person is the source of one’s own affective state 
[2006: 435]. 
Similar to this definition, my account claims that empathy can involve experiencing 
affective states that we recognize resemble or are an echo of another’s attitudes. 
However, unlike their definition, my account identifies other-oriented perspective-taking 
as the means by which we come to have resembling states. This identification 
conceptually distinguishes empathy from phenomena that do not involve this process and 
from phenomena that involve more than just this process. My account will take on greater 
detail and precision as I explain how empathy is distinct from related phenomena in the 
empathy literature. In particular I will clarify how empathy differs from sympathy, 
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empathic concern, mimicry, neural mirroring, emotional contagion, emotional 
identification, self-oriented perspective-taking, and empathic inference. 
2.  SYMPATHY 
I begin by looking at sympathy. Contemporary use of the term “sympathy” refers 
to an emotion felt for another person in virtue of perceiving or thinking about the 
condition, situation, or prospects of that person. It is often premised on a concern for the 
other’s well-being [Darwall 1998]. For example, we say that ‘we feel sympathy for our 
grieving friend after hearing about the loss of her child.’ This use of “sympathy,” 
however, can be understood in three different ways. First, it can refer to the experience of 
an emotion such as commiseration, pity, or compassion [Goldie 2000: 213-14]. We 
experience these emotions in response to something bad befalling another person. 
Second, “sympathy” can refer to a sui generis emotion. Understood in this way, 
sympathy is a distinct type of negative emotion that we feel for another out of a concern 
for something bad befalling that person. These two ways of understanding sympathy fit 
with prominent definitions of sympathy. For example, Heidi Maibom states, “S 
sympathizes with O when S feels bad for O as a result of believing or perceiving that 
something bad has happened to O” [2009: 287]. Stephen Darwall defines sympathy as “a 
feeling or emotion that responds to some apparent threat or obstacle to an individual’s 
good and involves concern for him, thus for his well-being, for his sake” [1998: 273].11 A 
third way of understanding “sympathy” is that it refers to more than just negative 
                                                
11 These definitions leave it open whether feeling bad refers to a sui generis emotion or to other negative 
emotions. 
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emotions. On this understanding we can sympathize with others when either good or bad 
things befall them. For example, I am happy for you because your welfare improves. My 
happiness is a sympathetic emotion because I feel it for you in virtue of perceiving good 
things happen to you.12 
Sympathy has some similar qualities to empathy. For example, both phenomena 
are in some sense other-oriented. When we empathize with a friend we focus on how she 
sees and responds to a situation, and when we sympathize we feel an emotion for her in 
virtue of the way in which her condition bears on her well-being. Further, both 
phenomena characteristically involve affective states that can change how we feel, and 
these states can in turn change what we are motivated to do. And finally both phenomena 
are often treated as morally praiseworthy. For example, we commend children for being 
compassionate and attuned to the emotions of others. To complicate the issue even 
further, some theorists use the language of “empathy” when discussing sympathy. For 
example, Daniel Batson identifies empathic concern as an emotional experience that we 
have when perceiving the suffering or distress of another person. He claims, “I shall use 
empathic concern and, as a shorthand, empathy to refer to the other-oriented emotion 
elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need” [2011: 11]. 
Empathic concern, he clarifies, is not a single, discreet emotion; rather, it consists of a 
constellation of other-oriented emotions [11-12].13 Inversely, some theorists use the 
language of “sympathy” when discussing the phenomenon of empathy. For example, 
                                                
12 For an example of someone using the term in this way, see Maibom 2014: 04.  
13 Researchers also use other terms to identity the same phenomenon. For example, Martin Hoffman calls 
this phenomenon “sympathetic distress” [2000]. 
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although neither is entirely consistent in how they use the term, David Hume [1739/2000] 
and Adam Smith [1790/2002] use “sympathy” to refer to an imaginative process whereby 
we come to experience a sentiment that matches another’s sentiment. For example, Smith 
describes the process as follows: 
By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive 
ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his 
body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence 
form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something, which, though 
weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. [1790/2002: I.i.1.2] 
Despite the similarities, we should keep empathy and sympathy conceptually 
distinct because of some key differences between the two. For example, sympathy is 
something that we feel for another. It is an affective state. Empathy, in contrast, is not an 
affective state. Empathy is an imaginative process whereby we try to reenact how another 
thinks and feels about a situation in virtue of seeing that situation in a particular way. As 
mentioned above, this process can involve experiencing affective states, but the process is 
not itself an affective state. Another difference is that the affective states we experience 
when empathizing are not felt for the other person in the way that sympathy is felt for 
another. Sympathetic affective states are felt for another in the sense that they represent a 
concern for a person’s well-being. The person is part of the object of the emotion. In 
contrast, the object of empathic affective states need not involve the other person. For 
example, when I empathize with a parent who is angry because her child is being 
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difficult, then the feelings of anger I experience are also directed at the child. The parent 
is not the object of my affective states; I do not feel angry at or for her. However, if in 
watching the situation unfold I come to feel sympathy, then my sympathetic feelings 
would be directed at the mother. I would feel sorry for her because of what she is going 
through. This distinction is perhaps less clear in cases involving reflexive states. For 
example, if a man feels guilty for a fatal car crash, then he is part of the object of his own 
emotion. If I empathize with him and experience a resembling state, then that state is also 
about him. Though he is the object of what I feel, this does not make the state a 
sympathetic emotion. I experience, while imagining the situation from his perspective, a 
self-directed emotion. Sympathy, in contrast, is other-directed. We feel something for 
someone because we care about her well-being. The feeling is outward looking in a way 
that feelings of guilt are not. A third difference between sympathy and empathy is that 
resemblance is not a constraining feature of sympathy. For example, we might feel pity 
for the man because of what he now has to live with. Our pity is sympathetic but it does 
not resemble his guilt. In contrast, empathizing involves resemblance. If we try to 
empathize with the man but we come to experience a different type of emotion, then we 
have likely failed to appreciate how he sees the situation. However, it is worth clarifying 
that experiencing resembling states while empathizing can ultimately lead to non-
resembling states. For example, experiencing an echo of the man’s guilt while 
empathizing could help me to appreciate his suffering in such a way that I am moved to 
feel sympathy for him. Finally, sympathy and empathy differ insofar as sympathy 
necessarily involves a concern or pro-attitude for the other person. It is because we care 
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about the other person and her well-being that the perception or thought of something bad 
befalling her is emotionally moving.14 Moreover, we are often motivated to help a person 
when we experience sympathy in response to her suffering [Batson 2011]. Empathy, on 
the other hand, need not involve any pro-attitude for the other person. It is neutral as a 
process. By empathizing, I argue, we can come to better understand how another person 
is responding to a situation; however, what we do with that understanding depends on 
other values and motivations we have. For example, empathy could help us to better 
appreciate another’s suffering, and we could then use that understanding to inflict even 
greater suffering upon the person [Battaly 2011: 297-98].15 
Although empathy does not require that we have a pro-attitude for the other 
person, it is certainly compatible with having such an attitude. For example, we might try 
to empathize in order to understand another’s response because we care about that 
person. We might think that her response matters and is worth understanding. 
Understanding her response may reveal something about her condition such that we come 
to feel sympathy for her. Things can also work in the other direction. Feeling sympathy 
for someone might motivate us to better understand what she is going through. This 
                                                
14 It is also because of this concern or pro-attitude that we sometimes describe sympathy as sharing in 
another’s sorrow or suffering. Because we care about the other person, her misfortune is meaningful to us 
in a personal way. We feel bad because we care about this person’s well-being, and our feeling shows 
solidarity for the person. In this way our sympathy can indicate an effort to participate in carrying the 
burden of the sorrow. Empathy, in contrast, need not involve the pro-attitude that gives rise to this 
solidarity.  
15 Bernard Williams makes this point in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. He states, “But one thing 
must be true is that the insightful understanding of others’ feelings possessed by the [empathetic] person is 
possessed in the same form by the sadistic or cruel person; that is one way in which the cruel are 
distinguished from the brutal or indifferent. But the cruel person is someone who has no preference to give 
help (he is not someone who has a preference to give help but finds it outweighed by a preference for 
enjoying suffering). Yet he certainly knows” [1985: 91]. 
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motivation might move us to empathize. In this way, empathy and sympathy can be 
closely related even though there are important differences between the two phenomena. 
3.  MIMICRY AND NEURAL MIRRORING 
Mimicry and neural mirroring are two phenomena discussed in the empirical 
literature on empathy. “Mimicry” refers to a process in which we imitate the bodily 
expressions of those we observe [Decety and Meltzoff 2011]. For example, sometimes 
when I perceive someone smiling my face changes to more closely resemble that smile. 
This change is an autonomic response to the perception; it is not that we see someone 
smiling and then consciously or intentionally make ourselves smile. Neural mirroring is 
also an autonomic response. We are hard-wired such that our perception of a goal-
directed action causes the firing of a neural pattern that resembles the neural pattern in 
the agent’s body [Freedberg and Gallese 2007]. The neural pattern in our body, however, 
may not result in action. For example, if I see someone grasping a cup, this perception 
causes the neural pattern to fire that would correspond with my grabbing a cup. This is 
sometimes called “embodied simulation” because we simulate within our own bodies the 
neural basis for another’s action. Marco Iacoboni argues that a similar effect occurs when 
we perceive another’s emotion. He claims that we mirror the neural pattern of the 
emotion in our own neural system [Iacoboni 2011]. 
Mimicry and neural mirroring are similar to empathy in that they produce 
resembling states. They use our own psychological machinery to reflect or reenact 
something that is going on in another person. Despite this surface similarity, these 
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processes are different from empathy in several important ways. Unlike with empathy, 
we cannot choose to initiate these processes. For example, we cannot decide to mirror 
another’s neural states. At best what we can do is to decide to put ourselves in a situation 
in which mirroring could occur. We also cannot control mimicry or neural mirroring. I 
cannot stop myself from having neural states that resemble another’s neural states. 
Furthermore, with these processes we often do not recognize when they are occurring 
because the process and the effects are below the level of conscious awareness. For 
example, if I perceive someone who is angry, then my face—without my noticing—may 
take on micro expressions that mimic the other’s facial expression. Because we cannot 
consciously start, control, or recognize the effects of these phenomena, theorists refer to 
them as “bottom-up” processes [Preston & Hofelich 2012, Coplan 2011].  
Empathy, in contrast, is a top-down process [Coplan 2011]. It is something that 
we can deliberately choose to do. It is also something that produces effects in us that we 
can recognize [Eisenberg and Strayer 1987: 6-9]. For example, I see a friend crying while 
watching what I take to be a not very sad movie. In reaction to the situation I empathize 
with her in order to better appreciate why she is responding in this way. Taking up her 
perspective can help me to reenact how she is seeing the movie, and it can cause me to 
experience an echo of her affective state. Although we can choose to empathize, this does 
not mean that we always have a conscious intention to empathize or that empathy always 
involves the same levels of imaginative effort or cognitive awareness. Sometimes we 
construe a situation as from another’s point of view without recognizing what we are 
doing or without forming a conscious intention to do so. However, the point is that unlike 
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mimicry and neural mirroring, empathy is not just something that happens to us. This is 
significant because it means that empathizing is within our power such that we can 
empathize more or less. Because we can control whether we empathize more or less, it 
makes sense to ask normative questions such as whether we should empathize with others 
while trying to be moral. 
4.  EMOTIONAL CONTAGION 
Emotional contagion is another bottom-up phenomenon discussed in the empathy 
literature. It is worth examining on its own because it has more in common with empathy 
than mimicry or neural mirroring. It is a process in which perceiving another’s emotional 
expressions causes us to experience a similar affective state [Coplan 2011, Goldman 
2011]. We may come to experience this state without consciously registering or thinking 
about the meaning of the other’s expressions. It is as if we simply catch or become 
“infected” by the others’ feelings [Scheler 1954]. Stephen Davies describes it as follows: 
One emotional state, appearance, or condition is transmitted to a person 
(or creature) who comes to feel the same way; the display of the first 
emotional state plays a causal role in the process of transmission and the 
first emotional state must be perceived, either attentionally or non-
attentionally, by the emotion’s recipient; the first emotional state is not the 
emotional object of the response, however, because the responder does not 
hold about the first emotional state beliefs that make it an appropriate 
intentional object for the response in question [2011: 138]. 
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Decety and Meltzoff offer a similar definition, but they attempt to explain what Davies 
refers to as the ‘causal role.’ They argue that the perception of the emotional expressions 
causes the observer to imitate those expressions. The imitation then functions as an 
informational feedback, which causes us to adopt the corresponding affective state. They 
claim, 
Emotional contagion, defined as the tendency to rapidly mimic and 
synchronize facial expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements 
with those of another person and, consequently converge emotionally with 
the other…is a social phenomenon of shared emotional expression that 
occurs at a basic level of cognitive awareness [2011: 68].  
It is quite possible that mimicry and neural mirroring are underlying mechanisms 
for emotional contagion [Goldman 2011]. However, these processes should still be 
distinguished from emotional contagion because on their own they do not necessarily 
produce any motivational, affective, or phenomenological consequences in the subject. 
Emotional contagion, in contrast, changes the way a subject feels and those changes can 
impact a subject’s motivational set. It is this higher-level impact that makes it similar to 
empathy, and it is for this reason that Alvin Goldman refers to emotional contagion as 
“basic empathy” [2006]. However, in spite of the similarity, empathy and emotional 
contagion have some notable differences. With empathy we attend to the other person, 
her condition, and what her states are about. The resembling states that we experience are 
intentionally directed at the same object as her states. For example, when I empathize 
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with my friend who is crying at a movie, the sadness that I experience is also about the 
movie. Emotional contagion, in contrast, does not require that we attend to others in the 
same way. For example, when I walk into a room filled with happy people, my 
perception of their expressions can cause me to feel happy. This effect can occur even if I 
do not consciously register that they are happy or register what their happiness is about. It 
could even occur if their happiness is a mood and lacks a discrete object. With emotional 
contagion, I might come to feel happy about some personal matter unconnected to the 
current situation. 
Researchers characterize emotional contagion as unintentional and operating 
below the level of cognitive awareness [e.g., Coplan 2011: 9].16 This language is 
appropriate because we cannot track or control the process that connects our perception 
of another’s expression to our experience of a resembling state. Of course, we can 
partially regulate whether emotional contagion occurs. For example, we can learn to 
identify situations in which others’ emotions are contagious. We can reflect on how we 
feel when in those situations. And we can deliberately put ourselves in or take ourselves 
out of such situations. This would impact the activity of emotional contagion. However, 
this is not the same as actually controlling the process. Even when we anticipate an 
instance of emotional contagion, we do not guide the process. We at best only perceive 
its effects. In this way the language of ‘contagion’ or ‘infection’ is quite fitting. With a 
disease we can control our exposure and we can recognize symptoms, but we have no 
                                                
16 Coplan cites several theorists who describe emotional contagion as unintentional [Wispé 1987: 76-77] 
and below the level of awareness [Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1994: 5]. 
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control over how the disease produces effects in us. Empathy is different. As explained in 
the previous section, we can be aware of what we are doing when it comes to empathy. 
We can choose to start empathizing, and we can make ourselves stop empathizing. We 
can change what we imagine and thereby affect how we take up others’ perspectives. By 
taking up these perspectives we can cause ourselves to experience states that resemble 
someone else’s states.  
 It is worth pausing at this point in order to clarify language found in the empathy 
literature. Researchers often refer to something called “affective matching” [e.g., Maibom 
2014]. Affective matching occurs when two or more people have the same type of 
affective state. It is important to recognize that this matching can arise in different ways. 
For example, affective matching can arise from people independently responding to an 
object with the same type of emotion. For example, two people can experience fear about 
a horror movie, and although their states resemble each other it is not because they are 
sensitive to or responding to each other’s mental life. Put otherwise, affective matching 
does not take into account how the resemblance is produced. This is worth mentioning 
because researchers sometimes characterize affective matching as the identifying feature 
of “affective or emotional empathy” [e.g., Bloom 2014]. This use of the term “empathy,” 
however, runs together different phenomenon that it is better to keep separate. On my 
account, both empathy and emotional contagion produce affective matching, but they do 
so in different ways. In order for a phenomenon to count as empathy it needs to produce 
affective matching in the right sort of way. 
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For a similar reason we should distinguish empathy from what one might call 
“feeling-with-another” or what Max Scheler calls “miteinanderfühlen” [1954: 12]. 
Feeling-with-another is a phenomenon in which two or more people have affective-
matching and at least one person recognizes that she is feeling the same emotion as 
another. In Scheler’s example, two parents feel sorrow at the loss of the their child. They 
also recognize that the other parent feels sorrow and because of this recognition there is a 
sense in which they feel their sorrow together [12-13]. I maintain that although they have 
matching affective states and they recognize this match, they are not empathizing. They 
are not empathizing because neither parent tries to see things from the other’s 
perspective. They presumably do not try because they already appreciate much about 
how the other feels. However, because they do not take the other’s perspective, they do 
not experience the other’s mental state as “external” to themselves [13]. They do not 
come to experience sorrow as an echo of the other’s sorrow as they would with 
empathizing. We can see the significance of this distinction if we consider cases in which 
we do not share the other’s values or concerns. With empathy, unlike with feeling-with-
another, we could still produce affective-matching because we would imaginatively take 
up the others’ perspective. We would imaginatively adopt her values and concerns, and in 
doing so, we could see the situation as she sees it and experience resembling thoughts and 
feelings about the situation. We could do this even though we do not ourselves normally 
care about things in the sort of way that would elicit the relevant thoughts and feelings.  
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 5.  EMOTIONAL IDENTIFICATION 
Emotional identification is seldom discussed in the empathy literature. It occurs 
when an intense engagement with another person causes us to lose sight of distinctions 
between that person and our self [Coplan 2011: 16, Goldie 2000: 193, Deigh 1995: 758-
59].17 As we focus on the other person we adopt mental states that seem appropriate to 
that person’s situation. However, because of our narrow focus, we do not appreciate that 
the mental states are fitting for or in some sense belong to a subject in the other’s 
situation. We experience the mental states as if we actually were the other person. Goldie 
describes the phenomenon as follows:  
This [phenomenon] takes various forms which have in common the fact 
that, when one emotionally identifies with another, one’s sense of one’s 
own identity to some extent merges with one’s sense of the identity of the 
other, so that there is a sort of draining away of the boundaries of 
cognitive and sensory identity [193]. 
For an example of emotional identification, consider a case given by John Deigh.  
Indeed, when such identification is strong and one’s own identity weak or 
budding, the result is likely to be a loss of the sense of oneself as separate 
from the person with whom one identifies. Thus a boy who so strongly 
identifies with a favorite ballplayer that every game is an occasion for 
                                                
17 Stocker and Hegeman describe it as occurring when “boundaries between them are too porous or 
nonexistent, each is too caught up in the life of the other, too involved and overly concerned with that 
person” [1996: 116]. Coplan quotes this passage as well [2011: 16].  
 28 
intense, vicarious ball playing…he makes believe that he is this player and 
loses himself in the process. He takes the latter’s perspective and 
imaginatively participates in the player’s trials, successes, and failures, but 
in doing so he may merely be transferring his own egocentricity from one 
perspective to another [1995: 759]. 
As the boy loses sight of his own identity, his thoughts and feelings begin to better fit 
with the situation in the field. He experiences the attitudes that correspond with being the 
ballplayer. If he perceives something as threatening the player’s success, then he 
experiences fear. He does not fear the threat because of a concern for the wellbeing of 
another; rather, he fears it because of a concern for his own success qua the player.18 
Emotional identification is similar to empathy in two key respects. Both 
phenomena involve imaginative attention directed at another’s situation as if one were a 
subject in that situation, and both produce affective states that respond to features of the 
situation. Despite this similarity, emotional identification involves a different mode of 
perspective-taking than that which characterizes empathy. Empathy involves 
imaginatively stepping into another’s perspective while remaining aware that this 
perspective is distinct from our own. We do not identify with that perspective, and 
therefore, we do not identify with the corresponding view of the situation or the resulting 
thoughts and feelings. Empathy maintains a psychological distance from the other 
subject. This distance creates space for us to appreciate how the states that we experience 
                                                
18 This is a modified version of an example used by Scheler [1954: 18-30]. 
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resemble how the other thinks and feels about a situation viewed in a particular way. 
Emotional identification, in contrast, does not preserve a distinction between the self and 
other. The person as other falls out of view. As a result, we do not differentiate the 
other’s perspective from our own, and the consequence is that we no longer appreciate 
how our experiences resemble another’s view or response to the situation.  
Researchers refer to the way in which empathy maintains psychological distance 
as “self-other differentiation.”19 Martin Hoffman describes this as a cognitively 
sophisticated sense of the self that allows us to distinguish things happening to us from 
things happening to others [2000: 62-64]. Because empathy uses our own psychological 
machinery to better understand others, it is crucial while empathizing that we can 
accurately maintain this distinction. As Amy Coplan explains, 
One thus remains aware of the fact that the other is a separate person and 
that the other has his own unique thoughts, feelings, desires, and 
characteristics. This enables deep engagement with the other while 
preventing one from losing sight of where the self ends and the other 
begins and where the other ends and the self begins. Without clear self-
other differentiation, we are almost certain to fail in our attempts to 
empathize. We either lose our sense of self and become enmeshed or, 
more often, we let our imaginative process become contaminated by our 
                                                
19 See Coplan 2011 and Hoffman 2000 for illuminating description of this notion. Theorists sometimes use 
other names to refer to this aspect of empathy (e.g., “self-other distinction” Bischof-Köhler	2012,	“self-
other	awareness”	Decety	and	Meltzoff	2011). 
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self-perspective and thus end up engaged in a simulation that fails to 
replicate the experience of the other [2011: 16, Coplan refers to emotional 
identification as “enmeshment”]. 
Sober and Wilson make a similar point, 
When Barbara learns that Bob’s father has just died, she may empathize 
with Bob without losing sight of the fact that they are two different people, 
not one and the same person…Barbara understands perfectly well who it 
is who has just lost a parent. When people confuse the real misfortunes of 
others with their own more fortunate situation, we do not praise them for 
their ability to empathize; empathy is not the inability to keep track of who 
is who [1998: 233]. 
6.  SELF-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE-TAKING 
There are different kinds of perspective-taking, but in general “perspective-
taking” refers to a kind of imaginative activity by which we change our standpoint on a 
situation. We change our standpoint by imagining that we are in a different position or 
that we have different psychology.20 For example, we can imagine that we are in a 
different set of circumstances with different beliefs, different values, and different 
experiences. This imaginative activity requires cognitive sophistication and careful 
regulation. We need to be able to construe a situation in different ways, entertain beliefs 
                                                
20 It is sometimes also called “perspective shifting” [e.g., Goldie 2011]. 
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that we do not have, and disregard some of our own concerns and related affective 
responses. As Coplan states, “perspective-taking requires mental flexibility and relies on 
regulatory mechanisms to modulate our level of affective arousal and suppress our own 
perspective” [2011: 13]. Empathy, as mentioned earlier, is a form of other-oriented 
perspective-taking. It involves imagining being in another’s circumstances and having the 
relevant features of her psychology. By doing so, we are able to reenact how she views a 
situation and how she thinks and feels about the situation.  
We need to distinguish this form of perspective-taking from what we might call 
“self-oriented perspective-taking.” Self-oriented perspective-taking involves imagining 
being in the circumstances of another person but with our own beliefs, values, 
experiences, and dispositions. We imagine how we—holding fixed our own 
psychology—would think and feel if we were in the other’s position. Heidi Maibom calls 
this an “imagine-self” process [2014, 2010], and Goldie refers to it as “in-his-shoes 
perspective-shifting.” Goldie states that the phenomenon involves “consciously and 
intentionally shifting your perspective in order to imagine what thoughts, feelings, 
decisions, and so on you would arrive at if you were in the other’s circumstances” [2011: 
302]. Smith identifies this distinction between self and other-oriented perspective-taking 
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. He explains it as follows: 
But though sympathy is very properly said to arise from an imaginary 
change of situations with the person principally concerned, yet this 
imaginary change is not supposed to happen to me in my own person and 
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character, but in that of the person with whom I sympathize. When I 
condole with you for the loss of your only son, in order to enter into your 
grief I do not consider what I, a person of such a character and profession, 
should suffer, if I had a son, and if that son was unfortunately to die: but I 
consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change 
circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters.” 
[1790/2002: VII.iii.i.4]. 
It is important to make this distinction because sometimes the two forms of perspective-
taking produce different states in us even when thinking about the same set of 
circumstances [Coplan 2011, Goldie 2011, 2000, Batson 2011].21 For example, if I 
imagine myself in the shoes of a tightrope walker, then I feel anxiety. I experience this 
negative attitude because I take no pleasure in being up high. This distaste for heights is 
part of my psychological profile. However, if I imagine being the tightrope walker with 
his psychology, then I view the situation in light of his confidence and familiarity with 
heights. This is a different perspective on the situation. When viewed from that 
perspective the situation does not give rise to the negative attitudes. It would reproduce 
the other’s way of thinking and feelings about the situation. 
 I believe that for a similar reason it is worth distinguishing a third form of 
perspective-taking. This form involves imagining being in another’s circumstances but 
having an edited or idealized version of that person’s psychological profile. For example, 
                                                
21 Evidence from neuroscience suggests that these processes rely on different neural mechanisms [Coplan 
2011: 10, Ruby and Decety 2004, Jackson, Brunet, et al. 2006]. 
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we would correct for such things as epistemic shortcomings and irrational fears when 
imaging things from the other’s perspective. This third form of perspective-taking is not 
often discussed in the literature. Even theorists who are careful to separate the first two 
often do not distinguish this third. For example, Coplan states, “Although many 
researchers discuss only a single form of perspective-taking, which can be more or less 
successful, there are at least two appreciably different forms” [2011: 9].22 Although it is 
not often discussed, this process is worth distinguishing because it can produce different 
states in us than the states we would experience if we empathize or if we imagine our self 
in the other’s circumstances. For example, we see a girl blissfully playing in shark-
infested water. She does not recognize that there is danger lurking below. If we imagine 
being the girl in her circumstances (i.e., empathy) or we imagine ourselves blissfully 
playing in the water, then we would experience an echo of her joy. However, if we 
imagine being her in her circumstances but we correct for her ignorance, then we would 
experience fear. Our fear would be an appropriate response to the danger, but it would 
not reenact her actual thoughts and feelings about the situation. 
By highlighting these distinctions I do not mean to imply that we can only use one 
form of perspective-taking when thinking about another’s attitudes. On any given 
occasion we can oscillate between the different forms. Moreover, I believe that each form 
has the potential to help us better appreciate others’ thoughts and feelings. However, the 
distinctions do imply that of the three forms only empathy is constrained by the other’s 
                                                
22 Goldie [2011, 2000] and [Batson 2010, 1997] also identify only two forms of perspective-taking. Martin 
Hoffman is the most notable exception. He identifies a version of this third form as a variant of what he 
calls “other-focused” perspective-taking [2000: 57]. 
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actual perspective. Empathy, therefore, is uniquely set up to reenact how view situations 
and how others think and feel about those situations. This is particularly salient when we 
consider cases in which another person thinks and feels about the situation differently 
than we would or differently than she should. In these cases empathy is better equipped to 
produce states that resemble the other’s actual thoughts and feelings.  
Several other clarifications are in order. First, my account is neutral about whether 
perspective-taking is the default means by which we identify or understand others’ 
attitudes. There are some neurological and phenomenological reasons for thinking that it 
is not [Zahavi 2012]. For example, in many cases we understand what a person is 
thinking and feeling without having to engage in complex imagining. I see a baby 
giggling while being tickled, and I recognize that she is happy. It seems that I do not need 
to imaginatively take her perspective in order to understand her response. Theorists offer 
different explanations of how such understanding occurs.23 For example, Dan Zahavi 
[2014, 2012] argues that we primarily understand others’ mental life by way of a 
primitive form of perception or quasi-perception. We are hardwired to directly experience 
others as undergoing intentional mental states. Zahavi claims that these experiences are 
qualitatively different from our experiences of non-minded objects and our experiences 
of our self. Even if Zahavi is correct, this basic mode of interpersonal understanding is 
compatible with more complex modes such as perspective-taking [2014: 141]. Empathy, 
                                                
23 The most prominent accounts involve versions of Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory. For more on 
these theories see Ravenscroft 2010, Hutto 2008, Goldman 2006, and Stueber 2006. 
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as I show below, would still be a valuable resource that helps us to appreciate the nature 
of others’ attitudes and actions even if it is not the default means.  
Second, sometimes we try to take others’ perspectives but fail to experience 
resembling states. This can happen for several reasons. For example, if we have 
inaccurate beliefs about another’s psychology, then these beliefs can cause us to take up a 
perspective that does not reflect the other’s perspective. Similarly, if another’s 
experiences, values, context, or beliefs are too foreign from our own, then we might 
struggle at imagining how that person construes the situation. People sometimes respond 
to things in irrational, inconsistent, and aberrant ways. When this occurs even if we come 
to see the situation from a similar standpoint, we may not respond in a similarly 
irrational, inconsistent, or aberrant way. In all of these cases, we fail to reenact how the 
other person thinks and feels about the situation despite trying to take her perspective. 
Third, as mentioned earlier, empathy does not produce states that are identical to 
the other person’s states. Rather, the perspective-taking process produces only an echo or 
resemblance of the other’s thoughts and feelings. The states are not identical for at least 
three reasons. First, we need to think about the other person’s psychology when 
imaginatively adopting her perspective. Her psychology shapes her perspective and 
thereby her response to the situation. Therefore, we need to take it into account when 
shifting into her perspective. However, as Goldie points out, the other person normally 
does not think about such things when responding to the world [2011: 309]. In a similar 
way, when we experience an echo of another’s thoughts and feelings, we might be 
attending to the nature of those states in a way that the other person is not. Therefore, our 
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mental states will involve considerations or features not present in the other person’s 
thinking. The second reason is that when empathizing we do not lose sight of the fact that 
we are imagining things from another’s standpoint. Because of this self-other 
differentiation we do not identify with the thoughts and feelings that we experience. We 
take our experience as a reenactment of how the other thinks and feels. In this way the 
states produced by empathizing are importantly different. They have an external or alien 
quality not present in the original. The third reason that our states are not identical is that 
they differ in intensity. There are two senses of intensity that are relevant here. The first 
is that the resembling states tend to be less affectively or emotionally intense. If the other 
person feels rage, then we experience a more constrained version of anger. Adam Smith 
argues that this difference arises because we only experience the states in virtue of 
imagining seeing a situation from the other’s perspective. In contrast, the other person 
experiences the emotions in direct response to her situation. He states, 
After all of this, however, the emotions of the spectator will still be very 
apt to fall short of the violence of what is felt by the sufferer. Mankind, 
though naturally sympathetic, never conceive, for what has befallen 
another, that degree of passion which naturally animates the person 
principally concerned. That imaginary change of situation, upon which 
their sympathy is founded, is but momentary. The thought of their own 
safety, the thought that they themselves are not really the sufferers, 
continually intrudes itself upon them; and though it does not hinder them 
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from conceiving a passion somewhat analogous to what is felt by the 
sufferer, hinders them from conceiving any thing that approaches to the 
same degree of violence [1790/2002: I.i.4.7]. 
Our resembling states are also often less intense in terms of phenomenal quality. They 
lack the same qualitative depth and robustness. Imagining being someone else thinking 
and feelings about a situation tends not to be as phenomenally rich as actually being the 
person responding to the situation. This is part of the reason why I describe the states that 
we experience as an echo of another’s states. Adam Smith makes a similar point; he 
describes the states we experience as a “shadow” of the states that the other experiences 
[1790/2002: II.ii.2.1]. 
The question then is ‘if not identity, how similar do the states need to be in order 
to count as resemblance?’ Other theorists note that it is difficult to specify when a state is 
similar enough that it adequately matches the other’s state [e.g., Morton 2011: 319, Snow 
2000: 69, Sober and Wilson 1998: 233]. Nancy Snow claims that such specification is not 
built into the concept of empathy [2000: 69]. However, even if she is right, we can still 
identify the kinds of features that determine whether or not there is sufficient 
resemblance. For example, it is necessary that the states have at least the same intentional 
object, appraisal, affective tone, and valence. These features are necessary because they 
are relevant to how states constitute meaningful or rational responses to a situation. 
Therefore, for an empathic observer to have states that resemble another’s, the states need 
to be similar in at least these ways. For example, a journal emails me with a decision 
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regarding my submission. Before opening the email, I am anxious yet hopeful. My 
experience represents both that I care about the publishing of the paper and that I am 
uncertain about the journal’s decision. If someone tries to empathize with me and his 
imaginative activity produces states that are not about the journal’s decision, then his 
states do not resemble mine. He is not thinking and feeling about the situation in the right 
way. Similarly, if his states fail to include any sense of ambivalence, then they are not 
capturing the complexity of my attitudes about the situation. If such discrepancies occur, 
then the other’s imaginative activity fails to fully reenact how I think and feel about the 
situation. Adam Morton makes a similar point. In defining empathy, he claims,  
I have required just that one ‘represent’ the state of the other person, but in 
a way that captures its affective tone and perspective. I intend this to 
involve the same sort of emotion felt in the same sort of way, but I am not 
requiring that the fit be perfect. I do have in mind, though I am not writing 
it into the definition, that the way one represents another’s state of mind in 
empathizing with them enable the kind of understanding of the person that 
empathy should support [2011: 319]. 
The fourth clarification is that taking others’ perspectives can produce states that 
resemble more than just emotions. This is a departure from how many theorists describe 
empathy [e.g., Morton 2011, Prinz 2011a, 2011b, de Vignemont and Singer 2006, 
Maibom 2010, 2007, Smith 1790/2002, Snow 2000]. Our responses to the world, 
however, are often complex sets of intentional states, and these sets do not consist of only 
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emotional states. For example, my brother is reminiscing about a childhood Christmas. 
He is feeling nostalgic and his nostalgia is an affective state. However, he also has doubts 
about the accuracy of his memories, he has beliefs about the origins of those memories, 
and he has desires to recreate those memories for his children. These latter states do not 
fit neatly into the category of emotions. Nevertheless, these states characterize what he is 
going through as he thinks about that Christmas. They are part of the complex set of 
intentional states that constitute how he is responding to the situation. If I only appreciate 
his feeling of nostalgia, then I fail to appreciate significant aspects of his thinking and 
feeling. Put otherwise, when we view a situation from another’s perspective, we do not 
just see it as calling for certain emotions. We can also see it as justifying certain beliefs or 
eliciting certain desires. Seeing it in this way can cause us to have beliefs or desires that 
resemble the other’s non-emotional states. Having these states can be part of reenacting 
another’s complex thoughts and feelings about a situation. 
 Finally, it is worth highlighting that taking others’ perspectives does not entail 
that we approve of the their perspectives or their thoughts and feelings. In fact we can 
reenact how others’ think and feel about a situation even when we disagree with their 
values or how they view the situation in light of those values. We take up others’ 
perspectives, as I argue in section 8, because it helps us to appreciate the nature of their 
thoughts and feelings. Appreciation, however, does not necessarily cause us to endorse 
the other’s attitudes as appropriate, agreeable, or praiseworthy. For example, if I 
empathize with a child bullying another, I might come to better appreciate his feelings of 
superiority. Despite this appreciation, I can still judge that the bully’s feelings are 
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inappropriate and that his conduct is morally blameworthy. In short, empathy is not itself 
an evaluative process.  
7.   ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES  
Perspective-taking is not the only way in which we improve our understanding of 
others’ thoughts and feelings. In this section I group together some of these alternative 
resources. These resources are sometimes problematically referred to as “empathic 
inference.” The term “empathic inference” comes from the work of William Ickes [e.g., 
2009, 2003]. Ickes describes empathic inference as the everyday mindreading that people 
do when attempting to determine others’ thoughts and feelings [2009: 57]. It involves 
coming to have new beliefs and feelings about someone’s attitudes based on our 
perception of the other person and our prior set of attitudes. Our prior set may include 
beliefs about the following sorts of things: the other person, the situation, the standard 
human response to this situation, and the object of the other’s mental states. These 
attitudes form an inferential base. By viewing the other’s attitudes and actions in light of 
our inferential base, we can come to feel and believe new things about the other’s 
response. Researchers also refer to this activity as “mentalizing.” To clarify, there is a 
way of understanding “empathic inference” and “mentalizing” such that it includes 
perspective-taking. I am not using the terms in this way. In this section “empathic 
inference” and “mentalizing” refer to ways in which we think and make inferences about 
others thoughts and feelings without taking up their perspectives. 
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Peter Goldie distinguishes two ways in which we think about others without 
taking their perspectives [2011, 2002, 2000].24 First, we can think about others in an 
impersonal way. In doing so we rely on a range of psychological norms, expectations, or 
folk theory regarding human beings in order to better understand and predict their 
attitudes. This theorizing does not draw on phenomenal concepts or what it is like to have 
such attitudes [2002: 248-49]. Second, we can think about others in a personal way. By 
‘personal’, Goldie means that we can think about others and their attitudes in terms of 
concepts that we have in virtue of subjective or first-personal experiences. For example, 
we can think about what it is like for someone to be afraid based on a personal familiarity 
with the phenomenology of fear [2002: 249]. Goldie claims that we can think about 
others in this way without imagining being them in their circumstances. He states,  
The neglected alternative [to empathy] is the possibility of seeing the other 
as another person, understanding and responding to him as having 
dispositions and attitudes perhaps deeply different from one’s own, whilst 
not theorizing about him as one might theorize over other kinds of things. 
The point of view is third-personal, but in no way impersonal [2011: 303, 
n.2]. 
Goldie’s point is that we come to have beliefs about others’ situations that depend on our 
own subjective experiences, these attitudes can help us to understand what others are 
going through, and we do not need to empathize in order to have these attitudes. For 
                                                
24 Goldie does not use the terms “empathic inference” or “mentalizing.” 
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example, I see a student who is crying while looking at an exam I just returned. I infer 
that the student is disappointed and I recognize how unpleasant it feels to be 
disappointed. My recognition depends on perceptual cues, my knowledge of the student, 
and my own personal experiences with disappointment. I do not need to imagine the 
situation from her standpoint in order to grasp the nature of what she is thinking and 
feeling.  
 Mentalizing or empathic inference is less demanding than empathy because it 
does not involve perspective-taking. Taking another’s perspective requires that we have 
familiarity with the other person and the relevant situation. We need to recognize her 
relevant beliefs, values, experiences, and dispositions insofar as they bear on the 
particular situation. We also need some sense of what it is like to be in that sort of 
situation. If we do not know these things, then we are going to struggle to reenact how 
she views the situation and how she thinks and feels about the situation. This is a 
demanding standard. We struggle to meet this standard in cases where we know little 
about the person or where the situation is unlike anything we have ever experienced. For 
example, most middle-class American children cannot even imagine what it is like to be a 
poor child scrounging for food in a war-ravaged city. The poor child’s situation is so 
different that it exceeds the children’s imaginative abilities. Of course empathic inference 
also benefits from greater familiarity with the other person or the situation. The more we 
know about the person or the situation, the more we can draw upon when trying to infer 
the nature of her thoughts and feelings. The difference, however, is that empathic 
inference does not require the familiarity. We are not trying to reenact the other’s 
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thoughts and feelings or how she views the situation, and so we do not need the 
familiarity in order to imaginatively recreate her perspective. As a result, inference is a 
resource that we can use in a wider range of cases. 
 This is not the only difference between the two sorts of phenomena. Empathy also 
involves an experiential feature that empathic inference lacks. When empathizing we 
experience an echo of how the other thinks and feels about a situation. This echo is an 
internal or first-personal subjective experience that resembles what the other undergoes in 
responding to the situation. As I argue below, this experience helps us to better appreciate 
her thoughts and feelings. Empathic inference, in contrast, does not involve perspective-
taking. As a result, although we might experience feelings about another’s response, 
those feelings are not a reenactment of how she thinks or feels. We do not experience 
how she responds to the situation given her perspective. In this way, inference and 
empathy do not have the same upshot when compared as resources for interpersonal 
understanding. 
8.  EMPATHY’S UPSHOT 
In the preceding sections I clarify how empathy is distinct from related 
phenomena. Empathy, I claim, is a process of other-oriented perspective-taking that 
enables us to imagine another’s view of a situation and experience an echo of their 
thoughts and feelings. When we experience these states we do not entirely identify with 
them; rather, we recognize that they resemble the other’s attitudes given their perspective 
on the situation. In this section I explain the upshot of empathy for interpersonal 
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understanding. I argue that the experience of resembling states helps us to appreciate 
others’ thoughts and feelings. In particular it helps us to appreciate how those thoughts 
and feelings are part of a meaningful response to a particular situation. It does so in 
roughly the following way: by reenacting how others think and feel about a situation, we 
come to better appreciate how another person views a situation, what she experiences in 
response to the situation, and how her thoughts and feelings are a rational response to 
specific features of the situation. 
 To begin, we must recognize that empathy involves more than just identifying the 
types of attitudes that others experience.25 Recognizing an attitude type is not the same as 
understanding how that attitude is meaningful.26 We can identify the attitude without 
appreciating why it makes sense for the person to have that attitude in response to the 
particular situation. For example, if I know that someone is afraid, but I do not know the 
object of her fear or I do not grasp what it is about the object that she finds frightening, 
then I do not appreciate how her fear represents a meaningful response to the particular 
situation.  I do not appreciate the reasons in virtue of which she responds with fear. 
Empathy, I argue, helps us to appreciate how another’s attitude is meaningful. When we 
take the other’s perspective we construe the situation as she sees it. This means that we 
come to see the object of her fear, in light of her beliefs and concerns, as dangerous. We 
also experience an echo of her fear of the object. By reenacting how she thinks and feels, 
                                                
25 I mention this because theorists sometimes describe empathy as simply a mechanism for attributing 
mental-state types [e.g., Bloom, 2014]. 
26 “Meaningful” here refers to the rational character of an attitude that reflects an agent’s responsiveness to 
reasons or what she takes to be reasons. 
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we can better appreciate how her attitude is a rational response to a specific feature or set 
of features in the situation.  
 Consider the following example to help clarify this point: My friend is reading the 
newspaper and becomes upset about one of the articles. Without taking his perspective, I 
can discern that he is angry just by looking at his facial expression. I can also assume—
based on the nature of anger—that he is angry because he found something offensive. 
Based on contextual features I can also infer that his anger is about something in the 
article. In this way, his attitude is intelligible to me. It makes sense for someone to get 
angry at offensive writing in a news article. However, because I do not see what is 
offensive in the article, I fail to grasp something about the particular nature of his 
thoughts and feelings. I do not appreciate what he finds offensive or how his feelings are 
(or are supposed to be) a rational response to specific features of the situation. One thing 
I can do to improve my understanding (in addition to talking with my friend) is to read 
the article as if from his perspective. Reading while imagining having his beliefs, values, 
and concerns can make salient new aspects of the article. It can draw my attention to 
features or qualities of those features that I may not see when reading from my original 
perspective. Attending to these features as offensive in light of my friend’s concerns 
allows me to reenact his thoughts and feelings. By reenacting the thoughts and feelings 
about those features, I come to better appreciate how my friend feels and how those 
feelings represent a rational response to the particular article. In short, empathizing with 
my friend helps me to understand what he is going through and why he feels the way that 
he does. 
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Expanding on this point, we can identify three related ways in which empathy 
helps us to understand the nature of others’ thoughts and feelings. First, empathizing 
helps us to see how another views the situation. When we take another’s perspective we 
imaginatively adopt the other’s position, beliefs, values, and concerns, and we view the 
situation in light of these psychological features. Because the other’s psychology differs 
from our own, viewing the situation from that perspective can change what is salient to us 
and it can change how we construe the evaluative significance of features of the situation. 
As a result, we may come to see things differently than how we initially saw them when 
we take up another’s perspective. For example, I hear a comedian tell an off-color joke 
that casually deals with issues of sexual harassment. I initially laugh at the joke because 
of its shock value and its use of a clever juxtaposition. My friend—who spends more time 
thinking about gender issues—does not laugh. He believes that sexual harassment is a 
serious social problem, and he thinks that it is not something about which male 
comedians should joke. As a result, he experiences anger because he views the joke as 
too casual and insensitive in its treatment of the topic. Suppose that I empathize with my 
friend and imaginatively adopt the sorts of concerns that shape his perspective. I will start 
to see the joke in a new light. The joke’s clever juxtaposition would lose salience, and its 
trivialization of the topic would gain salience. Viewing things in this way would help me 
to appreciate the situational features to which he is responding. 
Second, empathizing helps us to appreciate others’ thoughts and feeling by 
producing resembling states. When I take my friend’s perspective and construe the joke 
as offensive I experience an echo of my friend’s anger. Experiencing the echo provides a 
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vivid representation of what he feels. This representation involves an experiential element 
that is not present in just discerning that he is angry. The distinction is comparable to 
remembering that I was annoyed with a friend’s behavior versus imaginatively reliving 
the situation such that I feel the annoyance again. Having the experience provides an 
“enlivened” representation [Smith 1790/2002 I.i.2.2]. This enlivened representation helps 
me to appreciate what he is going through when he responds to the joke. Moreover, 
experiencing what he is going through can in turn impact how I view the situation. 
Emotion research indicates that being in affective states can cause us to construe features 
of a situation as having greater evaluative significance [Walton 1997]. For example, 
feeling jumpy after watching a horror movie makes us more disposed to see things as 
dangerous. The shadows on our walk home from the movie appear as hiding places for 
something scary. Because empathizing can cause us to experience affective states, 
empathizing can lead to an increase in the salience of features with evaluative 
significance. For example, I take the perspective of my friend who is angry. I focus on 
what he sees as offensive and I experience an echo of his anger. Experiencing this echo 
brings into sharper view how features of the situation appear offensive. My view of 
certain features as offensive becomes pronounced because I am experiencing a state 
resembling anger. Therefore, experiencing resembling states not only helps us to 
appreciate what another feels, it can also help us to appreciate how he sees evaluative 
contours of the situation such that he feels those things.  
Justin Steinberg makes a related point. He notes that we take in a substantial 
amount of information when we engage with the world as subjects. Though much of this 
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information is often not articulable or salient in higher-level conscious thinking, the 
information affects how we conceptualize and respond to the situation. He claims that 
because of the richness of the first-person subjective experience, we can lose a lot of 
information about how another person thinks and feels about a situation when we do not 
adopt a similar perspective. He states, “First-person perspectives contain so much 
compressed, sub-personal information that for all intents and purposes one might have to 
feel what it is like to grasp the whole perspective” [53]. This isn’t to claim that we need 
to grasp everything about an experience in order to understand someone’s thoughts and 
feelings. In many cases we might determine that we sufficiently understand another’s 
thoughts and feelings without the full breadth of this information. Instead, the point is 
that the way in which empathy provides understanding—by using our own imaginative 
and emotional machinery to acquaint us with the others’ thoughts and feelings—enables 
an extensive appreciation of those attitudes and how they relate to a particular view of the 
situation. Moreover, it provides this appreciation quickly, and thereby, it can help us in 
situations where we do not have much time and information with which to reflect, 
investigate, or theorize about the nature of the others’ experience.  
I’ve claimed so far that empathizing helps us to appreciate how others view a 
situation and how they think and feel about that situation. These two ways in which 
empathizing helps us to appreciate others’ attitudes give rise to a third. Empathizing helps 
us to appreciate how others experience their attitudes as a rational response to the 
situation. When we reenact how others think and feel about a situation, we experience an 
echo of their attitudes and that echo is about some feature of the situation construed as 
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having evaluative significance. In this way, we experience the echo as a rational response 
to the feature of the situation. The feature is presented as a reason to respond in a certain 
sort of way. For example, by empathizing with my angry friend, I experience an echo of 
his anger and that echo is about the inappropriateness of the joke. I thereby experience 
my resembling state as a rational response. It responds to the presentation of the joke as 
offensive for trivializing a sensitive subject. Moreover, experiencing this rational 
response disposes me to react in characteristic ways. Affective states are often 
motivating; they prime us to respond to the evaluative presentations of their objects. 
Therefore, experiencing an echo of my friend’s anger as about the offensiveness of the 
joke can affect my own motivational set within the bounds of the empathic process. It can 
prime me to respond to the joke in further ways that reflect one who is offended. The 
experience of this priming, in turn, helps me to better appreciate how my friend feels 
moved to respond to the situation. In this way, empathizing with my friend helps me to 
appreciate the complex nature of what he is going through. I experience how—given his 
view of things—his thoughts and feelings constitute a meaningful and fitting response to 
the situation.  
In short, empathizing involves using our own psychological machinery to reenact 
how others think and feel about situations that they view in particular ways. The 
experience of these reenactments helps us to appreciate the complex nature of others’ 
thoughts and feelings. For example, empathy helps us to appreciate how others view a 
situation, how they feel in response to the situation, and how that feeling represents a 
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meaningful response. I argue in the next chapter that this appreciation benefits us as 
moral agents. 
WORKS CITED 
Batson, C. Daniel. 2011. Altruism in Humans. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Battaly, Heather. 2011. “Is Empathy a Virtue.” In Empathy: Philosophical and 
Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bischof-Köhler, Doris. 2012. “Empathy and Self-Recognition in Phylogenetic and 
Ontogenetic Perspective.” Emotion Review 4 (1): 40–48. 
Bloom, Paul. 2014. “Against Empathy.” Boston Review, September 10. 
https://bostonreview.net/forum/paul-bloom-against-empathy. 
Coplan, Amy. 2011. “Understanding Empathy.” In Empathy: Philosophical and 
Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Darwall, Stephen. 1998. “Empathy, Sympathy, Care.” Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3): 
261–82. 
———. 2011. “Being With.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1): 4–24. 
Davies, Stephen. 2011. “Infectious Music: Music-Listener Emotional Contagion.” In 
Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan 
and Peter Goldie. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Decety, Jean, and Andrew N. Meltzoff. 2011. “Empathy, Imitation, and the Social 
Brain.” In Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, edited by 
Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Deigh, John. 1995. “Empathy and Universalizability.” Ethics 105 (4): 743–63. 
Eisenberg, Nancy, and Janet Strayer. 1987. “Critical Issues in the Study of Empathy.” In 
Empathy and Its Development. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Freedberg, David, and Vittorio Gallese. 2007. “Motion, Emotion and Empathy in Esthetic 
Experience.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (5): 197–203. 
 51 
Goldie, Peter. 2000. The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
———. 2002. “Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality.” Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences 1 (3): 235–54. 
———. 2011. “Anti-Empathy.” In Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological 
Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Goldman, Alvin. 2006. Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and 
Neuroscience of Mindreading. New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2011. “Two Routes to Empathy.” In Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological 
Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hatfield, Elaine, John T. Cacioppo, and Richard L. Rapson. 1994. Emotional Contagion. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hoffman, Martin L. 2000. Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring 
and Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2011. “Empathy, Justice, and the Law.” In Empathy: Philosophical and 
Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hume, David. 2000. A Treatise of Human Nature. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hutto, Daniel D. 2008. “The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Clarifications and 
Implications.” Philosophical Explorations 11 (3): 175–92. 
Iacoboni, Marco. 2011. “Within Each Other.” In Empathy: Philosophical and 
Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Ickes, William. 2009. “Empathic Accuracy: Its Links to Clinical, Cognitive, 
Developmental, Social, and Physiological Psychology.” In The Social 
Neuroscience of Empathy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Ickes, William, and Elliot Aronson. 2003. Everyday Mind Reading: Understanding What 
Other People Think and Feel. 1st Edition. Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books. 
 52 
Jackson, Philip L., Eric Brunet, Andrew N. Meltzoff, and Jean Decety. 2006. “Empathy 
Examined through the Neural Mechanisms Involved in Imagining How I Feel 
versus How You Feel Pain.” Neuropsychologia 44 (5): 752–61.  
Kennett, Jeanette. 2002. “Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency.” The Philosophical 
Quarterly 52 (208): 340–57. 
Maibom, Heidi. 2009. “Feeling for Others: Empathy, Sympathy, and Morality.” Inquiry 
52 (5): 483–99. 
———. 2010. “Imagining Others.” Les Ateliers de l’Éthique / the Ethics Forum 5 (1): 
34–49. 
———. 2014. “Introduction: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Empathy.” In 
Empathy and Morality, edited by Heidi Maibom. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Morton, Adam. 2011. “Empathy for the Devil.” In Empathy: Philosophical and 
Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Preston, Stephanie, and Alicia J. Hofelich. 2012. “The Many Faces of Empathy: Parsing 
Empathic Phenomena Through a Proximate, Dynamic-Systems View 
Representing the Other in the Self.” Emotion Review 4 (1): 24–33. 
Prinz, Jesse. 2011a. “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality.” In Empathy: Philosophical 
and Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2011b. “Against Empathy.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1): 214–33. 
Ravenscroft, Ian. 2010. “Folk Psychology as a Theory.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2010. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/folkpsych-theory/. 
Ruby, Perrine, and Jean Decety. 2004. “How Would You Feel versus How Do You Think 
She Would Feel? A Neuroimaging Study of Perspective-Taking with Social 
Emotions.” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16 (6): 988–99. 
Scheler, Max. 1954. The Nature of Sympathy. Edited by P. Heath. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Press. 
Snow, Nancy E. 2000. “Empathy.” American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1): 65–78. 
 53 
Sober, Elliott, and David Sloan Wilson. 1998. Unto Others: The Evolution and 
Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Steinberg, Justin. 2014. “An Epistemic Case for Empathy.” Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 95 (1): 47–71. 
Stueber, Karsten. 2006. Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psycholgy, and the 
Human Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
———. 2014. “Empathy.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by 
Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/empathy/. 
Vignemont, Frederique De, and Tania Singer. 2006. “The Empathic Brain: How, When 
and Why?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (10): 435–41. 
Walton, Kendall. 1997. “Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime.” In Emotion and the Arts, 
edited by Sue Laver and Mette Hjort. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Wispé, Lauren. 1987. “History of the Concept of Empathy.” In Empathy and Its 
Development, edited by Nancy Eisenberg and Janet Strayer. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press. 




Chapter 2: Empathy and the Reactive Attitudes 
In the previous chapter I examine the nature of empathy as a resource for 
interpersonal understanding. I show that empathy helps us to appreciate the complex 
nature of others’ thoughts and feelings. In particular it helps us to appreciate how their 
attitudes represent a meaningful response to a specific situation. This account, however, 
does not yet show that empathy benefits us as moral agents. In this chapter I begin to 
develop this part of the account. Using the reactive attitudes as a proxy for judgments of 
moral worth, I show that empathy helps us to make and correct judgments about the 
worth of someone’s conduct and to recognize others’ judgments about moral worth. The 
appreciation it provides of others’ thoughts and feelings makes possible a more 
sophisticated participation in the moral community.  
1.  INTRODUCTION 
P.F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” is one of the landmark essays in 20th 
century moral philosophy. One of the highlights of the essay is how it draws attention to 
the role of affective states in moral life. Strawson argues that we naturally respond to 
displays of interpersonal regard with attitudes such as gratitude, approbation, and love, 
and we react to a lack of regard with resentment, indignation, and guilt. He refers to these 
sorts of responses as the “reactive attitudes.” The reactive attitudes, he claims, are a 
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“complicated web of attitudes and feelings which form an essential part of the moral life 
as a we know it” [1993: 64]. They are ‘part of the moral life as we know it’ because they 
structure the way in which we participate in interpersonal relationships. As participants in 
these relationships, we expect and demand that people express sufficient regard and 
goodwill when they interact with one another. When we discern that someone meets or 
fails to meet these expectations, we are liable to experience the reactive attitudes. Our 
attitudes rest on, reflect, or constitute appraisals of the quality of will with which the 
person interacts. They are intimately bound up in our activities of praising and blaming 
and in making judgments about the worth of someone’s conduct.  
Not everyone is as confident as Strawson that the reactive attitudes—particularly 
the negative reactive attitudes—are a constructive or essential part of moral life.27 
However, even if one is doubtful about the value of the reactive attitudes, one cannot 
deny that the reactive attitudes characterize the way in which we normally experience 
moral life. Most of us cannot avoid responding to displays of concern with reactive 
attitudes of approval or reacting to displays of malice with disapproval. Similarly, most 
of us cannot turn off our sensitivity to others’ reactive attitudes. We are sensitive to 
others’ reactive attitudes because we care about how others think and feel. This 
prevalence is one reason why I examine the benefits of empathy in terms of the reactive 
attitudes. I wish to illustrate how empathy supports moral judgment in one of its 
widespread, everyday forms. 
                                                
27 For example, Watson [2004] raises skeptical concerns regarding the necessity of the ‘retributive 
sentiments’ for holding one another accountable. He identifies Gandhi and King as exemplars of moral 
virtue that combat oppression without expressing malice or vindictiveness [257-58].  
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There are three additional reasons to focus on the reactive attitudes. First, 
empathy is thought of as a phenomenon that deals primarily with the affective side of 
human experience. It makes sense, therefore, to begin assessing its role in moral life by 
looking at how it deals with an affective dimension of moral life. Second, much of the 
research on empathy and morality focuses on whether empathy helps agents to determine 
if an action would violate a harm norm or moral principle [e.g., Masto 2015, Prinz 2011b, 
Maibom 2010, Snow 2000]. Although these sorts of judgments about right and wrong 
and what one ought to do are a crucial part of moral life, we also expect mature moral 
agents to make and recognize sophisticated judgments about motives and the moral worth 
of attitudes and actions. We expect them to assess the quality of agents’ thoughts and 
feelings, and to determine how those thoughts and feelings contribute to the moral quality 
of agents’ conduct. Therefore, because these judgments are a significant part of moral life 
and they are connected to the reactive attitudes, it is worth examining whether empathy is 
a resource that helps us in our dealings with the reactive attitudes. Finally, Prinz, who 
denies that empathy is a valuable resource for moral agents, defends a sentimentalist 
account of moral judgment [2011a]. By showing that empathy supports our dealings with 
affective states such as the reactive attitudes, I can show that empathy is a resource that 
helps us to deal with the kind of states in terms of which he understands moral judgment.  
In this essay I identify three ways in which empathy supports our dealings with 
the reactive attitudes. Empathy helps us to appreciate how others’ conduct expresses ill 
will, goodwill, or indifferent disregard towards another person. This appreciation, in turn, 
helps us to have appropriate reactive attitudes that respond to the moral worth of others’ 
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conduct. In a similar way, empathy helps us to disqualify and dispel reactive attitudes that 
are inappropriate while affirming and sustaining attitudes that are appropriate. Finally, 
empathy helps us to appreciate and be moved by others’ reactive attitudes. Put otherwise, 
if we take the reactive attitudes as a proxy for judgments of moral worth, then empathy 
benefits us as moral agents by helping us to make and correct judgments about moral 
worth and to recognize others’ judgments about moral worth. 
2.  THE REACTIVE ATTITUDES 
In “Freedom and Resentment” Strawson never provides a precise definition of the 
reactive attitudes. He claims that his argument rests on ideas that are familiar from 
everyday understanding. He states, “my language, like that of commonplace generally, 
will be quite unscientific and imprecise” [48]. In this chapter I follow Strawson and do 
not offer a precise definition of the reactive attitudes. My goal is to show that empathy 
supports our dealings with the reactive attitudes, and I can do this without providing a 
theory-laden account. Nevertheless, I will provide a general characterization of the 
reactive attitudes in order to bring the phenomenon into the foreground.28 
The reactive attitudes are responses we have to the quality of agent’s attitudes and 
actions. We experience a reactive attitude when we discern that someone in her conduct 
is displaying or failing to display concern, regard, or goodwill for another [49]. Strawson 
identifies two sorts of other-directed reactive attitudes [57]. The personal reactive 
                                                
28 I am not taking a position in the debates over the nature of the reactive attitudes or how those attitudes 
constitute the ground of moral responsibility. For examples of work discussing these issues, see 
Macnamara 2015, 2011, Deigh 2011, Wallace 2011, 1993, Darwall 2006, Watson 2004, and Bennett 1980. 
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attitudes arise when we discern that someone is expressing ill will, a lack of regard, or 
goodwill towards us. For example, if someone publicly insults us in order to cause us 
pain, we resent his doing so. If our neighbor closes the garage door that we accidently left 
open in order to save us from theft, then we appreciate her help and feel gratitude towards 
her. In comparison, the vicarious reactive attitudes arise when we register someone 
displaying ill will, lack of regard, or goodwill towards another person. If we hear about a 
colleague callously making insensitive comments to a vulnerable student, we experience 
indignation in response to our colleague’s lack of concern. If we hear about a child 
courageously defending a peer from bullying, we feel approbation for the considerate 
child. We also have reactive attitudes in response to our own attitudes and actions. The 
self-reactive attitudes arise when we recognize that our own conduct meets or fails to 
meet the expectations about regard or goodwill we have for others. If I realize that I have 
thoughtlessly hurt my brother by disparaging his career choices, then I feel guilt or 
remorse for what I’ve done. Conversely, if I generously help a disadvantaged 
acquaintance secure social aid, then I feel pride about my altruistic behavior. 
Our reactive attitudes are involved in judgments of moral worth. When we are 
indignant we disapprove of someone displaying ill will or disregard for another. Our 
attitude indicates a condemnation and withdrawal of esteem. It communicates an 
attribution of blame to the person.29 When we feel approbation for someone we approve 
                                                
29 It is beyond the scope of my project to determine the precise nature of the relationship between our 
reactive attitudes and our appraisals of someone as worthy of blame or praise. My argument is consistent 
with a variety of accounts of this relationship. What is important—for my project—is that our reactive 
attitudes are intricately bound up in our practices of blaming and praising one another. This is not to claim 
that all blaming and praising involves reactive attitudes or that blaming and praising always involves an 
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of her exhibiting interpersonal concern. Our attitude indicates an endorsement and giving 
of esteem. It communicates an attribution of praise. When we praise or blame someone 
for her attitudes and actions, and our appraisals involve the reactive attitudes, we are 
responding to her as one with whom we participate in an interpersonal relationship. We 
view her as subject to the demands and expectations about showing regard when relating 
to others, and we treat her as responsible for meeting these demands and expectations. 
Our reaction to how someone meets these demands is at the heart of what it is to 
participate in interpersonal relationships. As Strawson observes, “being involved in 
interpersonal relationships as we normally understand them precisely is being exposed to 
the range of reactive attitudes and feelings that is in question” [54].30 Not all of our 
reactive attitudes or interpersonal relationships are necessarily best characterized in moral 
terms. We participate in various kinds of interpersonal relationships, and the differences 
in these relationships affect how we react to others’ attitudes and actions [49]. 
Nevertheless, one kind of relationship in which we participate is the relationship between 
members of the moral community. We demand and expect moral agents to treat one 
another with certain levels of respect and concern. When agents meet or fail to meet these 
expectations we experience reactive attitudes and these attitudes are involved in 
judgments of moral worth. Jonathan Bennett eloquently puts the point as follows: 
                                                                                                                                            
affective dimension; rather the claim is that when activities of blaming and praising occur in moral life our 
reactive attitudes are often present and they are connected to the blaming and praising in a relevant sense.   
30 In this essay—as in Strawson’s—the notions of ‘participation’ and ‘interpersonal relationship’ do not 
pick out finely delineated phenomena. They only gesture at a familiar yet imprecise aspect of everyday life.  
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When we regret an action, we may blame the agent for it, resent his doing 
it, hold it against him, find fault with him, speak of or to him in a manner 
which is censorious or vilifying or abusive, seek revenge, demand 
punishment. These responses are all related to blame—not as a faulty 
compass may be blamed for an accident, but in the stronger sense in which 
the object of blame must be believed to be personal, and the attribution of 
blame is a censure or reproach, which could naturally carry with it 
thoughts about moral unworthiness. When we welcome an action, we may 
respond with praise, admiration, gratitude, thoughts of reward, or the like. 
These responses can be thought of as praise-related—not as one might 
praise a fine physique or beautiful hair, but rather as one might accompany 
praise with thoughts of moral worth [1980: 14-15].  
We do not exclusively relate to others in the interpersonal manner characteristic 
of the reactive attitudes—what is sometimes called the “participant stance” [e.g., 
Macnamara 2011: 82]. Sometimes we step back from treating people as participants in 
interpersonal relationships, and we adopt an objective stance towards those persons 
[Strawson 1993: 53]. Strawson states, “we can have direct dealings with human beings 
without any degree of personal involvement, treating them simply as creatures to be 
handled in our own interests, or our side’s, or society’s—or even theirs” [54]. When we 
step back we change how we react to others’ conduct. We no longer view others as 
participants who are personally responsible for displaying regard for others. Because we 
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no longer view them in this way, we no longer react with attitudes that are premised on 
personal displays of regard. Moreover, if we are experiencing the reactive attitudes, 
taking up objective attitudes can cause our reactive attitudes to dissipate [52]. Strawson 
distinguishes objective attitudes by stating, 
The objective attitude may be emotionally toned in many ways, but not in 
all ways: it may include repulsion or fear, it may include pity or even love, 
though not all kinds of love. But it cannot include the range of reactive 
feelings and attitudes which belong to involvement or participation with 
others in inter-personal human relationships; it cannot include resentment, 
gratitude, forgiveness, anger, or the sort of love which two adults can 
sometimes be said to feel reciprocally, for each other [52]. 
It is worth further clarifying several things about the reactive attitudes. First, not 
all reactive attitudes are moral in character. We can experience gratitude when someone 
helps us to perform a devious action without our gratitude being accompanied by 
thoughts of moral worth. In these cases our attitude is not involved in an evaluation of the 
other as morally praiseworthy.31 In this essay I am only focusing on reactive attitudes as 
they occur in instances of moral judgment.  
Second, I am not claiming that we have an imperative to experience reactive 
attitudes in particular cases. For example, Strawson never argues that we ought to 
                                                
31 John Deigh makes this point while criticizing how Wallace and Darwall appeal to the reactive attitudes 
in their accounts of moral responsibility [2011]. He suggests that even more prototypical moral attitudes 
such as indignation, resentment, or guilt are not always or necessarily moral in character. 
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experience resentment in particular cases in which someone is worthy of blame. Instead, 
he only indicates that we have a negative imperative: we ought not to experience reactive 
attitudes when they are inappropriate. For example, we ought not to experience 
approbation if someone expresses indifferent disregard in his actions. Bennett puts the 
point as follows: 
Consider the proposition that someone ‘is blameworthy’. Strawson has a 
sense for this if it means that it would not be wrong to blame the person, 
but not if it means that it would be wrong not to blame him…Strawson’s 
account has nothing like this—no imperatives demanding indignation or 
any other reactive feeling, but only imperatives forbidding them in certain 
areas, and permissions to have them in the remaining areas [1980: 24]. 
There are two sorts of occasions in which our reactive attitudes are inappropriate. 
The first occurs when the targets of our attitudes do not fully participate (at least not 
without significant qualification) in interpersonal relationships. They do not fully 
participate because they lack relevant psychological capacities or development [e.g., 
young children]. We do not treat such individuals as fully responsible for displaying 
regard because of their condition. Because they are exempt from our demands and 
expectations to display regard, they are inappropriate targets for the reactive attitudes 
[Strawson 1993: 52].32 The second sort of occasion occurs when the targets of our 
                                                
32 These conditions are the grounds for what Watson calls “type-2” pleas. Such pleas attempt to show that, 
as Watson states, “the agent, temporarily or permanently, globally or locally, is appropriately exempted 
from the basic demand in the first place…they present the other either as acting uncharacteristically due to 
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attitudes do fully participate in interpersonal relationships and we would normally hold 
them accountable. Despite being the right kind of targets for the reactive attitudes, our 
attitudes are inappropriate on these occasions because there is some feature of the 
situation that excuses the agents for causing benefit or harm.33 Strawson describes such 
cases as follows: 
To [this] group belong all those which might give occasion for the 
employment of such expressions as ‘He didn’t mean to’, ‘He hadn’t 
realized’, ‘He didn’t know’; and also all those which might give occasion 
for the use of the phrase ‘He couldn’t help it’, when this is supported by 
such phrases as ‘He was pushed’, ‘He had to do it’, ‘It was the only way’, 
‘They left him no alternative’, etc…They do not invite us to view the 
agent as one in respect of whom these attitudes are in any way 
inappropriate. They invite us to view the injury as one in respect of which 
a particular one of these attitudes is inappropriate. They do not invite us to 
see the agent as other than a fully responsible agent. They invite us to see 
the injury as one for which he was not fully, or at all, responsible [1993: 
51]. 
                                                                                                                                            
extraordinary circumstances, or as psychologically abnormal or morally undeveloped in such a way as to be 
incapacitated in some or all respects for ‘ordinary adult interpersonal relationships’” [Watson 2004: 224]. 
33 These sorts of conditions are the grounds for what Watson calls “type-1” pleas. Such pleas attempt to 
indicate that despite appearances the agent did not actually fail to meet the basic demand or expectation to 
express regard and goodwill. 
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In short, I am suggesting we assume that for particular cases there is no 
imperative to have a reactive attitude. There is only a negative imperative to not have 
inappropriate attitudes. However, the absence of a positive imperative in particular cases 
is consistent with there being a more general imperative. There might be an imperative to 
at least sometimes have appropriate reactive attitudes. Similarly, perhaps there is an 
imperative that we make ourselves sensitive to others’ reactive attitudes. We would then 
merit criticism if we do not at least sometimes experience appropriate reactive attitudes 
and register others’ reactive attitudes. Put otherwise, if we look at particular cases in 
isolation, then we won’t identify an imperative that indicates that we ought to have or 
register a reactive attitude in that case. However, if we step back and look at moral life 
more broadly, then we find that there appears to be something resembling a general 
imperative to be agents who are liable to experience appropriate reactive attitudes and 
register others’ reactive attitudes. 
Two considerations support this idea. The first is that such an imperative is not 
particularly demanding nor would it change how many of us live our lives. As Strawson 
observes, we cannot altogether stop experiencing or registering the reactive attitudes even 
if we wanted to. Doing so would require us to stop participating in interpersonal 
relationships such that we stop being sensitive to the goodwill or ill will of others. He 
claims, however, that our commitment to these relationships is so thoroughly and deeply 
rooted that this option appears psychologically impossible [55-57].34 Second, some of our 
                                                
34 Even in cases where one pursues an ideal of human relationships that eschews the retributive reactive 
attitudes (e.g. King and Gandhi [Watson 2004: 257-58]) one is never completely rid of reactive attitudes. 
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relationships are such that participation is obligatory. For example, in most cases parents 
cannot justifiably stop interacting as parents with their children. Similarly, we cannot 
permissibly quit being moral agents and stop participating in the interpersonal 
relationships that make up the moral community. We cannot permissibly stop caring 
about whether our actions harm others or display sufficient regard, just as we cannot 
permissibly stop caring about whether someone else is doing harm or displaying regard. 
But if we cannot permissibly quit participating in the moral community and we cannot 
permissibly stop caring about whether people show sufficient regard for one another, then 
we cannot permissibly prevent ourselves from being liable to experience or register the 
reactive attitudes.35 This seems plausible if we consider things in the context of moral 
judgment. If someone never responded to displays of ill will with reactive attitudes 
related to disapproval, or one never took note of others’ reactive attitudes related to praise 
and approval, then it would be hard to view that person as adequately participating in the 
interpersonal relations that are at the heart of moral life. They would be unresponsive to 
the sorts of things to which a moral agent ought to react. Their unresponsiveness would 
suggest a failure to internalize the values at the core of morality.36 
                                                                                                                                            
Instead, one must continually struggle to suppress and regulate such attitudes while leaving space for pro-
social sentiments such as gratitude, forgiveness, and reciprocal love.  
35 Note that this is consistent with the position that we should try to limit our experiences and expressions 
of the negative reactive attitudes. 
36 R. Jay Wallace makes a related point while arguing that blame involves a reactive emotion. He suggests 
that blame involves an emotional response because emotional response reflects a commitment to an 
internalized set of values. He claims, “To blame someone is a way of caring about the fact that they have 
treated others with contempt or disregard; when you experience indignation, resentment, or guilt, you are 
not merely left cold by the immoral attitudes that form the object of blame, but find that those attitudes 
engage your interest and attention…blame reflects our internalization of the values at the heart of 
morality…” [2011: 367]. If one never responded emotionally, then we would find it difficult to describe 
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One final clarification about the reactive attitudes is that they come in degrees of 
intensity. We can be more or less indignant in response to conduct displaying contempt. 
We can experience greater or weaker feelings of approbation in response to other’s 
generosity. This variability in intensity is structurally similar to the variability of regard 
displayed in people’s conduct. Attributions of praise and blame—on the part of mature 
moral judges—are appropriate insofar as they are sensitive to such degrees. In a similar 
way the appropriateness of our reactive attitudes depends in part on the relation between 
their intensity and the degree of regard and goodness/badness displayed in someone’s 
conduct. 
3.  EMPATHY AND JUDGMENTS OF MORAL WORTH 
In a pair of recent papers Jesse Prinz calls into question whether empathy is a 
valuable resource for moral agents. He claims, “Empathy is a thick concept, and it 
connotes praise. But an endorsement of empathy requires more than a warm fuzzy 
feeling. We need an argument for why empathy is valuable in the moral domain” [2011b: 
214-15]. In this section I provide the beginnings of an argument. I show how empathy 
supports our efforts at making, correcting, and recognizing judgments of moral worth by 
helping us in our dealings with the reactive attitudes. Empathizing helps us to have 
appropriate reactive attitudes in response to the moral worth of others’ conduct, and it 
helps us to register and appreciate the moral appraisal represented in others’ reactive 
attitudes. Because the reactive attitudes partially structure our interpersonal relationships, 
                                                                                                                                            
that person as having internalized the values (e.g., concern for goodwill) that come with a commitment to 
participating in the moral community. 
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the support that empathy provides can improve our participation in those relationships 
and make possible a more sophisticated participation in the moral community.37  
To begin, it is worth highlighting how others’ thoughts and feelings make a 
difference when it comes to judgments of moral worth. The quality of an agent’s conduct 
often depends partially on the nature of the agent’s thoughts and feelings. For example, 
we approve of someone offering criticism when it is intended to help students, but we 
would disapprove of someone offering similar feedback if it were done condescendingly 
or if it were intended to put students down. We find it morally worse if a friend insults 
someone out of malice than if a friend causes the same insult inadvertently. If we aim to 
make sound judgments—judgments that are based on and respond to the morally relevant 
features of the other’s conduct—then we often need to understand the nature of others’ 
thoughts and feelings. We need to grasp how a person thinks and feels about a situation 
and how she takes herself to be interacting with others in that situation. In much the same 
way, if we want to understand what others’ judgments indicate as worthy of praise or 
blame, then we need to understand how others are thinking and feeling about an agent 
and that agent’s conduct.  
As I argue in the previous chapter, understanding the nature of others’ thoughts 
and feelings often involves more than just identifying the types of mental states or the 
                                                
37 It is worth clarifying that this position is consistent with the following two possibilities: 1) not all 
experiences of the reactive attitudes involve empathizing, and 2) not all moral judgments involve the 
reactive attitudes. My position only requires that a subset of our judgments of moral worth intricately 
involve reactive attitudes (or other evaluative attitudes) and empathy supports our dealings with some of 
those attitudes. The size of the subset, however, needs to be large enough such that if a person is blind to or 
disengaged from participating in the relevant subset of judgments, then she is disconnected from an 
important aspect of moral life. I discuss this issue in greater detail below and in Chapter 4.  
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objects of the mental states they are experiencing. To understand the nature of their 
thoughts and feelings we need to appreciate how they see or construe an object such that 
they respond to the situation in the way that they do. For example, in order to fully 
appreciate my friend’s anger about an off-color joke, I need to appreciate what it is about 
the joke that he sees as offensive. By coming to recognize what it is about the joke that he 
sees as offensive, I can better appreciate how he thinks and feels and why he has those 
thoughts and feelings about this particular joke. In this way a better understanding of 
others’ thoughts and feelings can require that we grasp their point of view. We may need 
to appreciate how their thoughts and feelings are related to a view of the situation that is 
shaped by such things as their concerns, values, and beliefs.  
Empathy, I argue in Chapter 1, is a resource that helps us to do just this. It is a 
process in which we imaginatively take up others’ perspectives such that we see a 
situation in a similar way and reenact their thoughts and feelings about that situation. 
This process helps us to appreciate how they are thinking and feeling and why they have 
those attitudes about the particular situation. Empathy is not the only resource we can use 
for interpersonal understanding, but it differs from the other resources in important 
respects. For example, empathy differs from bottom-up processes such as emotional 
contagion insofar as it is something that we can consciously choose to do. It is also unlike 
other imaginative processes insofar as empathy is oriented around taking up the other 
person’s perspective. In virtue of this it helps us to better appreciate how the other person 
sees the situation such that she has particular thoughts and feelings about the situation. It 
is not, for example, about how we would think and feel if in similar circumstances (i.e., 
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self-oriented perspective-taking). Moreover, empathy is unlike inferential processes 
insofar as it produces states that resemble the others’ thoughts and feelings about the 
situation. The experience of these states quickly provides a rich representation of what 
the other person is going through in virtue of seeing the situation in a particular way.  
These differences are important given the challenges that we sometimes face in 
understanding the nature of others’ thoughts and feelings. Social situations can involve 
layers of complexity, and agents can respond to those situations in subtle, idiosyncratic 
ways. Moreover, we each have our own sets of beliefs, concerns, and expectations that 
shape the way in which we view social situations, and these views can differ significantly 
from those with whom we interact. Understanding others’ thoughts and feelings, 
therefore, can require that we come to appreciate alternative ways of viewing a situation. 
This is not always easy or effortless, sometimes it requires deliberately considering how 
and why others might view the world differently. Further complicating things is that in 
many cases we do not have limitless time with which to investigate how others’ see the 
situation and sometimes it is not feasible or appropriate to ask agents about the nature of 
their thoughts and feelings. Given these challenges, it is sometimes an open question how 
others view a situation and what is the nature of their thoughts and feelings. Empathy 
better equips us to answer such questions. It uses our imaginative abilities to entertain 
alterative views of the situation, and it uses our own emotional machinery to provide a 
reenactment of how other people feel given their view of the situation. In this way, 
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empathy is a resource that provides a rich appreciation of others’ mental life, and it can 
do so on the fly within an unfolding social situation.38   
To see how this is valuable, consider the recent tension between law enforcement 
and supporters of the Black Lives Matter movement (BLM). Supporters of BLM point to 
police shootings as examples of unwarranted brutality that are part of a systemic violence 
against the black community. They see these incidents as signifying a callous disregard 
by police for the value of black lives. In contrast, the police officers and those defending 
their conduct argue that the shootings are the unfortunate consequence of officers 
defending law and order in the face of great danger. They claim that the shootings do not 
occur because of a disregard for the value of black lives, but rather they occur because 
officers face an impossible situation in which they are forced to make rapid decisions 
about the threat posed by dangerous-looking suspects to the wellbeing of themselves and 
innocent by-standers. Each group is indignant and believes that the members of the 
                                                
38 In this way empathy resembles a psychological resource such as episodic memory. Episodic memory is 
an expedient way to provide a robust representation of how we were thinking and feeling on a particular 
occasion. For example, if I want to know why I treated a friend gruffly a few weeks ago, then I will replay 
the experience in memory in order to relive how I was thinking and feeling about my friend such that I 
responded as I did. This experiential process is quick way to gain insight into the nature of my anger and 
my subsequent conduct. There are other resources I could also use to gain understanding. In many cases we 
know certain facts about our previous experiences, and on the basis of this knowledge we can infer 
something about the nature of our thoughts and feelings. However, because of the richness of our subject 
experiences, it is often difficult to access and consider many of the rich, qualitative details about those 
experiences just by way of semantic memory. We can see this exemplified by people who lack episodic 
memory, a condition called “severely deficient autobiographical memory” [For a fascinating account of 
someone with such a condition, see the story of Susie Mackinnon: http://www.wired.com/2016/04/susie-
mckinnon-autobiographical-memory-sdam/]. These individuals memorize and record detailed facts about 
their previous states, and they can draw on these facts in order to correctly determine aspects of their 
previous experiences. However, their understanding about their previous experiences is greatly 
impoverished. They often cannot recount significant details about their experiences, and their only way to 
improve their understanding about previous thoughts and feelings is to rely on external resources such as 
others’ testimony, detailed notes, or video evidence. Their inability to draw on episodic memory deprives 
them of a valuable resource that the rest of us use to improve our understanding about our own mental 
lives.  
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opposing group fail to appreciate what they are going through. For example, the 
supporters of BLM engage in protests, in part, because they believe that the police and 
society at large fail to appreciate how the black community feels targeted and threatened 
by law enforcement. The police and their supporters, in contrast, complain that the 
supporters of BLM fail to appreciate the difficulty and dangers of police work. They feel 
that the BLM protests show disrespect for those who have made sacrifices and been 
harmed in the line of duty. 
The growing tension between the members of the two groups detracts from the 
quality of their interpersonal relationships. It has led to a withdrawal of goodwill, feelings 
of hostility, and acts of physical violence. Moreover, the tension not only impacts 
members of each group. Other people are drawn into discussions about the merits and 
demerits of each group’s conduct, some people have property damaged in protests, and 
some people have friends arrested by police. These people thereby also have personal 
interactions that are affected by the general situation. The situation is complicated, and it 
gives rise to deep convictions and strong emotional responses. Many people feel 
resentment and indignation about others’ conduct while feeling that their own conduct 
and point of view is not being understood or judged appropriately. In short, the 
complexity and tenor of the situation has made it difficult for people to appreciate and 
evaluate what one another are going through. Empathy can help to provide interpersonal 
understanding in these sorts of situations, and it does so in such a way that supports our 
dealings with the reactive attitudes. We can identify three related ways in which empathy 
supports our dealings with the reactive attitudes.   
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3.1  The Support of Empathy: The First Way  
The first way in which empathy supports our dealings with the reactive attitudes 
is that it helps us to appreciate how someone’s conduct displays regard or a lack of regard 
for others, and this appreciation, in turn, helps us to have appropriate reactive attitudes 
about the moral worth of that conduct. When we empathize with another person we 
reenact how she views a situation and how she feels about features of that situation. If her 
response to the situation involves negative sentiments for another such as feelings of ill 
will, contempt, or malice, then empathizing would produce an echo of these sentiments as 
part of a resembling response. We would come to experience similar thoughts and 
feelings about the person who is the object of her conduct. Similarly, if her conduct 
involves positive sentiments such as affection, love, or protectiveness, then we would 
view another person in a similarly positive light and feel an echo of these sentiments. 
Reenacting her experience would help us to better appreciate how she regards another 
person and how her conduct exhibits that regard.  
For example, while walking on campus, I see several colleagues and students 
participating in a lively protest in front of the campus police department. The protesters 
are waving signs and shouting slogans familiar from the BLM. The police in response 
have lined up officers between the protesters and the department building. The presence 
of the officers, however, has incited greater passion in the protesters. I see several 
colleagues start to shout protest slogans in the direction of the officers nearest to them. 
Their shouting sounds accusatory, and it initially makes me feel uncomfortable. Struck by 
my colleagues’ lack of civility towards another person, I consider what they are thinking 
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and feeling. On this occasion I take up their perspectives and in doing so I come to view 
the situation in light of their concerns about the treatment of black lives by law 
enforcement. I also imagine being in the midst of those protesters in a state of emotional 
arousal. Viewing the situation in this way helps me to appreciate how their antisocial 
conduct towards the officers is not about any personal offense done to them by the 
officers. Nor does it express any personal ill will or malice felt for those officers in 
particular. Instead their indignation is about the harm caused by the institution and the 
fact that nothing is being done about that harm. They direct their indignation towards the 
individuals because the officers are convenient representatives of that institution.  
Empathizing with my colleagues helps me to appreciate what they are thinking 
and feeling in such a way that I do not experience indignation. I recognize that their 
conduct issues from a place of concern for the wellbeing of others, and that the emotional 
intensity and tenor of their shouting is influenced by the intensity and tenor of the larger 
protest. I excuse them for the antisocial character of their conduct. Suppose that this is a 
sound judgment. We can compare my reaction in this case to a similar case in which I see 
a protestor, a student of mine, exhibiting a more agitated behavior. In addition to chanting 
slogans, he levies personal insults and even throws a water bottle at the officers. The 
student, similar to my colleagues, is concerned about the wellbeing of the black 
community and he is caught up in the emotional fervor of the protesting crowd. However, 
unlike my colleagues, his agitation boils over into personal attacks. By empathizing with 
my student, I come to appreciate how he has the officers in view such that he responds as 
he does. I appreciate how his conduct displays contempt and ill will for the officers. In 
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virtue of this appreciation I come to experience indignation about the poor moral quality 
of his conduct. My indignation, however, is somewhat mitigated by his concern for others 
and his being affected by a mob mentality. These cases illustrate the way in which 
empathy can help us to navigate psychologically complex social situations. Empathy 
brings into focus how others view a situation given their particular perspective and the 
thoughts and feelings they have about that situation. This helps us to better appreciate the 
nature of their thoughts and feelings such that we discern the regard or lack of regard 
expressed in their conduct. This appreciation, in turn, helps us to respond appropriately to 
the moral worth of the conduct.  
The experiential character involved in empathizing makes empathy 
psychologically potent as a trigger for the reactive attitudes. Consider the psychological 
difference between hearing a brief factual account of someone maliciously causing harm 
and witnessing that malicious response first hand. In both cases we can discern that the 
agent expresses ill will in her response. In the latter case, however, the other’s 
maliciousness is presented to us in a qualitatively different way. It is as if we see and feel 
the other’s disregard as an evaluative feature of the situation. This subjective, experiential 
component makes us more liable to experience the reactive attitudes. In a similar way, 
when we empathize with someone responding maliciously, we experience an echo of her 
negative sentiment in our reenactment. Experiencing this echo causes us to have a rich 
representation of the character of the other’s thoughts and feelings. We come to 
appreciate how her thoughts and feelings involve an anti-social quality. This appreciation 
makes us more liable to experience indignation than we would be if we simply heard a 
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report that they lack regard for another. Feeling the lack of regard and ill will can move 
us, as participants in interpersonal relationships, to appraise the moral worth of the 
attitude.39 
It is also worth noting that we can empathize with the people most affected by 
someone’s conduct. Reenacting how those people react to another’s conduct can draw 
our attention to the moral quality of the conduct. For example, I can empathize with the 
police officer and reenact how he thinks and feels about my student’s aggravated 
behavior. In doing so I would experience an echo of his hurt feelings and resentment 
towards the student. This empathic experience would draw my attention to the comments 
and make salient that they have evaluative significance. By attending to the comments as 
something causing harm, I may be moved to appraise their moral worth.40 In this way, 
empathizing with the officer makes me more liable to experience reactive attitudes in 
response to the students’ behavior.  
                                                
39 The imaginative activity involved in empathy fits naturally with the participant stance. When we 
empathize we are not just trying to collect facts about how another responds to the world. Instead, we are 
trying to appreciate how that person, given her circumstances and individuating features, is thinking and 
feeling about others in the situation. One way of construing this activity is that we as participants are trying 
to understand how another participant is engaging in interpersonal relationships, and we pursue this 
understanding by trying to reenact the other’s form of participation. In contrast, hearing a detached factual 
description of someone’s behavior is just as compatible with inhabiting a participant stance as it is with 
inhabiting an objective stance. For example, when someone outlines the facts pertaining to another’s 
response we could easily engage in a cost-benefit analysis of such a response. This analysis would make us 
liable to experience objective attitudes rather than participant attitudes.  
40 Hume makes a similar point in the Treatise [1739/2000: 2.2.2-8]; however, he has a slightly different 
phenomenon than empathy in mind. What he calls “sympathy” is closer to what I identify in Chapter 1 as 
“emotional contagion.” See Coplan and Goldie 2011: X-XI for more on Hume’s understanding of empathy. 
Martin Hoffman [2000] also makes a structurally similar point. He argues that when we cause another to 
feel distress and we empathize with that person, the empathic experience of distress can trigger feelings of 
guilt. Hoffman argues that these experiences of guilt brought about by empathizing play a foundational role 
in our moral development. I discuss both Hume and Hoffman’s accounts in more detail in Chapter 4 
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I do not wish to oversell the support that empathy provides in helping us to have 
appropriate reactive attitudes. First, empathizing does not produce mental states that 
perfectly resemble the other’s thoughts and feelings.41 Because it does not produce 
perfectly resembling states, we do not experience precisely the same attitudes as the other 
person. As a result, reenacting how another views a situation and how she feels about that 
situation does not completely disclose the agent’s ill will, goodwill, or indifferent 
disregard. Second, empathy cannot reveal others’ ill will or negative feelings in cases 
where they carefully hide such sentiments. For example, a person can perform an action 
that benefits another but perform that action as a charade. In such a case the agent may 
only want to trick others into thinking that he cares. Despite having the trappings of a 
praiseworthy deed the agent is not acting with goodwill. He is secretly and perhaps 
maliciously laughing at having pulled the wool over people’s eyes. If this is the case, then 
trying to empathize might not help to reveal the true nature of his conduct. We cannot 
accurately reenact his view of the situation if we do not know to correct for the façade of 
concern. A similar problem arises if the agent performs an action that neither harms nor 
benefits another, but the agent performs that action with ill will. Trying to empathize with 
the agent in either case is not going to cause us to have an appropriate reactive attitude. 
Third, empathizing is not necessary for experiencing reactive attitudes in particular cases. 
Without empathizing we can form beliefs about the nature of others’ conduct and these 
beliefs can trigger the reactive attitudes. For example, if someone describes a case of 
physical abuse, then we could recognize that the abuser lacks goodwill and we could 
                                                
41 For more on this issue and why it is the case, see Chapter 1, section 6. 
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experience indignation in response. We can do this without deliberately taking up his 
perspective and having a resembling response.42 
Even with these limitations empathy is a resource that helps us to experience 
appropriate reactive attitudes in response to the moral worth of others’ conduct. By taking 
another’s perspective we come to reenact how she thinks and feels as she interacts with 
another person. If her conduct involves negative thoughts or feelings towards another, 
then these thoughts and feelings can impact the moral worth of her response. Even if 
empathizing produces an imperfect resemblance of the other’s attitudes, the reenactment 
would still involve some version of the thoughts and feelings that characterize the nature 
of the other’s response. It would still involve viewing and thinking about some other 
person in a way that involves insufficient regard. Experiencing a reenactment would draw 
our attention to the qualitative character of the others’ thoughts and feelings. As we better 
appreciate the nature of others’ thoughts and feelings and how they arise, we better 
discern and appreciate how their attitudes and actions manifest ill will, goodwill, or 
indifference. This appreciation helps us to respond appropriately to the moral worth of 
the other’s conduct.43 
                                                
42 I address the question of whether empathy is necessary for making moral judgments in Chapter 4. At this 
point, I only wish to highlight that we can respond to blameworthy attitudes or actions without empathizing 
in the particular case.  
43 My point in this section resembles a Humean idea found in the work of Michael Slote [2010: Chapter 1]. 
The idea is that empathizing with an agent who has positive or negative attitudes about someone else can 
produce in us associated feelings that are moral in character. Slote argues that when an agent shows 
concern for another it is because she empathizes with that person. He claims that this empathic concern is 
accompanied by a feeling of warmth. When someone fails to empathize and feel concern for another then 
her attitudes are accompanied by a feeling of chilliness. Slote argues that when we in turn empathize with 
the agent, we experience a copy of her warm or chilly feelings. The experience of these resembling feelings 
can cause feelings of warmth or chilliness in us that are directed at the agent. These latter feelings, he 
claims, represent an appraisal of the other’s behavior.43 Despite both of us claiming that empathy can give 
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3.2  The Support of Empathy: The Second Way 
Empathy also supports our dealings with the reactive attitudes by helping us to 
manage the attitudes that we are actively experiencing. Empathy provides an appreciation 
of others’ thoughts and feelings that puts us in a better position to disqualify and dispel 
our inappropriate reactive attitudes and affirm and sustain our appropriate reactive 
attitudes.44 Thus, whereas the previous section shows how empathy helps to bring about 
appropriate reactive attitudes, this section shows how empathy helps us to correct or 
affirm the attitudes that we find ourselves experiencing. I will begin by examining the 
case of inappropriate attitudes. 
Strawson identifies two methods by which we dispel the reactive attitudes. I 
gestured at these methods in §2. Taking up an objective stance towards someone stops us 
from relating to her as a participant in interpersonal relations. Because we no longer 
relate to her as a participant, we stop responding to her attitudes and actions with the 
reactive attitudes. Thus, we can dispel a reactive attitude by viewing the target of our 
attitude as one who is to be “handled in our own interests, or our side’s, or society’s—or 
                                                                                                                                            
rise to moral sentiments, my account is importantly different in several respects. First, my account does not 
involve or turn on whether the agent—with whom we empathize—is empathizing. Second, my account 
allows for cases in which agents can demonstrate ill will or malice without failing to be sufficiently 
empathetic. Third, my account does not claim that the experiences involved in empathizing somehow 
constitute or resemble moral judgments. My claim is that empathizing causes us to experience an echo of 
the thoughts and feelings that represent regard or lack of regard involved in others’ responses, and this 
experience contributes to the cognitive base that triggers the reactive attitudes and judgments of moral 
worth. Put otherwise, my account keeps conceptually distinct the experience involved in empathizing and 
the experience of the reactive attitudes. By keeping these distinct, my account can explain how we 
sometimes experience the reactive attitudes and moral judgments without empathizing. 
44 The language of ‘disqualifying’ and ‘dispelling’ comes from Bennett [1980]. For example, Bennett 
states, “Usually when a kind of intellectual operation dispels a kind of feeling, it does so by disqualifying it, 
showing it to be inappropriate—as when fear ebbs upon the discovery that there is no danger, and pride 
evaporates when one realizes that the applause was ironical [28]. 
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even theirs” [54]. We also dispel the reactive attitudes by disqualifying them. We 
disqualify a reactive attitude by discerning that it is premised on a mistaken view of 
someone’s conduct. For example, I feel indignation in response to what I see as a friend’s 
malicious action. When I come to realize that she does not actually feel malice or ill will, 
I stop feeling the indignation. Discerning the actual nature of her conduct dispels the 
attitude because it reveals that the attitude fails to meet its internal criteria. 
Strawson notes that disqualifying and dispelling reactive attitudes plays an 
important role in interpersonal relationships. We interact with one another in complex 
ways, and we often have multifaceted intentions and plans that we do not make explicit. 
Because of this complexity and lack of full disclosure, we sometimes mistake the nature 
of each other’s conduct. Our mistake can result in us experiencing inappropriate reactive 
attitudes. Moreover, we often have expectations that prime us to respond negatively or 
positively to one another’s conduct. In some cases without any conscious consideration 
or deliberation we pass judgment and our judgment takes the form of inappropriate 
reactive attitudes. This propensity for experiencing inappropriate attitudes negatively 
impacts the quality of our interpersonal relationships. Therefore, disqualifying and 
dispelling inappropriate attitudes is an important part of participating in relationships 
with others. As Strawson states, “Since things go wrong and situations are complicated, it 
[the offering of explanations and the correction of inappropriate attitudes] is an essential 
and integral element in the transactions which are the life of these relationships” [51, 
parenthetical statement is mine]. 
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Empathy helps to disqualify and dispel inappropriate reactive attitudes by helping 
us to better discern the thoughts and feelings that characterize others’ conduct. When we 
empathize with someone who is interacting with another, we imaginatively take up the 
agent’s view of the situation and we experience an echo of how she thinks and feels about 
that situation. This process helps us to discern how the agent has the other person in view, 
and how she is thinking and feeling about that person. By coming to better appreciate her 
attitudes towards the person, we come to better appreciate aspects that contribute to the 
moral quality of her conduct. In this way, empathizing might change how we view the 
quality of another’s conduct. It can cause us to recognize that we were mistaken in 
reacting to another’s response as if it involved a certain degree of ill will, goodwill, or 
disregard.  
Moreover, the experiential character of empathy is particularly valuable in 
helping us to overcome the at times stubborn character of our affective attitudes. For 
example, in cases where we are in the throes of a strong emotion, or in cases where we 
have a personal incentive or prejudice to judge someone negatively or positively, then it 
can be psychologically difficult to dispel inappropriate reactive attitudes. For example, 
sometimes it is hard to stop feeling resentment even when a person offers a legitimate 
excuse. Empathizing, however, causes us to experience an echo of the thoughts and 
feelings that characterize another’s conduct, and this can be psychologically potent. 
Suppose that we feel indignation. If we empathize and we experience thoughts and 
feelings that express no ill will (or perhaps we even experience states that express 
goodwill), then we are vividly presented with that which makes our reactive attitude 
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inappropriate. We experience the quality that negates the very premise of our reactive 
attitude. In doing so, the inappropriateness of our reactive attitude is impressed upon us. 
A detached belief can also reveal that our attitude is inappropriate but it is not as potent at 
dispelling attitudes that are affective in character. This fits with how people tend to offer 
excuses for their conduct. They provide an explanation, but they also ask others to try to 
see it from their point of view. They believe that if others take up their perspective and 
appreciate how and why they acted as they did it will help dispel feelings of indignation 
and resentment.  
For example, suppose that my brother is a police officer who cares deeply about 
the people he has sworn to protect. I know that he has a kind disposition, and I am 
cognizant of the dangers he faces on a regular basis. My sympathies with my brother 
color the way in which I think about the tension between police and the BLM. I become 
defensive when I overhear friends discussing police violence and the militarization of the 
police. I feel irritated when I hear colleagues planning to protest the police union and its 
resistance to reform. I think that they are displaying insufficient regard for the valiant 
service of people like my brother. When I see them angrily protesting at the union 
headquarters I become indignant. My indignation, however, is premised on a mistaken 
view of their conduct. My colleagues are concerned about systemic injustice and the 
wellbeing of members of their community. They protest not out of ill will but because 
they see it as a means of drawing public attention to a social crisis. Empathizing with my 
colleagues can help me to disqualify and dispel my inappropriate attitude. By taking their 
perspective, I view the situation in light of a different set of concerns and I experience an 
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echo of their thoughts and feelings. This process helps me to appreciate how their 
conduct is characterized by thoughts and feelings that display goodwill. I experience a 
rich representation of that which undermines the premise of my reactive attitude.  
Finally, in much the same way that empathizing helps us to disqualify and dispel 
reactive attitudes, empathizing also helps us to affirm and sustain reactive attitudes. Our 
reactive attitudes are affirmed and sustained when we recognize that another’s conduct 
expresses the ill will, goodwill, or indifference premised in our attitudes. Because 
empathy helps us to appreciate the thoughts and feelings that characterize another’s 
conduct, it helps us to appreciate how and why that conduct expresses ill will, goodwill, 
or indifference. For example, we initially experience indignation at an agent’s cruel 
remarks, and then we empathize with that agent and experience an echo of his malice, the 
experience will affirm and reinforce our initial reaction. In this way, empathy supports 
our dealings with the reactive attitudes by moving us to affirm and sustain reactive 
attitudes that are appropriate. 
3.3  The Support of Empathy: The Third Way 
Of course we are not alone in making judgments about the moral worth of 
attitudes and actions. If others discern that someone’s conduct expresses ill will, 
goodwill, or indifference, then they too are liable to experience reactive attitudes. Some 
of their reactive attitudes are and will be responses to the moral quality of our conduct. In 
order to recognize what those attitudes indicate as worthy of praise or blame, we need to 
appreciate how others view the situation such that they think and feel as they do. The 
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third way then in which empathy benefits moral agents is that it helps us to appreciate the 
nature of others’ reactive attitudes. 
My claim in this section is not the Darwallian point that empathy helps to 
constitute the second-person standpoint from which we recognize others’ claims as 
authoritative [Darwall 2011, 2006]. My claim is simpler and connected to the theoretical 
point that I’ve been making in the previous two sections: empathizing helps us to 
appreciate the thoughts and feelings that someone has about another person with whom 
they are interacting. Our reactive attitudes are one way in which we interact with one 
another; they involve approving and disapproving of conduct. Therefore, in order to 
appreciate others’ reactive attitudes, we need to appreciate how others view an agent’s 
conduct such that they approve or disapprove of that conduct. For example, a friend 
experiences gratitude for a stranger’s helpful behavior. In order to fully grasp our friend’s 
attitude, we need to appreciate how she views the stranger’s conduct such that she 
discerns it as expressing goodwill. Empathy can help us to do this. By taking up her 
perspective, we view the action in light of her interests and concerns, and we feel an echo 
of her approbation for the stranger. This experience helps us to appreciate how she sees 
the stranger’s conduct such that she feels gratitude; we better appreciate how and why she 
feels the way that she does. 
Sometimes we struggle to appreciate why people feel the reactive attitudes that 
they do. For example, I recognize that my colleagues feel indignation about my 
unwillingness to join the protest, yet I fail to appreciate what it is about my conduct that 
they view as expressing a lack of regard. If all I recognize about my colleague’s attitude 
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is that they disapprove of my choice, then I fail to grasp an important aspect of their 
response. I do not grasp on what their attitude is premised. Empathy can be especially 
valuable in these cases. By taking up my colleague’s perspective, I entertain different 
beliefs, concerns, and values, and I can come to appreciate an alternative view of the 
situation. I imaginatively construe my conduct in light of their beliefs and concerns, and I 
experience an echo of their thoughts and feelings. This helps me to appreciate how they 
view my choice as offensive in a particular way. They see my conduct as expressing an 
indifferent disregard for the black community, and therefore, they experience indignation. 
Regardless of whether their attitude is appropriate or not, empathizing helps me to better 
appreciate how and why they feel as they do.  
As noted in the preceding sections, empathizing does more than just help us to 
discern the nature of others’ responses. It also involves a psychologically potent 
experiential aspect. Empathizing with others’ reactive attitudes communicates feelings 
related to approval and disapproval. We experience an echo of the censorious withdrawal 
of goodwill and esteem when we empathize with an indignant colleague. This is 
significant because, as Strawson notes, as participants in interpersonal relations we are 
particularly sensitive to how people think and feel about one another. Therefore, 
experiencing an echo of another’s reactive attitude can move us to reconsider from our 
own standpoint the evaluative character of someone’s conduct. It can move us to 
reexamine the thoughts and feelings that characterize an agent’s conduct, and thereby 
alter our judgment about the moral worth of that conduct. The experiential aspect 
involved in empathizing is especially potent when we are the targets of others’ reactive 
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attitudes. We care deeply about how others regard us, and so feeling another’s 
withdrawal of goodwill and esteem is psychologically significant. It can move us to 
evaluate the moral worth of our own attitudes and actions. 
3.4  The Significance of Empathy’s Support  
In our everyday interactions with others empathy supports our dealings with the 
reactive attitudes. It helps us to appreciate others’ thoughts and feelings such that we 
experience appropriate reactive attitudes about the moral worth of their conduct. It helps 
us to disqualify and dispel our reactive attitudes when they are inappropriate and affirm 
and sustain our reactive attitudes when they are appropriate. It also helps us to appreciate 
others’ reactive attitudes such that we better recognize what those responses indicate 
about the moral worth of someone’s conduct. Moreover, the support that empathy 
provides is such that without it we are less adept at participating in the moral community. 
 To see this last point, consider agents who cannot empathize. These agents lack a 
resource for understanding the nature of others’ thoughts and feelings. They cannot 
employ their own imaginative and emotional machinery to reenact the way in which 
others are thinking and feeling about a situation in virtue of seeing it from a particular 
perspective. Although they might have other resources at their disposal, they are less well 
equipped to improve their understanding within the context of an unfolding social 
situation. In virtue of this we would expect these agents to have a harder time interacting 
with others in cases where others view and respond to a situation differently than they do. 
This fits with the findings from recent literature on empathy and autism. High-
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functioning autistics are described as impaired in their empathic abilities, and researchers 
claim that these impairments make it difficult for autistics to appreciate and respond to 
others’ thoughts and feelings [e.g., Shoemaker 2015, Kennett 2002].45 Jeannette Kennett 
illustrates this difficulty by quoting Jim Sinclair,  
I have to develop a separate translation code for every person I 
meet…Even if I can tell what the cues mean, I may not know what to do 
about them. The first time I ever realized someone needed to be touched 
was during an encounter with a grief-stricken, hysterically sobbing person 
who was in no condition to respond to my questions about what I should 
do to help. I could certainly tell he was upset. I could even figure out that 
there was something I could do that would be better than nothing. But I 
didn’t know what that something was [2002: 352]. 
As Sinclair suggests, the difficulty in understanding others’ thoughts and feelings 
and the inability to see the world from another’s point of view creates challenges for 
interpersonal interactions. It can be harder for autistics to know what is the right thing to 
do in a particular situation. Researchers claim that we should take these challenges into 
account when judging the moral worth of autistic individuals’ conduct. For example, 
David Shoemaker argues that the difficulties in understanding others’ thoughts and 
feelings mitigates or exempts autistics from being fully accountable for their conduct 
                                                
45 Not everyone agrees that autistics suffer from empathic impairment, see the works-in-progress by Dana 
Fritz and Nathan Stout for arguments along these lines (Shoemaker references Stout’s work at 2015: 168).  
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[2015: 166-72]. However, what researchers don’t discuss and what I wish to emphasize is 
that the difficulties autistics face in appreciating others’ thoughts and feelings also creates 
challenges for how they are able to make and recognize judgments of moral worth. For 
example, take the cases I presented in §3.1 of my colleague and my student protesting in 
front of the police headquarters. Although they are both protesting, my student’s conduct 
merits blame in a way that my colleague’s conduct does not. There is a morally relevant 
difference in how each agent is thinking and feeling about the situation. Autistic 
individuals would have a much harder time tracking this sort of difference because of the 
difficulties they face in appreciating the nature of others’ thoughts and feelings. As a 
result, it would be difficult for them to have appropriate reactive attitudes in response to 
both my colleague and my student.  
These sorts of cases, however, are not uncommon in moral life. We encounter 
many complex cases in which subtle differences in agents’ thoughts and feelings impact 
the moral quality of their conduct. In order to respond appropriately with the reactive 
attitudes we often need ways of coming to better appreciate others’ thoughts and feelings. 
Similarly, we often need to better appreciate others’ thoughts and feelings in order to 
correct our attitudes and to recognize what others’ reactive attitudes indicate as worthy of 
praise or blame. Empathy is valuable because for most of us it is an available resource 
that helps us to do this very thing. It helps us to appreciate how others see a situation such 
that they think and feel as they do.  This improvement makes an important difference 
because it enables us to interact with others in ways that are sensitive to a greater degree 
of particularity and nuance. It makes possible more sophisticated dealings with the 
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reactive attitudes. Because the reactive attitudes play such a central role in how we 
interact with others as members of the moral community, it makes possible a more 
sophisticated participation in the moral community.   
The ability to empathize does not guarantee success when dealing with the 
reactive attitudes. Sometimes we try to empathize but fail to accurately take up another’s 
perspective. Other times we try to empathize but fail to appreciate relevant aspects of 
another’s thoughts and feelings. Moreover, empathy is not the only resource that supports 
the reactive attitudes. We have other psychological tools such as inductive and abductive 
reasoning that also help us to understand others’ responses. Furthermore, I am not 
claiming that empathy is conceptually or psychologically necessary for dealing with the 
reactive attitudes. It is consistent with my account that for any occasion in which we 
would have, disqualify, or register a reactive attitude, it is theoretically possible that we 
could do so without first empathizing on that occasion.46 However, if we consider the 
nature of human psychology we see that we often have limited access to others’ mental 
states, we often view situations from different perspectives than other people, we have a 
limited time in which to respond, and despite these limitations we often react to others’ 
attitudes and actions anyways. Because of these features of human psychology we face 
challenges in appreciating and responding appropriately to others’ conduct. These 
challenges make it more difficult for us to deal with the reactive attitudes. Empathy 
equips us to better face these challenges. It is a resource that helps us to appreciate the 
thoughts and feelings that contribute to the moral worth of others’ conduct, and this helps 
                                                
46 I will discuss this issue in much greater detail in Chapter 4.  
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us to have, correct, and register the reactive attitudes. Therefore, even though empathy is 
not a magic bullet that alone overcomes all the challenges, it makes us more proficient in 
our dealings with the reactive attitudes. This proficiency facilitates a more sophisticated 
participation in the moral community.  
4.  WORRIES 
There are critics of empathy who deny that it is a beneficial resource for moral 
agents. These critics will have doubts about the account I develop in this chapter. In this 
section I address two initial worries regarding the support of empathy for dealing with the 
reactive attitudes. In the following chapter I address three putative reasons to doubt that 
empathy produces understanding that helps us to make sound moral judgments about 
what we ought to do. 
4.1  Empathizing Makes Us Less Liable to Disapprove 
The first worry is that empathizing with someone makes us less liable to have 
attitudes of disapproval in cases where such attitudes are appropriate.47 We are less likely 
to have disapproving attitudes because we take up the beliefs and concerns of agents in 
such a way that we become overly understanding or sympathetic to their position. For 
example, I see a friend rudely ignore a colleague’s philosophical contributions. 
Empathizing with my friend causes me to imagine what it is like to have his interests and 
concerns. Because I imaginatively adopt his interests and concerns I search for reasons to 
                                                
47 This worry was expressed in different forms by audience members to presentations I gave at the 
Graduate Center of the City University New York, the University of Toronto, and the 2015 Meeting of the 
Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. 
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excuse his actions instead of feeling indignation and blaming him for his response. This 
worry suggests that we struggle to sufficiently step back from others’ standpoints after 
empathizing. As a result, even if empathizing helps us to appreciate the nature of others’ 
responses, it does not do so in a way that helps us to have an appropriate moral reaction.48  
There are several things to say in response to this worry. First, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, empathy involves a self-other differentiation [Coplan 2011, Hoffman 2000, 
Deigh 1995]. When we empathize we remain aware of the distinction between our self 
and the other person, and we recognize that we are reenacting how the other thinks and 
feels about a situation. This feature of empathy means that we do not completely identify 
with the other person when empathizing. Because we do not completely identify with the 
other person, we do not entirely share his concerns and beliefs regarding the situation. As 
a result, we can step back and distance our self from his view of the situation and his 
corresponding thoughts and feelings. With this distance we can evaluate, reflect on, or 
simply react to the nature of the other’s response. We can appreciate how his behavior 
expresses ill will and come to experience indignation. 
Second, we are not restricted to empathizing with only one person in a situation. 
If we are worried that empathizing with an agent does not produce an adequate view of a 
situation for the purposes of moral appraisal, then we can also empathize with the person 
                                                
48 One might question whether this is in fact a worry. Perhaps being less liable to blame others or 
communicate disapproval is a desirable result. In responding to the worry in this section I do not mean to 
suggest that blaming others or signally disapproval via the reactive attitudes is always the optimal thing to 
do. However, I do assume that some attitudes and actions are wrong and merit blame and that the reactive 
attitudes are sometimes an appropriate way in which we attribute blame. My intent in this response, 
therefore, is to show that empathy does not undermine blaming others in cases where we think it is 
constructive to blame them. 
 91 
most affected by the agent’s conduct. For example, in addition to empathizing with my 
friend who is ignoring a colleague, I can also empathize with the colleague. Empathizing 
with the colleague helps me to appreciate how she thinks and feels about my friend’s 
behavior. I can feel an echo of her hurt feelings and resentment for my friend. This 
process draws our attention to and makes salient evaluative features of the situation in 
such a way that it can elicit reactive attitudes in us. However, empathizing with the 
person most affected by an action does not involve experiencing an echo of the agent’s 
thoughts and feelings. We do not take up the agent’s perspective, and as a result, the 
process is less effective at helping us to appreciate how the agent views the situation such 
that he thinks and feels as he does. This makes it harder for us to discern how his conduct 
expresses ill will, goodwill, or indifference. In addition to taking up the standpoint of 
someone in the situation we can also try to take up a more general point of view. For 
example, we could imagine how disinterested members of our community would think 
and feel about the agent’s conduct. We could also try to inhabit the perspective of an 
idealized impartial spectator [Smith 1759/2002].49 These sorts of imaginative activity—
similar to empathizing with the recipient—would require us to think about concerns and 
interests that differ from the agent’s concerns and interests. Therefore, even though 
empathizing involves imaginatively taking up the agent’s concerns, interests, and point of 
                                                
49 One could reasonably question whether we ever achieve the ideal neutrality of seeing things from the 
perspective of an impartial spectator or disinterested members of the community. However, even if we 
cannot achieve such ideal neutrality, attempting to do so could still be beneficial. Trying to take up such 
perspectives can broaden or change what we see as significant compared to just viewing a situation from an 
individual’s interested standpoint. What is more, the worry about our ability to take up a disinterested 
perspective could count in favor of empathizing with others. If we cannot truly see things from a 
disinterested standpoint, then perhaps the next best option is to see things from a variety of interested 
perspectives. Empathizing can help us to appreciate the view from different perspectives. 
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view, this is not a problem because we can step back from the agent’s standpoint and we 
can take up other neutral or adverse standpoints.  
Finally, it is worth highlighting how the focus of the worry is quite narrow. The 
worry is about whether empathizing helps us to make judgments of moral disapproval. 
This only applies to half of “the first way” (§3.1) in which empathy benefits our dealings 
with the reactive attitudes. Even if one is unconvinced by the rest of my reply to the first 
worry, the worry gives us no reason to think that empathizing would not help us to make 
judgments of moral approval. When I take up the standpoint of someone engaged in 
helping behavior I come to better appreciate how her conduct expresses goodwill. There 
is no pull to the thought that previously identifying with her interests or concerns would 
then prevent me from feeling approbation. Instead, it seems that coming to better 
appreciate the nature of her thoughts and feelings would make me more liable to feel 
approbation. 
4.2  Calm, Considered Evaluations Versus the Reactive Attitudes 
The second worry is that judgments of moral worth that involve strong affective 
states are inferior to judgments that involve calm, considered evaluations. The reactive 
attitudes—as the name suggests—can be quick reactions instead of careful, deliberate 
responses. They often involve emotional arousal and a focus on short-term goals. They 
can cause us to lose sight of relevant considerations, considerations we might not 
overlook when making carefully reasoned judgments. As a result, perhaps empathy is not 
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a valuable resource for moral agents because it makes us more liable to experience the 
reactive attitudes instead of calm, considered judgments of moral worth.  
There are several things to say in response to this worry. First, as Strawson 
carefully illustrates, the reactive attitudes are an essential aspect of participating in 
interpersonal relationships with others. They are not the sorts of thing we can completely 
turn off while actively engaging in those relations. We turn them off by stepping back 
from the relationships as ones in which we have normative expectations and in which we 
hold each other accountable to those expectations. Strawson observes that though we 
sporadically step back and have objective attitudes it would be greatly impoverishing to 
the quality of our lives to continuously do so. It would mean giving up on the personal 
transactions that characterize human life. This is particularly true of the relationships we 
participate in qua moral agents. As I suggested at the end of §2, it looks morally 
impermissible for us to do either of these things. It would be wrong if we stopped caring 
about how we treat one another, and part of caring involves at least sometimes reacting to 
things with feelings of approval and disapproval. Second, it is not a case of either/or 
regarding the reactive attitudes and calm, considered responses. Even when we 
experience the reactive attitudes, we can always proceed to reflect on the situation and 
form a calm, carefully weighed judgment. Similarly, even after calmly deliberating about 
a case we can experience reactive attitudes after considering the nature of someone’s 
response. Third, social interactions are messy, complex things. In many cases we see 
someone respond in a way that causes benefit or harm yet we do not immediately 
appreciate the nature of the interaction. Often talking to the participants or calmly 
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deliberating on the case is an effective strategy. However, not all cases are amenable to 
such a strategy. Sometimes it is impossible to question the participants, and sometimes a 
situation calls for a prompt evaluative response to a person’s conduct. For example, we 
see a colleague appearing to bully another colleague. We should respond quickly and we 
should censure such behavior in the given situation in order to publicly express a 
condemnation of such conduct. In such a case we do not have time to reflect endlessly or 
investigate all of the relevant facts. Nevertheless, the degree to which our colleague’s 
behavior expresses ill will is relevant to what is an appropriate response. Empathizing 
with our colleague can quickly help us to better appreciate the thoughts and feelings that 
characterize his action and thereby avoid an inappropriate judgment. In this sort of way, 
empathizing can help us to navigate the complexities of a social setting and thereby 
improve our initial evaluative responses. 
In short, there are reasons to believe that the reactive attitudes can perform 
beneficial evaluative and communicative functions.50 These functions are consistent with 
us also making calm, deliberate judgments. Thus, it is plausible that both the reactive 
attitudes and calm, deliberate judgments are effective means of participating in the moral 
community; they just provide different ways of doing so. However, even if one thinks 
that the best way to balance the contributions of the two forms of moral activity is to 
minimize our reactive attitudes, that person should still think that empathy supports 
making, correcting, and recognizing judgments of moral worth. We are going to 
experience the reactive attitudes, and insofar as we have those attitudes they should be 
                                                
50 For more on these functions see Macnamara 2015, Wallace 2011, 1996, and Gibbard 1990. 
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appropriate, we should disqualify and dispel ones that are inappropriate, and we should 
do our best to understand others’ reactive attitudes. Empathy, as I argue in §3, helps us to 
do these three things. Therefore, even if we should aim to minimize the reactive attitudes 
in our lives, empathy is still a valuable resource because it helps us to deal with the ways 
in which we encounter the reactive attitudes in moral life.  
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Chapter 3: Defending Empathy 
In the previous chapter I offer an account of how we can benefit from empathy as 
moral agents. I argue that empathy provides appreciation of others’ thoughts and feelings, 
and that this appreciation helps us to make, correct, and recognize judgments of moral 
worth. Some philosophers, however, are skeptical that empathy is a beneficial resource 
for moral agents. In particular they argue that we have reasons to doubt that empathizing 
produces understanding that improves moral judgment. These critics tend to focus on 
moral judgment in terms of judgments of right and wrong. In this chapter, therefore, I 
extend my account by showing how empathy helps us to make judgments of right and 
wrong. I then defend this extended account by responding to three putative reasons to 
doubt that empathy produces understanding that helps us to make moral judgments. 
These putative reasons are that empathy only produces distorted representations of 
others’ thoughts and feelings [Goldie 2011], empathizing causes levels of personal 
distress that interfere with understanding others’ thoughts and feelings [Maibom 2010], 
and bias undermines the reliability of empathy as a source of understanding [Prinz 2011b, 
Maibom 2010]. I argue that we should reject each of these reasons, and therefore, they do 
not create a problem for my account of empathy as a beneficial resource for moral agents.    
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1.  WHAT’S AT STAKE? 
We can distinguish different kinds of moral judgments. In Chapter 2 I focus on 
judgments of moral worth by looking at the reactive attitudes. I note that we experience 
reactive attitudes related to disapproval when we discern that someone’s conduct 
expresses a lack of regard for others, and we experience reactive attitudes related to 
approval when we discern that her conduct expresses goodwill and regard. These 
judgments are related to our practices of praising and blaming. We can distinguish these 
judgments from judgments about right and wrong. These latter judgments consider what 
we morally ought to do (or ought not to do). They involve determinations about whether 
conduct is morally permissible, whether conduct violates a harm norm or moral principle, 
and whether the balance of moral reasons supports one form of conduct over another. 
Judgments of right and wrong are an important aspect of how we interact with others in 
the moral community.  
Similar to judgments of moral worth, when we make moral judgments of right 
and wrong we often take into account others’ thoughts and feelings. We take these 
attitudes into account because how others think and feel about a situation (and how they 
would think and feel) can be morally relevant. For example, if I am holding a snake and 
you are terrified of it, then your negative attitudes about the snake count as a 
consideration against my bringing it nearer. Similarly, if you are upset at the 
remembrance of a terrible event, then your feelings count as a consideration against my 
casually discussing the event. In both cases, your thoughts and feelings about the 
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situation are morally relevant to what I ought to do. Because others’ attitudes can be 
relevant in this way, understanding what others are thinking and feeling (or would think 
and feel) is important when it comes to trying to make sound moral judgments—
judgments that are based on and respond appropriately to the morally relevant features of 
a case.  
As I show in the previous chapters, understanding the nature of others’ thoughts 
and feelings can involve more than just identifying the types of mental states or the 
objects of their mental states. To understand the nature of their thoughts and feelings we 
sometimes need to appreciate how they view the situation such that they respond to it in 
the way that they do. We may need to appreciate how their thoughts and feelings are 
related to a view of the situation that is shaped by such things as their concerns, values, 
beliefs, and experiences. For example, suppose that my employer compliments a 
colleague’s physical appearance with the intention of making her feel good about herself. 
The comments involve the kind of praise that he would find flattering if someone said 
such things to him. My colleague, however, is offended and she responds to the 
comments with indignation. In order to fully grasp my colleague’s indignation, we need 
to appreciate how her view of the comments differs from the view of my employer. She 
views them as offensive because of her experience with unwelcome advances as well as 
her beliefs about gender dynamics and appropriate conduct in the workplace.  
Critics agree that in order for us to make some sound moral judgments we often 
need to understand others’ attitudes. What is contentious, however, is whether empathy is 
a beneficial resource for understanding others’ thoughts and feelings. In the previous two 
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chapters I have offered reasons to think that it does. Empathy, I argue, uses our 
imaginative abilities to entertain alterative views of the situation, and it uses our own 
emotional machinery to provide a reenactment of how other people feel or would feel 
given their view of the situation. It is a resource that provides a rich appreciation of 
others’ mental life, and it can do so on the fly within an unfolding social situation. As I 
explain in Chapter 2, this is valuable because of the complexity of social situations and 
the limited nature of human psychology. We often have limited access to others’ mental 
states, we often view situations from different perspectives than other people, we often 
have a limited time in which to assess a situation, and despite these limitations we often 
need to decide what we ought to do. These challenges make it more difficult for us to 
make sound judgments about right and wrong. However, in much the same way that 
empathy supports judgments of moral worth, it also supports judgments of right and 
wrong.  
By empathizing we can come to better appreciate how others think and feel (or 
would think and feel) about a situation involving our conduct. This appreciation helps us 
to recognize the impact of our conduct on others. This recognition, in turn, helps us to 
make a sound judgment about what we ought or ought not to do. For example, by taking 
up the perspective of my colleague, my supervisor could come to better appreciate how 
she thinks and feels about his comments. He could appreciate how she finds them 
offensive despite his good intentions and despite what he takes to be their flattering 
character. By coming to appreciate the nature of her thoughts and feelings and how those 
thoughts and feelings differ from his own, he is better positioned to recognize reasons for 
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which he ought not to make those comments. Consider another case. I see a colleague 
brusquely dismiss a student’s philosophical suggestion. Shortly after dismissing the 
suggestion, my colleague endorses a very similar proposal made by a well-respected 
speaker. The manner in which I ought to address the situation depends in part on how the 
student would react to my drawing public attention to his insult of her. When facing such 
a case, I do not have time to endlessly reflect, discuss the issue with others, or calmly 
investigate all of the relevant facts. I need to better understand how she would think and 
feel, and I can employ different resources in trying to do so. For example, I could consult 
heuristics about typical human behavior, or I could imagine how I might react in a similar 
circumstance. These sorts of resources, however, are not oriented around the student’s 
particular perspective. They provide information about how people tend to respond or 
how I would respond; they do not provide a nuanced representation of how she is 
thinking or feeling or how she would think and feel if I spoke up. Empathy, in contrast, 
provides a means of representing her attitudes about the situation given her perspective. 
Therefore, by empathizing, I might come to appreciate that unlike myself or other 
students she would resent a public address of the insult. The attention would make her 
feel exposed and vulnerable in virtue of her status as a student. In this way, empathizing 
could help me to recognize morally relevant considerations and thereby make a sound 
judgment that takes those considerations into account. 
Although I use individual examples in developing my account, my account is not 
ultimately about how empathy works in isolated cases. It is about whether empathy helps 
us in general to make sound moral judgments. Take the virtuoso moral judge, what 
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enables her to consistently make sound moral judgments? Based on my account, we 
should expect that she would sometimes empathize with others in order to navigate 
complex social relations because empathy would help her to appreciate the subtle and 
personal nature of others’ thoughts and feelings. Moreover, I am not arguing that we 
cannot make moral judgments without empathy; rather I am arguing that empathy makes 
us more adept at appreciating relevant features connected to others’ mental life. In doing 
so, it helps us to make sound moral judgments. Finally, I am not claiming that all sound 
moral judgments require that we understand the nature of others’ thoughts and feelings. It 
is plausible that some judgments don’t require this level of interpersonal understanding. 
However, even if that’s the case, it is implausible that only an insignificant number of 
judgments require such understanding. This is all that my account needs here; empathy is 
a beneficial resource because it provides understanding of others’ thoughts and feelings 
that helps us to make sound moral judgments. 
However, some philosophers question whether empathy is beneficial. They 
identify three putative reasons to doubt that empathy produces understanding of others’ 
thoughts and feelings that helps us to make moral judgments. If these putative reasons are 
correct, they undermine my account of empathy as a beneficial resource. The benefits 
that I identify here and in Chapter 2 rely on empathy producing a certain sort of 
understanding. If empathy does not produce this understanding, then it does not support 
moral judgment in the ways I claim. If it does not support moral judgment in the ways 
that I claim, then I have not yet shown that empathy is a beneficial resource for moral 
agents.  
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2.  THREE PUTATIVE REASONS TO DOUBT THAT WE BENEFIT FROM EMPATHY  
In this section I present the putative reasons to doubt that empathy provides 
beneficial understanding of others’ thoughts and feelings, and I explain why we should 
reject each one.  
2.1  The Problem of Distortion 
The first putative reason comes from Peter Goldie [2011, 2000]. Goldie argues 
that empathy can only produce in us mental states that are a distorted model of another 
person’s mental states. Because empathizing only produces a distorted model, it does not 
effectively help us to understand the nature of the other’s thoughts and feelings. 
Therefore, his argument indicates that empathy does not produce understanding that helps 
us to make sound moral judgments.   
Goldie begins his challenge by discussing the features that contribute to a 
person’s perspective. He calls these features “agent-specific characterizations” [2011: 
308-09]. These characterizations include emotional dispositions, intellectual ability, 
moods, history, and values. He claims that these features affect the way we think and 
feel. They are part of what shape the first-person perspective from which we respond to 
the world. Goldie argues that our thoughts and feelings are only properly understood in 
light of our first-person perspective. This means that a full understanding of our thoughts 
and feelings involves reference to the agent-specific characterizations that shape our 
perspective. For example, a modest agent has attitudes that express and fit with a modest 
disposition. It is in virtue of this disposition that the agent responds to a situation in a 
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modest way. According to Goldie, in order to think about and fully grasp the nature of the 
modest attitdues, we must appreciate how they arise from a particular disposition [309]. 
However, Goldie argues that in having a modest thought the agent does not typically 
attend to her disposition. It does not show up in the content of her occurrent thoughts 
about the world, but nevertheless, it shapes her occurrent thoughts. He claims, “the 
typical role of these dispositions is passive or in the background in the sense that our 
conscious thoughts and feelings that feature in our deliberations are shaped by, but are 
not directed towards these dispositions” [309]. 
Goldie argues that the background nature of agent-specific characterizations 
creates a problem for empathy. He claims that to accurately take another’s perspective 
and match their thoughts and feelings we must take the other’s characterizations into 
account. We must recognize that the modest thought arises from a modest disposition. 
This is problematic because it means that we need to focus on the characterizations in a 
way that the other person does not. We must bring the characterizations into the 
foreground of thought. As a result, the mental states we experience fail to match the 
other’s mental states. As Goldie puts it: 
This typical role of characterization…simply cannot be matched through 
empathetic perspective-shifting onto another. A, cannot, as part of a 
consciously willed project, keep B’s characterization in the non-conscious 
background...And this produces a fundamentally distorted model of B’s 
thinking [2011: 309]. 
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Goldie describes this problem as a “conceptual problem” [2011: 303]. He thinks that it 
derives from the nature of empathy. When we empathize we attempt to produce a copy of 
the other’s mental states, but the process cannot produce these states. It can only produce 
a distorted model of another’s thoughts and feelings. It is distorted because we are 
focusing on the agent-specific characterizations whereas the other person is not. This 
problem, he argues, undermines the value of empathy as a resource for interpersonal 
understanding. Because empathizing only produces a distorted model, we fail to gain 
accurate understanding of the nature of others’ thoughts and feelings. If empathizing does 
not help us to understand others’ thoughts and feelings, then it does not help us to make 
sound moral judgments as I argue in Chapters 2 and 3. 
We should reject Goldie’s argument because it depends on a bad inference. 
Goldie moves from the idea that empathizing does not produce a copy of another’s 
thinking and feeling to the idea that empathizing does not provide understanding of the 
other’s thinking and feeling. He attempts to justify this move by pointing out that we can 
only have a distorted model of the other’s mental states. This attempted justification, 
however, does not support the inference. Having a distorted model does not preclude 
understanding. As I mention in Chapter 1, empathy does not require that we experience 
identical states. It only requires that we have similar or congruent states. Having similar 
states provides understanding because they still resemble much of the other’s thoughts 
and feelings. Similar to the other’s states, the resembling states are about features of the 
situation. Therefore, experiencing these states helps us to appreciate how the others’ 
thoughts and feelings represent a meaningful response to a particular situation. Put 
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otherwise, in order for empathy to produce understanding, the mental states we 
experience must correctly resemble the other’s mental states. Correctness, however, can 
be distinguished from precision. We do not need to experience precisely the same states 
in order to better understand the nature of the other’s thoughts and feelings. The process 
allows for some distortion. We can have states that are slightly distorted from the other’s 
mental states while still gaining understanding.51 As other theorists note, it is difficult to 
specify when a state is “similar enough” that it correctly resembles the other’s state. 
Several theorists claim that such specification is not built into the concept of empathy 
[e.g., Morton 2011: 319, Snow 2000: 69, and Sober and Wilson 1998: 233]. It is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to attempt to provide such specification. However, we can 
identify the kinds of features that are relevant to resemblance. For example, it is 
important that the two states have the same intentional object, appraisal, affective tone, 
and valence. These features matter because they are relevant to how states such as 
emotions constitute a rational response to a situation. Therefore, for an empathic observer 
to have an attitude that resembles another’s response, the attitude needs to be similar in at 
least these ways. 
The crucial question then is how attending to agent-specific characterizations 
affects resemblance: Does focusing on features of the other’s perspective cause us to 
have states that fail to correctly resemble the other’s states? Goldie provides no argument 
                                                
51 This distinction between precise and correct resemblance applies to more than just the value of empathy. 
We value maps that involve a Mercator projection even though the maps are distorted. The Mercator 
projection causes landmasses near the poles to be represented as proportionately larger in area than they in 
fact are on the earth’s surface. Despite the imprecision, we value the maps because they still provide 
beneficial understanding about geographical locations. 
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to show that it does. Moreover, there is reason to believe that such focus does not cause a 
distortion of the relevant aspects. To see why, we must distinguish two levels of 
intentional mental states involved in empathy. On one level we focus on the other’s 
perspective and we try to understand her thoughts and feelings. In reference to this level 
we can describe some of our mental states as intentionally directed at the other person. 
On a different level empathy involves seeing the situation as if from the other’s 
perspective. This activity causes us to have mental states that are intentionally directed at 
features of the situation. By referencing this second level, we can describe some of our 
mental states as about the situation. These descriptions of the intentionality are consistent. 
Our mental states are about both of these things when we empathize with others. 
Describing the intentionality in this way highlights how the states we experience will 
differ from the states of the other person. The other is responding to some situation and 
she can do so without thinking about the perspective from which she responds. She does 
not require the two levels of intentionality involved in empathy. Furthermore, the 
descriptions of the two levels of intentionality also highlight the way in which empathy 
leaves space for having resembling mental states. As empathizers we experience states 
that are nested in a larger intentional framework. There is nothing about the framework, 
however, that prevents those nested states from being structurally similar to the other’s 
thoughts and feelings. Our states can resemble the other’s states in terms of their 
intentional object, appraisal, valence, etc. In this way, the states we experience when 
empathizing can model the relevant aspects of how the other is thinking and feeling about 
the situation.   
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Goldie is right that the states we experience will not precisely resemble the 
other’s thoughts and feelings. The intentional framework of the empathic process will 
always shape to some degree what we think and feel. This is in part because we cannot 
completely take up the other’s perspective and leave our self behind while still 
empathizing. This distance, however, is important for preserving the sense that what we 
experience is a reenactment of another’s thoughts and feelings. Despite the difference, 
empathy can produce states that are similar in relevant respects. By experiencing these 
resembling states we can come to better appreciate the nature of the other’s thoughts and 
feelings. In short, Goldie’s challenge fails. The structure of empathy does not prevent it 
from producing understanding that helps us to make sound moral judgments. 
2.2  The Problem of Personal Distress 
The second putative reason to doubt that empathy is a beneficial resource comes 
from Heidi Maibom. She argues that empathizing causes us to experience personal 
distress. This distress interferes with our ability to focus on the nature of others’ thoughts 
and feelings. The distress can also create long-term negative effects in our psychology. 
These effects make us less adept at emotionally engaging with others. Both of these 
consequences, she argues, undermine empathy as a source of understanding for the 
purpose of making moral judgments.  
Maibom describes personal distress as an acute, unpleasant experience. This 
experience is something we feel for our self. She explains that in many cases we 
experience distress because of egoistic considerations. For example, thinking about our 
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own potential or actual suffering can cause us to feel great discomfort. However, she 
claims that we can also experience personal distress because of others’ suffering. She 
states, “S is personally distressed by O’s experience of emotion E in C if S feels E—not 
for O, but for herself (S)—as a result of believing or perceiving that O feels E, or 
imagining being in C, OR as a result of believing that something bad has happened to O” 
[2014: 3]. One way in which others’ suffering causes personal distress is by imagining 
how we would feel if in their circumstances. Maibom calls this an “imagine-self” process 
[2010: 38]. The imagine-self process involves imagining ourselves with our own 
psychology in the circumstances of the other person. This imaginative activity causes us 
to have an emotion and this emotion reflects our own beliefs, values, and concerns. When 
the emotion is a response to something bad, it often causes a feeling of personal distress 
[2010: 38]. Maibom acknowledges that the imagine-self process is distinct from empathy. 
The imagine-self process is about how we would think and feel given our psychology, 
and empathy is about how the other person thinks and feels given their psychology. 
Despite this difference, she argues that we should expect empathy to also cause personal 
distress because of the way in which it involves resemblance. If we empathize with 
someone feeling personal distress, then we can experience attitudes that resemble that 
distress. She argues that this leads to a problem. The problem is that there is no apparent 
mechanism for alleviating the distress after we stop taking the other’s perspective. She 
worries that the distress produced by empathizing will lead to a full-blown, non-empathic 
episode of personal distress. This is a problem, she explains, because personal distress 
prevents us from understanding others’ emotions. She argues that it does so in two ways. 
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The first way is that in particular situations personal distress draws our attention 
away from the other person. Instead of trying to appreciate the other’s thoughts and 
feelings, we focus on our own discomfort and look for ways to make the discomfort go 
away. The personal distress undermines our responsiveness to the other’s experience. 
Maibom claims, “And to the extent that personal distress motivates us to escape the 
situation, the danger of simulation [i.e., empathy] is that it may cause us to be less 
responsive to the plight of others” [2010: 38]. The second way is that experiences of 
personal distress can cause long-term negative effects. She argues that personal distress 
can lead to a harmful condition known as “vicarious traumatization” [2010: 39]. 
Vicarious traumatization, she explains, is a phenomenon in which repeated exposure to 
others’ suffering causes subjects to develop the characteristics of traumatized victims. 
These subjects demonstrate decreased emotional engagement and concern for others. 
They become less responsive to others’ experiences. The lack of responsiveness leads to 
a decrease in pro-social action. She claims, 
However since certain types of perspective takings lead to exactly the kind 
of personal distress that Hoffman and others propose is the result of 
empathic over-arousal, there is reason to think that…it can also have more 
long-term damaging effects on the individual (vicarious 
traumatization)…and that…is going to increase the likelihood of the 
person not helping another in need [2010: 39]. 
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Maibom’s doubts about empathy call into question my account. If empathizing impedes 
our sensitivity and responsiveness to others’ experiences, then it is not well suited to 
provide understanding that leads to the making of sound moral judgments. I argue, 
however, that we should reject Maibom’s argument; empathizing is not susceptible to 
personal distress in either of the two ways.  
Maibom is correct that both empathy and the imagine-self process involve 
imaginative activity that can result in affective attitudes. However, she fails to note that 
when we empathize we maintain a distinction between our self and the other person 
[Coplan 2011: 16, Hoffman 2000: 62-64]. It is this distinction that separates empathy 
from emotional identification. When empathizing we recognize that the attitudes we 
experience are a reenactment of the other’s thoughts and feelings.52 They are attitudes 
that we attribute to the other’s perspective. We do not take the empathic experience to 
represent thoughts and feelings that reflect our own standpoint and concerns. Because we 
remain aware that the attitudes model the other’s response to the situation, there is a 
ready explanation for why empathizing may not involve the same amount of personal 
distress. The other’s personal distress is about the evaluative significance of some object 
to her. When we empathize we come to have attitudes about this object. However, 
because we relate those attitudes to the other’s standpoint, we recognize that the object is 
not something distressing for us or at least not in the same way. It might not be something 
that we are personally concerned about. Therefore, when we stop empathizing, we can 
                                                
52 Martin Hoffman states, “[the empathic observer has] a cognitive sense of themselves as separate 
physical entities with independent internal states, personal identities, and lives beyond the situation, and 
can distinguish what happens to others from what happens to themselves” [2000: 63]. 
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stop thinking and feeling about the object as something that has evaluative significance to 
us personally. 
I am not denying that empathy can give rise to feelings of distress. It does so in at 
least two ways. The first is what I have been discussing. We can experience resembling 
attitudes that involve distress when we empathize with someone who is suffering. 
Second, empathizing can cause distress downstream. If we empathize with someone 
suffering and we come to better appreciate the nature of her response, then our 
understanding can lead to a feeling of intense negative affect for her and her 
predicament. Hoffman [2000] calls this “sympathetic distress” and Batson calls it 
“empathic distress” [2011: 19]. In either case the distress is conceptually and 
psychologically distinct from personal distress. Maibom identifies personal distress as a 
form of negative affect a subject feels “for herself” [2014: 3]. The distress caused by 
empathizing, however, is either attributed to the other or felt for the other and the other’s 
situation. Therefore, this distress lacks the self-directed quality with which Maibom 
characterizes personal distress. Furthermore, it is misleading to describe this distress as 
drawing our attention away from the other person. When we feel distress while 
empathizing that experience helps us to better appreciate what the other person is going 
through. It improves our understanding of the nature of her thoughts and feelings. When 
we feel distress after empathizing, the distress represents a concern for the other’s 
condition. It shows that we are invested in how the other person is doing. In short, 
Maibom’s comparison of empathy and the imagine-self process does not show that 
empathizing produces the sort of self-focused distress that obstructs understanding.  
 113 
There are also reasons to question Maibom’s view that empathy would lead to 
long-term effects such as vicarious traumatization. First, we do not need to empathize in 
every situation; therefore, the exposure to distress need not be a frequent occurrence. 
Second, many attitudes do not involve personal distress; therefore, many instances of 
empathizing will not produce resembling states involving personal distress. Third, it is 
unclear whether the non-personal distress produced by empathy can lead to over-arousal 
and vicarious traumatization in the same way as full-fledged experiences of personal 
distress. Maibom does not provide empirical evidence to show that it does.  
Two final issues are worth mentioning. First, Maibom treats empathizing as 
something we do only in response to other’s negative emotions. However, as I’ve 
suggested, we can empathize in response to a variety of attitudes and many of these 
attitudes will not involve personal distress. Therefore, even if she were right about the 
negative effects of personal distress, this would only create an issue for a restricted set of 
cases. For all of the other cases, empathy could still benefit moral agents by providing 
understanding of others’ thoughts and feelings. Second, some people are more prone than 
others to experience personal distress, and some people are also better disposed than 
others to handle that distress. Presumably, this is similar for any distress caused by 
empathy. Some people will be better equipped than others to manage the distress. These 
people, as a result, will be more likely to gain understanding from empathy in cases 
involving distress. Hence, even if distress impacts the effectiveness of empathizing, the 
impact would vary from person to person.  
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2.3  The Problem of Bias 
The third putative reason to doubt that empathy produces understanding that 
benefits moral judgment comes from Maibom and Jesse Prinz. They each argue that bias 
undermines the reliability of empathy as a source of understanding. If this is correct and 
empathy is not a reliable source of understanding, then—contra my account in Chapter 2 
and 3—empathy would not be something that helps us to make sound moral judgments or 
recognize others’ moral judgments.  
There are two ways in which bias purportedly undermines the reliability of 
empathy. The first is that bias causes us to empathize inconsistently across different 
situations. For example, Prinz argues that we are more likely to empathize with those 
who are similar to us (i.e., the similarity bias) and with those who are close in proximity 
and affection (i.e., the near and dear bias) [2011b: 227]. He suggests that because we are 
not disposed to empathize consistently in different situations, empathy, in general, is not 
a reliable source of understanding. It is not something that can effectively inform moral 
judgment across the disparate cases of moral life. The second way is that biases 
purportedly distort the accuracy of the empathic process. For example, Maibom argues 
that self-interest is the most problematic bias when empathizing. She claims that when we 
are particularly invested in something we have a tendency to interpret others’ thoughts 
and feelings in a way that “dovetails” with our own pursuits [2010: 43]. Our self-interest 
distorts our thinking such that we fail to appreciate how others in fact think and feel about 
a situation. She states, “…we often think of others as wanting, thinking, and feeling 
things because thinking of them that way serves some, not necessarily conscious, 
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interests of ours” [43-44]. Prinz identifies two similar examples. He claims that the 
degree to which we find others attractive or the degree to which we see others as 
members of an in-group impacts how charitable we are when trying to take up their 
perspective [2011a: 226]. We are more inclined to think about others’ ways of thinking 
and feeling in terms of uncharitable generalizations if we find them unattractive or see 
them as out-group members. Prinz takes this to show that bias causes us to 
mischaracterize others’ perspectives and because we mischaracterize others’ perspective 
we do not reenact how they think and feel about a situation. In this way, Prinz and 
Maibom argue that bias undermines empathy as a resource for understanding others’ 
thoughts and feelings.  
It is not always clear which of these two ways Prinz and Maibom have in mind 
when discussing the problems that bias creates for empathy. Prinz at times seems 
satisfied to argue just for the first. For example, he tries to show that there are particular 
moral judgments for which we are better off not empathizing. He raises these examples to 
support his thesis that we do not need empathy in order to make moral judgments. At 
other points, however, Prinz seems interested in simply raising worries about empathy’s 
merits as a resource for moral agents; he suggests that empathy does not better equip 
moral agents to make moral judgments. I am responding to the latter thesis in this 
chapter. Maibom appears more interested in the second thesis. She claims that empathy is 
problematically susceptible to distorting influences, and thereby, moral agents should not 
rely on it as a resource for understanding others’ thoughts and feelings when trying to 
make judgments of right and wrong. 
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The first way in which they suggest (or at least Prinz suggests) that bias 
undermines reliability does not create a problem for my account. My account does not 
entail that we need empathy in order to make every sound moral judgment; nor does it 
entail that empathy is sufficient for making all sound judgments. It is consistent with my 
account that there are cases in which we make sound moral judgments without 
empathizing. For this reason, the fact that biases dispose us to not empathize in certain 
cases does not call into question the thesis that empathy is a resource that produces 
beneficial understanding of others’ thoughts and feelings. It is this latter point that 
matters for my account. If empathy reliably produces relevant understanding, then it is 
something that benefits moral agents even if we don’t empathize in all cases.  
The second way in which they suggest that bias undermines reliability poses a 
more pressing challenge to my account. It indicates that empathy does not reliably 
produce accurate understanding of others’ thoughts and feelings. However, there is a 
question here concerning scope: what do Prinz and Maibom take to be the range of cases 
in which the reliability of empathy is in doubt? An unsatisfactory answer would be that 
the reliability is in doubt when considering all cases involving others’ thoughts and 
feelings. There are many cases in which we lack significant information about others’ 
concerns, their beliefs, and their situations. This lack of information makes it difficult for 
us to take their perspectives, and as a result, we do not empathize in many of these cases. 
Because we do not rely on empathy in all cases, we should narrow the scope of cases we 
use to assess the reliability of empathy. In Chapter 1 I claim that empathy helps us to 
appreciate why others’ think and feel about a situation in the way that they do. In these 
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cases, however, we have some familiarity with the situation and the other person. 
Therefore, I propose that we assess the reliability of empathy in terms of cases in which 
we have this sort of information. If empathy is unreliable in these sorts of cases, then we 
have reason to doubt that empathy produces understanding that helps us to make, correct, 
and recognize moral judgments.53  
Prinz and Maibom attempt to motivate their points about bias by appealing to 
empirical research on empathic accuracy. In particular they cite well-known studies by 
William Ickes. In these studies participants watch short videos of people experiencing 
emotions. Participants are then asked to identify the attitudes experienced by the subjects 
in the videos, and their answers are compared to self-reports given by the subjects [Ickes 
2009: 58]. Based on these comparisons, the studies purportedly show that agents are 
“relatively bad” at correctly ascribing attitudes to others [Maibom 2010: 42]. Moreover, 
Prinz and Maibom suggest that the studies show that participants’ accuracy gets worse in 
cases where there is reason to suspect bias [Prinz 2011a: 2226, Maibom 2010: 42-3].54 
Despite this body of empirical research, pointing to such studies does not help Maibom 
and Prinz in making a case against empathy. First, the studies often fail to specify the 
exact phenomenon being examined. For example, Ickes [2009: 57-58] argues that the 
studies measure what he calls “empathic inference” which he identifies as the ability to 
                                                
53 This move to assess reliability in terms of a restricted set of cases is not unique to empathy. For example, 
we don’t rely on perceptual experience in cases in which we know there’s an illusion, and we don’t rely on 
testimony in the context of certain board games. If we wanted to assess the general reliability of these 
resources, we would do so in regards to the cases in which we actually rely on the resources to produce 
understanding. 
54 For example, Prinz states, “It has also been found that empathetic accuracy— which includes the ability 
to identify someone else’s emotions, and, thus, perhaps, to mirror them—increases when the target is 
viewed as attractive (Ickes et al. (1990))” [Prinz 2011: 226]. 
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infer others’ mental states. It is unclear how this phenomenon overlaps with empathy 
where “empathy” is understood as a process of taking another’s perspective and 
experiencing resembling states. This ambiguity is significant because as I explained 
earlier there are important differences between phenomena like the imagine-self process 
and empathy. We should not expect such phenomena to have the same levels of accuracy. 
Therefore, it is unclear what these studies show about the accuracy of empathy in 
particular. Second, many of the studies involve cases in which observers know almost 
nothing about the other person or the relevant situation [e.g., Ickes 2003 and 2009: 58]. 
These experiments thereby do not clearly resemble the cases in which we would actually 
empathize.55 Third, we can be mistaken in identifying and reporting our own mental 
states. Hence, using self-reporting as the basis for measuring accuracy is problematic. 
There could be cases where the observer accurately describes the other’s attitudes, but her 
description is judged inaccurate based on a mistaken self-report. Fourth, the studies 
usually measure the rate at which subjects accurately identify another’s emotion type. 
Empathy, as I explained above, is not simply about trying to identify emotion types. It is 
about trying to understand the nature of others’ thoughts and feelings and why they 
respond in the way that they do. In short, these studies are a poor guide to determining 
empathy’s reliability at providing understanding of others thoughts and feelings. 
Furthermore, there appears to be an unstated premise in Prinz and Maibom’s case 
against empathy. They both argue that biases undermine the accuracy of empathy, and 
                                                
55 This is worth noting because some studies [Ickes 2003] suggest that we are significantly better at 
recognizing the mental states of people we know than those belonging to strangers. 
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therefore, it is unreliable. Because it is unreliable it is not something we should lean on 
when trying to make sound moral judgments. This argument presupposes that there is 
some alternative resource to empathy that is not equally affected by bias and that we 
could replace empathy with when trying to make sound moral judgments. However, Prinz 
and Maibom provide no empirical evidence to indicate that bias creates a unique problem 
for empathy, and to the best of my knowledge no such evidence exists. This is part of a 
larger problem: they cannot establish the baseline for the reliability of empathy in cases 
without bias. Without this baseline and the baseline for other resources we have no means 
of comparing how bias effects the reliability of different resources. As a result, we cannot 
yet determine whether alternative resources would be better off than empathy when faced 
with cases involving bias. So why might Prinz and Maibom think bias creates a unique 
problem for empathy? 
One possible explanation is that empathy involves sophisticated interpretation 
about how others’ view situations in light of their unique perspectives. Because a 
perspective consists of a complex constellation of features, there is a lot of interpretive 
space for biases to distort the process. Moreover, biases can have an impact without our 
recognizing that they are doing so. This is problematic for empathy because if we cannot 
determine whether we are correctly taking another’s perspective, then we cannot 
determine whether we are reenacting how that person views the situation or how she 
thinks and feels about the situation. If we cannot determine that we are reenacting how 
that person thinks and feels, then we cannot trust that we are gaining understanding about 
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the nature of the other’s thoughts and feelings.56 However, this possible explanation of 
Prinz and Maibom’s thinking does not give us sufficient reason to think that bias creates 
a unique problem for empathy. The biases that they mention are cognitively upstream 
from empathy. As a result, we should expect that other psychological resources face a 
similar problem. For example, the growing literature on implicit attitudes reveals that 
even non-emotional attitudes such as belief, judgment, and inference are all susceptible to 
bias [Brownstein and Saul 2016]. Therefore, if we have the relevant biases, then we 
should expect that even without trying to take the other’s perspective the biases would 
impact how we think about the other person, her attitudes, and the relevant situation.  
Moreover, the literature on bias also indicates that although biases can undermine 
epistemic resources such as evaluative judgment, no one thinks that we should give up on 
such resources. Instead, we just make efforts to minimize the possible effects of bias. For 
example, in judging the quality of an essay, we can use practices of blind review to 
decrease the likelihood that implicit bias distorts the evaluation. Similarly, there are 
things we can do to guard against the effects of bias on empathy. First, we can learn 
which biases we have and how those biases impact the way in which we see other people. 
This knowledge can help us to identify the situations in which empathy would be 
particularly susceptible to bias. When in those situations we can then avoid empathizing, 
                                                
56 They might also try to argue that empathy faces a special problem because it involves experiencing 
affective states, and affective states are more likely to misrepresent the world because of bias. However, 
this option is problematic for at least two reasons. First, empathizing does not involve just affective states. 
The affective states arise because of higher-order cognitions, and it is the cognitive elements that would 
presumably be compromised by bias. Second, it is a substantive thesis that bias makes affective states less 
reliable than non-affective states. Such a thesis would need a careful defense, but theorists such as Prinz are 
not interested in offering such a defense because of sentimentalist commitments. 
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or we can place less weight on the information that it produces. For example, given the 
deep-seated nature of racial stereotypes in North America,57 white jury members should 
be skeptical about their ability to reenact the thoughts and feelings of an accused African 
American. Thus, they should also be skeptical about making judgments based on 
empathizing with the accused.58 Second, we can try to appropriately motivate our 
empathizing. The appropriate motivation derives from curiosity about the other’s 
response.59 This curiosity presupposes that the response might be different than what we 
expect and that it is worth knowing the nature of the response. Curiosity moves us to 
keep updating and correcting our interpretation of how the other sees the situation. This 
helps us in trying to understand how the other actually thinks and feels and not how we 
would think and feel or how we expect her to think and feel. Empirical studies support 
the idea that increasing motivation to understand another’s mental state improves 
accuracy of understanding.60 For example, Klein and Hodges conducted studies in which 
some of the test subjects were offered a reward if they correctly described another’s 
response. Those offered the reward outperformed the control group by 15% [Klein and 
Hodges 2001: 727]. 
                                                
57 For more on racial cognition see Kelly and Roedder’s [2008] excellent article. 
58 But perhaps they should be skeptical about any of their judgments regarding the guilt of the accused. For 
more on the difficult relationship between empathy and the law see Hoffman 2011.  
59 Jodi Halpern identifies curiosity as an essential characteristic of the empathic physician. Curiosity, she 
explains, helps physicians to remain focused on understanding the other’s experiences, experiences that 
may differ from how they would feel. Halpern 2012: 236-37. 
60 Maibom [2010: 42] also makes note of these studies. As with the Ickes studies, there is an important 
question regarding how much these studies actually show about empathy as defined in this paper and the 
philosophical literature.  
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In short, bias challenges the accuracy of all of our resources for improving 
interpersonal understanding. It does not create a special problem for empathy. As a result, 
we should not respond to this challenge by giving up on empathy. Instead, we should take 
measures, as we do with other productive resources, to minimize the possible effects of 
bias. With these measures in place, we should expect empathy to support interpersonal 
understand. Empathy enables us to reenact how someone thinks and feels in response to a 
situation, and this helps us to appreciate the nature of the other’s thoughts and feelings. 
This appreciation is beneficial for moral agents because it helps us to make, correct, and 
recognize moral judgments.  
3.  CONCLUSION 
Some philosophers question whether empathy is beneficial for us as moral agents. 
One way in which they do so is by denying that empathy is a resource that helps us to 
understand others’ thoughts and feelings. If empathy does not provide relevant 
understanding of others’ thoughts and feelings, then it does not help us to make, correct, 
or recognize judgments of moral worth or judgments of right and wrong. In this chapter I 
address three putative reasons—identified by prominent critics in the empathy 
literature—to doubt that empathy provides beneficial understanding of others’ thoughts 
and feelings. In doing so, I defend my account of the way in which empathy is a 
beneficial resource for moral agents. However, questions still remain regarding the role 
of that resource in moral life. For example, is it in some sense necessary? Do we need 
empathy when making moral judgments? Are people who are incapable of empathy able 
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to make all of the same moral judgments? If not, where does this leave them compared to 
other moral agents? In the following chapter I explore these questions and how they are 
answered in the literature. I propose a novel account according to which empathy has an 
indispensable role to play in moral life.  
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Chapter 4: The Necessity of Empathy 
In the previous chapter I reject three putative reasons to doubt that empathy 
produces understanding that helps us to make, correct, or recognize moral judgments. By 
doing so I defend my account that we benefit from empathy as moral agents. Questions 
still remain, however, regarding the role of empathy in moral life. In particular there are 
questions about whether empathy is something we need as moral agents. For example, do 
we need to empathize in order to make moral judgments? Are people who are incapable 
of empathy able to make all of the same moral judgments? If not, how does that affect 
their status as moral agents? The way in which we answer these questions can change 
how we think about empathy. Instead of thinking about empathy as just a helpful 
resource, we might come to view it as something required by morality. In this chapter I 
examine the answers that philosophers offer in response to these sorts of questions. Some 
philosophers argue that empathy is not necessary for making moral judgments. Critics of 
empathy use these arguments as stepping stones for asserting that moral agents would do 
just as well without empathy [e.g., Prinz 2011b]. Other philosophers argue that empathy 
is necessary because it is a precondition for making all or some moral judgments [e.g., 
Masto 2015]. There are problems with both lines of argument. I argue that although 
moral agents can make judgments without empathy, empathy is indispensible to moral 
life.   
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1.  WHAT’S IN QUESTION? 
Moral psychologists have recently begun to question whether empathy is 
something we need as moral agents. For example, in a pair of articles Jesse Prinz argues 
that people mistakenly believe that “empathy is somehow necessary for morality” 
[2011a: 211, 2011b].61 This mistake, he suggests, results in people overlooking problems 
with empathy, and it keeps them from recognizing that we would do just as well or better 
without empathy [2011b: 216]. Nancy Snow is more positive than Prinz regarding the 
value of empathy; however, she too denies that empathy is necessary for morality. She 
states, “Some philosophers believe that empathizing…can help us to understand the 
perspectives of others…these philosophers would have to admit, however, that empathy 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for morality” [2000: 74]. In a similar vein Jeannette 
Kennett [2002] states, “I think that empathy…is important to us as moral agents, but I am 
not sure how essential it is to moral agency” [2002: 345]. Heidi Maibom denies that 
people need empathy in order to have moral understanding or to make moral judgments 
about whether something violates a harm norm [2010, 2009]. She states, “neither the 
ability to simply ascribe psychological states to others nor the ability to imagine being in 
others’ positions are necessary for moral understanding or moral motivation” [2010: 36]. 
In contrast to these philosophers, Meghan Masto argues that empathy is required by 
morality because we need empathy in order to make certain moral judgments. She states, 
“Thus, empathy is sometimes epistemologically necessary for morality because it is 
                                                
61 Prinz actually titles one of his articles “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” His answer in the article is 
a resounding “No” [2011a].  
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sometimes necessary for forming justified beliefs about which act is the morally right 
one” [2015: 91]. Despite this breadth of literature, it is not always clear what is in 
question about the role of empathy in moral life when researchers deny or affirm that 
empathy is necessary. In this section I attempt to clarify the question; I hope to reveal 
what is at stake when researchers ask whether we as moral agents need empathy.   
 To begin, we should recognize that it is misleading to frame the question in terms 
of whether empathy is necessary for morality. We can distinguish two senses in which 
people commonly use the term “morality” [Gert 2016, Donagan 1977]. The first sense is 
descriptive in character. We use it to refer to a society’s set of customs and normative 
conventions. The “morality of a society,” in this sociological sense, can be read off of the 
codes of conduct put forward and followed by groups within the society [Gert 2016; 
Donagan 1977: 2]. The second sense of “morality” is normative in character. We use it to 
refer to a standard, such as a set of universal principles, by which we evaluate the 
customs and conventions of a society. When we use “morality” in this sense we 
recognize that the current mores of a society may be wrong or inadequate as guides to 
appropriate behavior [Gert 2016, Donagan 1977: 3]. Neither of these senses seems to 
refer to the sort of thing about which we would ask whether empathy is necessary. If we 
ask whether empathy is necessary for a system of mores or a set of universal principles, 
then our question does not appear to make sense. In what way would a set of norms need 
or depend on our empathizing with others? Note that this is different than wondering 
whether a set of norms requires agents to empathize. Instead, it is similar to wondering 
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whether counting is necessary for arithmetic. Perhaps counting is necessary for studying 
arithmetic, but it is confusing to ask whether it is necessary for arithmetic.  
However, perhaps this is too fast. Suppose that someone argues for a 
constructivist account in which empathy generates the principles that constitute morality, 
we could then sensibly ask whether empathy is necessary for morality. However, this sort 
of question no longer tracks the literature. The researchers criticizing and defending 
empathy do not argue about whether empathizing constitutes moral principles or facts. It 
is not a meta-ethical debate.62 Instead, they argue about whether we use, are required to 
use, and should use our capacity for empathy when engaging in moral activity. They 
approach the topic from the standpoint of moral psychology and normative theory.63 
Therefore, we should reframe the question regarding empathy and necessity. It is 
not a question of whether empathy is necessary for morality, but a question of whether 
empathy is necessary for being moral. Or put slightly differently, it is a question of 
whether we as moral agents need empathy in order to perform the sorts of activities that 
characterize appropriate participation in the moral community. However, we can carve up 
being moral or moral activity such that they involve different elements. We can 
conceptually distinguish moral perception from moral judgment, and we can distinguish 
moral judgment from moral motivation and action. It is beyond the scope of this project 
to examine the role of empathy in relation to each element. In the previous chapters I 
                                                
62 One notable exception is Michael Slote [2010]. He argues that empathy contributes to how we fix the 
reference of moral terms [Chapter 4 of Moral Sentimentalism]. 
63 For examples of theorists that criticize or defend empathy in this way, see Prinz 2011a, Maibom 2009, 
Kennett 2002, Snow 2000 and Sherman 1998. 
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focus on how empathy supports judgments of moral worth and judgments of right and 
wrong. Therefore, in this chapter I build on my account by exploring the question of 
necessity in terms of whether moral agents need empathy for making moral judgments.  
The question, however, requires further clarification because we can distinguish at 
least three senses in which empathy might be necessary for making moral judgments. The 
first sense is what we might call an “analytic condition.” Empathy is necessary as an 
analytic condition just in case empathy is built into the concept of moral judgment. For 
example, if a determination only counts as moral judgment if it involves a particular 
psychological underpinning and empathy is a constitutive part of that underpinning, then 
empathy would be an analytic condition for moral judgment. Moral agents would need to 
empathize every time they make a moral judgment because all moral judgments, by 
definition, would involve empathizing. The second sense is what we might call an 
“enabling condition.” Empathy is necessary as an enabling condition just in case it is 
something that makes it possible for us to make moral judgments. This sense of necessity 
does not require that empathy is part of the concept of moral judgment. Instead, it treats 
empathy as precondition for making all or some moral judgments. For example, if we 
learn what is right and wrong in virtue of empathizing with others, then empathy might 
be necessary as a developmental precondition for making some moral judgments. Finally, 
the third sense is what we might call a “normative condition.” Empathy is necessary as a 
normative condition just in case we need to empathize in order to satisfy the demands of 
morality when it comes to making moral judgments. This sense of necessity does not 
depend on the other two senses. Even if empathy is not necessary as an analytic or 
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enabling condition, we might be morally required to empathize with others when making 
some moral judgments.  
If empathy is necessary in any of these senses, then it has a crucial role to play in 
moral life. It would be more than just a beneficial resource that helps agents to make 
moral judgments. Instead, it would be a resource that agents cannot justifiably choose to 
do without. Part of being moral would involve drawing on empathy as an available 
resource for understanding others; empathy would be an indispensible part of moral life. 
However, as we have seen, some researchers deny that moral agents need empathy, and 
some suggest that moral agents could do just as well without it. In the following sections 
I engage with accounts from the literature that imply that empathy is necessary for moral 
judgment and accounts that imply that it is not. This review of the literature will reveal 
instructive points regarding how to think about the necessity of empathy.  
2.  SLOTE’S HUMEAN SENTIMENTALISM  
I begin my review by examining an account by Michael Slote that implies that 
empathy is an enabling condition for moral judgment. Slote’s account is deeply inspired 
by the work of David Hume. Therefore, in setting up Slote’s account, it is helpful to first 
consider what Hume has to say about sympathy (or what Slote calls “empathy”).64 Hume 
describes sympathy as a psychological mechanism by which our ideas about others’ 
states are converted into impressions of those states. When we encounter someone 
experiencing a passion such as anger, we perceive the external expressions of that anger 
                                                
64 I will focus on Hume’s view of sympathy as developed in the Treatise [1739/2000].  
 131 
(e.g., the redness of their face), and from this perception we infer that he is angry.65 Our 
mind, by way of sympathy, then enlivens this idea, turning it into an impression of anger. 
This impression corresponds to the passion of the other person, and by having the 
impression we experience some of the pain or unpleasantness of anger [1739/2000: 2.2.2-
8].66 
Hume argues that the passions we experience because of sympathy are the basis 
for the moral sentiments. When sympathy causes us to have an impression of anger, the 
unpleasantness of this experience—through the associative principle of resemblance—
causes feelings of disapprobation. Through the associative principle of cause and effect, 
this sentiment is then directed at the cause of the anger [3.3.1]. For example, we see 
someone who is upset at an offensive comment. Sympathy converts our idea of her 
emotion into an impression and we come to have a resembling experience. The 
unpleasantness of this experience then causes us to feel disapprobation about the 
offensive comment. Our disapprobation is a moral sentiment, and on the Humean 
account, moral sentiments are in effect moral judgments. Thus, empathizing (or what 
                                                
65 Hume also thinks that perceiving the typical causes of a passion can produce in us the idea of another’s 
passion. He states, “When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind 
immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is 
presently converted into the passion itself. In like manner, when I perceive the causes of any emotion, my 
mind is convey’d to the effects, and is actuated with a like emotion” [3.3.1]. 
66 It is worth noting here, and as I explain below, Hume and Slote actually have a broader conception of 
empathy than the one I identify in Chapter 1. Their conception allows for phenomena such as emotional 
contagion to also count as empathy. Examining their accounts, however, is still quite helpful. It reveals the 
problems that would arise if we treated my narrower conception of empathy as conceptually necessary. 
Adam Smith offers an account that is in many ways similar to Hume’s but relies on a conception of 
empathy that more closely resembles the one I outline in Chapter 1 [see Coplan and Goldie 2011: x-xi for 
more on the differences between Hume and Smith’s conceptions of sympathy (i.e., empathy)]. However, 
the recent literature on empathy and morality—in part because of Prinz—focuses on Hume’s account and 
not Smith’s.   
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Hume would call “sympathizing”) with the other’s anger gives rise to a disapprobative 
sentiment, and with this sentiment we pass judgment on the offensive comment.67 The 
way in which Hume identifies moral judgment with sentiments ascribes to empathy a 
central role in the psychology of moral judgment. Our moral judgments consist of 
sentiments that are based on experiences of fellow-feeling, and our experiences of fellow-
feeling are brought about by empathy. In this way, Hume’s account treats empathy as an 
enabling condition for moral judgment.  John Deigh puts the point as follows: 
In other words, the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, esteem 
and blame, result from one's first being so connected to another's pleasure 
or pain and then taking the party or parties responsible for it as the 
sentiments' objects. Hume thus, in attributing this mechanism of 
connection to the human mind, gave an account of the phenomena of 
having feelings in common with another that we now typically explain as 
resulting from empathy. His explanation of how we make moral 
distinctions, distinctions between virtue and vice, in particular, thus 
                                                
67 In Book III, Part 3, Hume adds an extra layer to his account. He argues that we can sympathize with 
others from the “common point of view.” The common point of view is the perspective from which others 
would also sympathize and respond to another person’s character or actions. Hume introduces this point of 
view in order to explain the cohesion in people’s moral judgments. The common point of view corrects for 
variability in people’s sentiments that can arise in virtue of sympathizing from the individual or “peculiar 
point of view” [Hume 3.3.1.30]. He states, “But we shall easily satisfy ourselves on this head, when we 
consider, that every particular person’s pleasure and interest being different, ‘tis impossible men cou’d ever 
agree in their sentiments and judgments, unless they chose some common point of view, from which they 
might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the same to all of them. Now in judging of 
characters, the only interest or pleasure, which appears the same to every spectator, is that of the person 
himself, who character is examin’d; or that of persons, who have a connexion with him.” For more on the 
common view and its role in Hume’s ethics, see Cohon 1997.  
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represents a view of moral judgment as requiring empathy” [Deigh 
Forthcoming: 4-5]. 
In his book Moral Sentimentalism Michael Slote claims to offer an account of 
normative ethics that “seems to be more Humean than anything that has appeared since 
Hume’s day” [2010: vii]. He states that his account is deeply indebted to Hume’s views 
of the sentiments and the role of empathy in generating those sentiments. However, 
despite this debt, he disagrees with Hume about how the phenomenology involved in 
empathy gives rise to sentiments of approval and disapproval. Slote proposes an 
alternative account that focuses on the qualitative character of agents’ experiences and 
not empathic experiences of pain and pleasure. He argues that when an agent feels 
concern for others, she experiences feelings of warmth. Conversely, when an agent lacks 
concern for others, she experiences feelings of chilliness. An agent, Slote explains, 
expresses her concern or lack of concern for others in her conduct. He claims that if we 
empathize with an agent whose conduct expresses concern for others, we can come to 
experience feelings resembling her feelings of warmth. When we empathize with an 
agent whose conduct expresses a lack of concern, then we experience chilliness 
resembling the agent’s chilliness towards others [Slote 2007: 31 and 2010: 34-37].68 Slote 
argues that the warmth and chilliness that we feel when empathizing with agents forms 
the basis for our sentiments of approval and disapproval. When we feel warmth or 
                                                
68 Slote argues that the relevant sense of concern is also empathic in nature. Behavior that lacks concern for 
others arises when agents fail to appropriately empathize with those effected by their behavior [Slote 2010: 
Chapters 1-2].  
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chilliness about an agent’s display of concern or lack of concern those feelings constitute 
a judgment of the agent’s conduct. Slote states,  
In particular, if agents’ actions reflect…concern for (the well being or 
wishes of) others, empathic beings will feel warmly or tenderly toward 
them, and such warmth and tenderness empathically reflect the…warmth 
or tenderness of the agents. I want to say that such (in one sense) reflective 
feeling…also constitutes moral approval, and possibly admiration as well, 
for agents and/or their actions [34-35]. 
Despite offering an alternative account of the phenomenology, Slote follows Hume in 
ascribing a central role to empathy in the psychology of moral judgment. He agrees that 
moral judgment is based on sentiments that are brought about by empathizing with 
others. In doing so, he too makes empathy an enabling condition for making moral 
judgments.  
Jesse Prinz identifies several putative problems with ascribing this central role to 
empathy. Discussing the Humean account of empathy and moral judgment, he states that 
many paradigmatic cases in which we feel approbation and disapprobation do not seem to 
involve empathizing [2011a: 214]. For example, when we judge that our own actions are 
morally blameworthy, we do not need to empathize with ourselves in order to feel 
disapproval. He also claims that we do not need to empathize with the agent or victim in 
cases where an action transgresses a clear deontological commitment. For example, when 
we judge that it is wrong to steal organs from five innocent patients and give them to one 
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patient, we do not empathize with any of the patients in order to make the judgment 
[2011a: 214]. Moreover, Prinz states that empathy involves the experience of resembling 
states; however, this phenomenological aspect, he claims, is not present in many of our 
moral judgments [2011b: 217-18]. For example, if you help someone in need that person 
feels grateful towards you. However, when I approve of your action, I feel admiration 
and not gratitude towards you. Prinz claims that my feeling of approbation towards you is 
not a resembling affective state. Because empathy involves feeling resembling states, he 
infers that I must not need to empathize in order to make the moral judgment. Finally, 
Prinz argues that Hume’s account cannot explain moral judgments of disapproval in cases 
where no one is harmed. If no one is harmed, Prinz claims, then there is no one feeling 
displeasure. If no one feels displeasure, then there is no one to empathize with such that 
we come to feel disapprobation. For example, Prinz argues that in cases of bestiality there 
is no person harmed and thereby no one with whom to empathize. [2011b: 218].69 
These attempts by Prinz to identify problems miss their mark for several reasons. 
First, Prinz seems to have an overly narrow conception of the Humean accounts. As a 
                                                
69 Prinz [2011b: 218-19] raises an additional worry regarding Slote’s account. He claims that it is unclear 
on Slote’s account why we should think of judgments of disapproval as constituted by empathy. Prinz’s 
worry is roughly as follows: when we disapprove of an agent we view a situation in a very different way 
then the agent, and thus we should not be described as empathizing with that person. For example, if we 
disapprove of a corrupt election official our disapproval involves a failure to agree with or see things the 
same way as him. Thus, according to Prinz, we are not empathizing with the politician. Nevertheless, we 
are able to pass judgment on the moral worth of his actions. Therefore, Prinz denies that Slote’s account 
shows that we need to empathize when making moral judgments. This objection, however, relies on a 
misrepresentation of Slote’s account. Slote does not think that we need to agree with how someone views a 
situation in order to empathize with that person. Instead, he would argue that empathizing with the official 
would cause us to experience something resembling the official’s lack of concern for his constituents. This 
experience of a lack of concern is what causes us to experience chilliness towards the official. The 
chilliness constitutes our sentiment of disapprobation. In short, Prinz is mistaken in assuming that 
empathizing requires agreeing with the point of view we imaginatively takes up.  
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result, he overlooks theoretical resources available to Hume and Slote. For example, 
Hume could deal with cases such as bestiality in several ways. He could argue that in 
such cases we empathize with members of the community who are closely connected to 
the agent [1739/2000: 3.3.1.30]. Those community members interpret the act as 
disrespectful, and this causes them to feel displeasure. By empathy we come to 
experience resembling displeasure, and this gives rise to a sentiment of disapproval. Even 
in a case in which the community members do not learn about the bestiality, we could 
experience disapproval in virtue of imagining their response. Empathy converts the idea 
of their response into an impression, and our experience of that impression gives rise to 
disapprobation.70,71 
Second, Prinz’s attempts to raise problems misfire because he mischaracterizes 
what the Humean accounts identify as the role of empathy in moral judgment. Slote and 
Hume identify empathy as playing a central psychological role in how we come to have 
the sentiments that constitute moral judgment. However, they do not claim that on every 
occasion in which we judge that something merits disapproval or approval we must first 
empathize on that occasion. They are not committed to empathy being an analytic 
condition for making moral judgments. The putative problems that Prinz identifies have 
                                                
70 Hume might also explain cases such as bestiality by arguing that bestiality is one of the instances in 
which we find an action immediately disagreeable. These judgments do not seem to require empathy as an 
enabling condition. 
71 Prinz also claims that we do not need to empathize when making judgments from behind the veil of 
ignorance. He states, “consider the moral judgments one might issue from behind a Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance; you might decide it’s good to distribute resources to the needy because you might be needy. 
Here there is no empathy for the needy, but rather concern for the self” [2011a: 214]. However, these 
idealized judgments are prudential rather than moral in character. One could argue that in order to make a 
moral judgment about an unfair distribution of resources we should empathize with the disadvantaged and 
appreciate their discomfort. Feeling the discomfort would cause us to feel disapproval of those people and 
actions that reify distributive injustice.  
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the following form: he describes a case that appears to involve moral judgment, and then 
he explains how empathy is not present in that case. He takes the cases as evidence that 
we do not need empathy when making moral judgments. However, even if these cases are 
examples of moral judgments made without empathizing on the particular occasions, they 
fail to undermine the Humean point that empathy produces the fellow-feeling upon which 
our moral sentiments are based. We may still need empathy as an enabling condition for 
those sentiments even if we can make some judgments without empathizing on the 
particular occasion [e.g., a judgment based on a memory of an earlier sentiment]. 
Finally, Prinz’s attempts fail because they rely on a conception of empathy that 
differs from the one used by Hume and Slote. As mentioned in note 7 above, Hume and 
Slote conceive of empathy as a psychological mechanism that causes our perception or 
thought of another’s affective states to produce similar affective states. This mechanism 
could include perspective-taking but it also includes less cognitively-involved 
phenomena such as mirroring and emotional contagion. This is a different conception of 
empathy than the one I’ve been considering in Chapter 1-3. However, by conceiving of 
empathy in this broad way, Slote and Hume could maintain that empathy frequently 
occurs without conscious deliberation and below the level of awareness. They can then 
claim that we often do not recognize we are empathizing when making moral judgments 
because we are frequently not aware that we are empathizing. In this way, they can 
explain away Prinz’s challenges about phenomenology and experiencing resembling 
states. For example, Slote can argue that when I see you perform a helpful action, I 
empathize with you and feel the warmth of your empathic concern, and this experience 
 138 
constitutes my feeling approval and admiration for you. However, because I do not 
reflectively register that I am feeling your empathic concern, I do not identify the 
experience underlying my judgment as empathic in character. 
Prinz claims that he is also using a broad conception of empathy. He states, “The 
core idea, as I will use the term, is that empathy is a kind of vicarious emotion: it’s 
feeling what one takes another person to be feeling. And the ‘taking’ here can be a matter 
of automatic contagion or the result of a complicated exercise of imagination” [2011a 
212].72 However, there are two reasons to doubt that Prinz holds true to this ecumenical 
conception of empathy. First, as we’ve seen, he presents putative problems that rely on a 
conception of empathy that operates at a high level of conscious awareness. Second, 
Prinz uses his criticisms of empathy in order to call into question whether we should 
empathize when making moral judgments. He suggests that we would be better off 
avoiding empathy in favor of using other psychological resources [e.g., 2011a: 228-29, 
2011b: 230-31]. His questioning implies that we have some control over when and 
whether we empathize. Having deliberative control, however, suggests that the 
phenomenon is a higher-level psychological process such as perspective-taking. 
Although Prinz’s challenges misfire, considering them offers an interesting 
takeaway. The takeaway is that it is implausible that the narrow conception of empathy 
I’ve been discussing in Chapters 1-3 is necessary as an analytic condition for moral 
judgment. There are too many cases in which we make moral judgments without it 
                                                
72 Earlier in the passage he also rejects the idea that empathy necessarily involves imagining. He states, 
“the appeal to imagination seems overly intellectual. Imagination sounds like a kind of mental act that 
requires effort on the part of the imaginer. As Darwall recognizes, empathy in its simplest form is just 
emotional contagion: catching the emotion that another person feels” [212].  
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seeming necessary for us to empathize on that occasion. For example, I see someone 
swerving as they drive drunk down the street. I judge that their conduct is wrong and that 
they are blameworthy for their actions. It seems that I can make these judgments without 
empathizing with the agent or with any potential victims. Moreover, this could be the 
case even if one insisted that I needed to empathize on some prior occasion in order to 
have the relevant sentiments or to appreciate that driving while impaired is morally 
wrong. Because I can make a judgment without empathizing on the particular occasion, 
there seems to be space between empathy and moral judgment such that we should not 
view empathy as built into the concept of moral judgment.73  
                                                
73 It is worth noting a problem that is particular to Slote’s account. Slote claims that his account of moral 
judgment improves on Hume’s account by grounding moral judgment in our empathizing with agents. He 
states, “The present approach also avoids the difficulties that Adam Smith attributed to the Humean 
approach to moral approval and disapproval. If approval and disapproval involve empathy with (the point 
of view of) agents, then there is no danger that we will morally approve or disapprove of boulders, houses, 
storms, or other things that can be useful or harmful to people. If we feel chilled or, possibly, repelled by 
certain people and that constitutes a disapproval of them, that is because those people are cold hearted 
toward others and our being chilled or repelled empathically reflects that (immoral) attitude/motivation on 
their part. But inanimate objects don’t harm or hurt us as a result of having such motives or attitudes. So 
there is nothing for empathy to latch on to in what inanimate objects do in their (quasi)agential capacity, 
and our theory therefore makes it understandable, as indeed it ought to be, that inanimate objects are not the 
targets of moral approval and disapproval” [2010: 38]. However, by explaining moral judgment in virtue of 
empathizing exclusively with agents, Slote’s account lacks the resources to offer straightforward 
explanations of some ordinary moral judgments. For example, we judge that disproportionate distributions 
of wealth are unjust, and we disapprove of a society losing biodiversity without just cause. We can make 
these judgments without focusing on individual agents who are causing these states of affair. Because we 
do not focus on individual agents, we do not empathize with anyone such that we experience chilliness 
resembling their lack of concern. Hume’s account, in contrast, can tell a much simpler story by claiming 
that we empathize with those most affected by income inequality and environmental instability. Similarly, 
sometimes we judge that an action is wrong even though the agent performs the action with commendable 
intentions or attitudes. For example, we now recognize that certain forms of foreign aid (e.g., providing 
genetically modified seeds, youth service programs) produce social harm even when done by agents who 
demonstrate great empathic concern. We may judge that agents ought not to provide that aid even if we 
empathize with the agents and experience states that resemble their empathic concern. It is unclear on 
Slote’s account how empathizing with the relevant agents is supposed to produce disapproval. I am not 
claiming that Slote lacks any resources by which to offer an explanation; rather, the point is that Hume can 
offer a more straightforward (and plausible) account by explaining how our empathizing with those 
negatively affected would give rise to sentiments that form the basis of our disapproval.  
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3.  DARWALL AND BEING WITH OTHERS  
Stephen Darwall proposes a very different account of the role of empathy in 
making moral judgments. He argues that moral judgments take into account what he calls 
“second-personal reasons” that we have in virtue of “being with others.” Genuinely being 
with others” involves what he calls “mutual accountability” [2011: 4]. To be with others, 
we need to see them as sources of accountability; we need to recognize that they can 
make normative claims upon us. We also need to recognize that we are sources of 
accountability for them. This is part of acknowledging each other as persons.74 Darwall 
argues that this mutual accountability requires empathy.75 It is by viewing things 
(including ourselves) from others’ perspectives that we recognize one another as unique 
subjects with authority. This recognition establishes the “second-person standing” [2011: 
15]. We come to see ourselves as inhabiting a shared space in which we are one amongst 
others, and each has the authority to make claims of others. Darwall states, 
Second-personal relating, I argue, requires a distinctive form of empathy, 
projective empathy, through which we imaginatively occupy others’ 
                                                
74 “Person” is a theoretically significant term for Darwall. He states, “In The Second-Person Standpoint, I 
argue that person in this sense is a “second-personal concept” since it can be understood only within a 
network of concepts that involve the idea of second-personal address: the authority or standing to address 
claims and demands to others, legitimate claims and demands and the distinctive kind of reasons for acting 
they create (second-personal reasons), and answerability for complying with valid claims and second-
personal reasons (Darwall 2006)” [2011: 14]. 
75Though Darwall refers to the relevant empathic phenomenon as “projective empathy,” he seems to have 
both self-oriented and other-oriented versions of perspective-taking in mind [see Chapter One for more on 
this distinction]. It is important for him that empathizing is at least in part other-oriented because it involves 
coming to see how the other given their beliefs, concerns, and prejudices sees us.  
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perspectives and view ourselves as if from their point of view. Projective 
empathy is thus an essential constituent of “being with” [2011: 1]. 
Mutual accountability requires responsiveness to a distinctive kind of reasons (i.e., 
second personal reasons). We recognize that others can make claims upon us, and these 
claims not only give us considerations regarding what to do, but they also make valid 
demands. For example, I am inadvertently stepping on someone’s gouty toe, and he asks 
me to step off, his request is a second-personal address. He both gives me a consideration 
in favor of removing my foot (i.e., it would relieve his pain) and makes a valid demand of 
me [2006: 7]. In order for me to recognize that his request is a valid demand (i.e., a 
second-personal reason), I need to recognize his authority to make such demands [8]. In 
other words, I need to relate to him second-personally. Because Darwall identifies 
second-personal reasons with moral reasons, he ascribes to empathy a crucial role in 
making moral judgments. We recognize moral reasons as such in virtue of being with 
others in the space of second-personal relating, and we enter into this space by 
empathizing with others. Therefore, in making moral judgments we are engaging in a 
rational activity that is intimately bound up with empathy.76    
                                                
76 It is an exegetical issue whether Darwall thinks that every instance of moral judgment involves an act of 
empathizing such that we appreciate the authority of others’ demands or what they could validly demand of 
us. I am reading him as claiming that empathy is an enabling condition for being with others in the space of 
second-personal relating, but that we don’t need to empathize on each occasion in order to recognize 
others’ demands as authoritative. This seems like the most plausible view. However, if he does think that 
we only recognize something as a second-personal reason in virtue of empathizing on the particular 
occasion, his view is better categorized as implying that empathy is necessary as an analytic condition for 
making moral judgments. For my purposes, it is not that important which he actually believes. Either 
version would run into the issue I discuss below. 
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Darwall’s account sets a demanding cognitive standard for making moral 
judgments. As Darwall states, relating to others’ second-personally requires that agents 
imaginatively occupy others’ perspectives. This is a complex imaginative activity 
requiring a high-level of cognitive sophistication.77 The demanding cognitive standard 
entails that it is impossible for some people to recognize the moral reasons in virtue of 
which we make moral judgments. Some people cannot empathize with others because of 
the nature of their cognitive development (e.g., young children, some autistic 
individuals); thus, making empathy a precondition for second-person relating seems to 
entail that those individuals are incapable of making moral judgments. However, 
researchers [Prinz 2011b, Maibom 2010, 2009, Nichols 2004, Kennett 2002, Snow 2000] 
observe that many individuals who cannot empathize make what they and others regard 
as moral judgments. For example, Shaun Nichols claims that young children cannot 
imaginatively take up others’ perspectives. Nevertheless, they can learn moral principles 
and societal harm-norms, and they can appeal to these norms in distinguishing right from 
wrong [2004].  
                                                
77 For example, suppose I fail to stop to help a stray dog, and I come to have negative attitudes about my 
own conduct. In order for my attitudes to count as a moral judgment, I need to see my conduct as 
something that fails to meet the valid demands that others would make of me given the context of mutual 
accountability. This requires the sophisticated ability to appreciate how others would view the situation and 
evaluate my inaction. Some philosophers would find Darwall’s view of moral judgments as too cognitively 
demanding. For example, sentimentalists such as Prinz would argue that we could morally disapprove of an 
action without that censure being accompanied by higher-order ‘moral thoughts.’ In other words, he would 
deny that for disapprobation to count as a moral judgment it is required that we take up another’s 
standpoint in order to recognize the moral reasons. In response, Darwall could admit that we do disapprove 
of actions without moral thoughts that involve the second-person standpoint, but he would deny that those 
attitudes are properly speaking instances of moral judgment. Darwall is stipulating that by moral judgments 
he means judgments based on second-personal reasons and mutual accountability. 
 143 
Jeanette Kennett makes a similar point in discussing autistic individuals. She 
argues that high-functioning autistics suffer from empathic impairments. These 
impairments, she claims, can make it difficult for them to understand others’ thoughts 
and feelings. She discusses the case of John Sinclair as an example. Sinclair has a 
difficult time recognizing when someone is suffering and what that suffering is about. He 
compensates by memorizing a set of bodily and behavioral cues that indicate when 
someone is upset. He also learns a series of pro-social responses that people tend to 
welcome when they are upset. Sinclair admits that sometimes these compensatory guides 
fail and he is left not knowing what will help or harm a person. For example, he describes 
one of his experiences as follows: “I could certainly tell he was upset. I could figure out 
that there was something I could do that would be better than nothing. But I didn’t know 
what that something was” [2002: 352].78 Kennett argues that empathic impairments can 
cause autistics such as Sinclair to fail to recognize morally relevant features of a 
situation. As a result, they may fail to make certain moral judgments that other agents 
might make. However, Kennett argues, their impairments do not make autistics entirely 
insensitive to the normative force of moral considerations. They still demonstrate regard 
for others’ wellbeing, and they feel the force of considerations that bear on that 
wellbeing. She states,  
                                                
78 This is something that a non-autistic person might say as well. The point, however, is that a non-autistic 
person can take up the other’s perspective in order to determine how to help. This empathic option can help 
the non-autistic individual to see ways in which to help.   
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Sinclair’s realization that he should do something – that the other’s 
distress provided a reason for action – and his eventual conclusion that 
touching might be appropriate, is clearly not here dependent on the 
operation of empathy, but rather on the application of a more explicit 
practical concern to do the right thing, whatever that should turn out to be, 
together with his hard-won realization that other people have needs and 
feelings different from his own. He has, it seems, a generalized moral 
concern, what we might call a sense of duty, or a conscience. His moral 
feelings are of a Kantian, rather than a Humean cast [2002: 352]. 
Kennett denies that we should think of autistics such as Sinclair as insensitive to moral 
reasons. Although their understanding of others is hard won and often leaves out relevant 
details, they are not absent moral feeling. They are still moved by moral considerations to 
do what is right and to disapprove of that which fails to show regard for others. 
Therefore, she argues that we should not think of their empathic impairment as making 
them unresponsive to moral reasons. She states, “Autistic people, though lacking 
empathy, do seem capable of deep moral concerns. They are capable...of the subjective 
realization that other people’s interests are reason-giving in the same way as one’s own, 
though they may have great difficulty in discerning what those interests are” [354]. 
Kennett concludes that instead of thinking that empathy is required for being moral and 
for making moral judgments, we should think of empathy as something that is beneficial 
but not necessary. She also claims, “Those who lack empathy may miss finding out about 
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things which constitute reasons for actions, but they need not thereby exhibit indifference 
to reason” [355]. 
 In short, Kennett and Nichol’s points are instructive. They highlight how accounts 
such as Darwall’s face a serious issue: these accounts imply that certain individuals are 
incapable of making moral judgments despite appearances, beliefs, and self-reports to the 
contrary. This issue arises because the accounts entail that empathy is required as a 
precondition for moral judgment, and thereby, they commit themselves to the thesis that 
individuals who cannot empathize cannot make moral judgments. This is a large bullet to 
bite, and perhaps researchers could avoid biting that bullet by not making empathy a 
necessary precondition for responding to considerations as moral reasons. There are other 
accounts that run into a similar issue. I will now turn to two such accounts that argue that 
empathy plays a crucial role in the development of our ability to determine what makes 
something right or wrong.79  
4.  DEVELOPMENTAL ACCOUNTS  
There are two prominent accounts in the psychological literature that treat 
empathy as an enabling condition for moral judgment. These accounts suggest that 
empathy is involved in the development of our capacity for moral judgment. The first 
developmental view is by R.J.R Blair. Blair suggests that empathy is necessary for 
learning what is wrong about harmful actions. He claims that it is by empathizing with 
                                                
79 These views focus primarily on how we come to make judgments about what is wrong or what ought not 
to be done. They focus on this negative side of judgment because they emphasize the developmental 
importance of empathizing with others who are suffering or in distress.  
 146 
those we harm while we are still children that we come to appreciate the qualitative 
nature of the harm.80 This allows us to recognize that our actions have an aversive quality 
and to develop what he calls a “violence-inhibiting mechanism” (VIM) [1995: 2-3]. 
Psychopaths, Blair argues, lack the ability to empathize and as a result they do not learn 
how their actions have an aversive quality, and they do not develop a VIM. Blair explains 
that psychopaths learn that certain actions are wrong insofar as they are reprimanded for 
those actions, but they do not appreciate what makes it the case, independent of 
conventional rules, such that they ought not to perform those actions. Their lack of 
empathy results in moral blindness; they cannot appreciate how moral transgressions 
differ from conventional transgressions [1995: 20-21]. If they are blind to moral reasons 
as such, then they will not be able to determine what they ought or ought not to do based 
on moral reasons. In this way, their inability to empathize makes it the case that they do 
not develop the capacity to make mature judgments. 
Martin Hoffman makes a similar developmental point. He argues that we 
experience empathic distress by empathizing with those we see suffering. This distress 
when accompanied with parental discipline and instruction leads to the formation of 
“prosocial moral scripts.” As we learn these scripts, we start to experience distress at the 
prospect of engaging in harmful actions and while seeing others perform harmful actions. 
                                                
80 Blair does not assert his view on empathy this definitively. However, Prinz—who picks up Blair’s 
account and uses it as his foil for the developmental significance of empathy—does take the view this 
strongly. He states, “It is not coincidence, some surmise, that psychopaths are decidedly deficient in this 
capacity. Lack of empathy is a diagnostic criterion for psychopathy, and there is an attractive story about 
how this deficit might eventuate in moral blindness (e.g., Blair 1995).” [2011b: 221]. I follow Prinz’s lead 
for two reasons: 1) I plan to address Prinz’s criticisms of the view; and 2) it is beneficial to consider what a 
strong developmental view of empathy would entail regarding empathy’s role in making moral judgments.  
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The feelings of distress cause us to look past just our egoistic motivations. It makes 
salient to us others’ wellbeing as a relevant consideration regarding what others or we are 
about to do. It also causes us to experience anger and guilt when we perceive someone 
being harmed (by others or our self) without a good reason. In this way, according to 
Hoffman, empathy plays a crucial role in our moral development. It enables us to see 
how hurtful actions impact others in such a way that we can determine why agents ought 
not to perform those actions [2000: Chapters 5 and 6].  
On straightforward readings of Blair and Hoffman, they argue that the 
development of the capacity for moral judgment requires empathy. It is by empathizing 
with others that we learn what is wrong about harmful conduct. This development 
enables us to make moral judgments based on considerations about the rightness or 
wrongness of certain actions. In this way, their developmental accounts imply that 
empathizing is a necessary precondition for becoming an agent who makes judgments in 
virtue of moral considerations. Prinz attempts to raise an objection to this developmental 
thesis. He argues that Blair—but his point applies to Hoffman as well—underestimates 
the alternative resources available for moral education [2011b: 221-22]. Prinz claims that 
children can learn that something is wrong by being subjected to a variety of 
punishments. For example, he claims, “she might be spanked, yelled at, sent to her room, 
or deprived of some privilege she enjoys” [221]. These punishments, he argues, can 
instill in children fear, sadness, and shame for their inappropriate behavior. Prinz also 
claims that children are disposed to imitate adults. If the adults demonstrate 
disapprobation towards attitudes or actions that harm others, then the children will also 
 148 
express disapprobation towards acts that harm others [222]. Such methods, he argues, can 
teach children through association what sorts of conduct is wrong. Therefore, he 
concludes that children do not need to empathize in order to develop the capacity for 
making moral judgments about harmful conduct. 
Prinz’s objection overlooks an important aspect of Blair and Hoffman’s accounts. 
The objection identifies alternative ways in which individuals can learn that certain 
conduct is wrong. Blair and Hoffman, however, are trying to explain more than this. They 
are trying to explain how agents develop such that those agents discern what makes 
certain conduct wrong. The difference here is between being able to determine that 
something is wrong and being able to determine why something is wrong. Their claim is 
that we learn to identify why something is wrong (at least in part) by empathizing with 
others being harmed or experiencing distress. By empathizing we come to appreciate how 
certain conduct impacts others such that it produces harm and negative experiences. This 
appreciation coupled with moral instruction helps us to see what is wrong about the 
particular conduct. Learning to see what is wrong in these particular cases enables 
development such that we cultivate the ability to identify why an action is wrong in other 
cases (or in general). Prinz’s objection fails to show that we have alternative means of 
enabling this development. 
However, there is an issue regarding Blair and Hoffman’s accounts that is in the 
vicinity of Prinz’s objection. The issue is that having the capacity to make a moral 
judgment does not require that one is able to appreciate the relevant reasons in virtue of 
which something is right or wrong. If an action is wrong in virtue of x, we do not need a 
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sophisticated appreciation of the moral quality of x in order to judge that it is morally 
wrong to perform that action. For example, children can judge that it is wrong to steal 
candy from the store even if they do not yet understand precisely why it is wrong. 
Perhaps their parents told them it was wrong because it doesn’t belong to them, and they 
trust the moral guidance of their parents. In such a case the children judge that they ought 
not to steal the candy, but their judgment is not based on any deep understanding of the 
reasons in virtue of which the act is wrong. In making this judgment the children are not 
just parroting their parents. They are trying to determine for themselves the moral 
standing of the action. One of the considerations they take into account is that their 
parents say that stealing candy is wrong. The parents’ testimony is not what makes the 
action wrong (i.e., a convention), but nevertheless, the testimony indicates to them that 
there is a moral reason to judge that stealing is wrong. The children take this into account 
when determining whether or not to steal the candy. In this way, even though they do not 
fully appreciate why the action is wrong, they can make carefully considered judgments 
regarding its moral standing.  
This is similar to the case of Sinclair. Sinclair, like other autistic individuals, has 
empathic impairments, but he can learn heuristics that help him to recognize when others’ 
are suffering and what tends to alleviate that suffering. Heuristics of this sort can then 
help him in determining what he should do and how that conduct will impact others. 
Nevertheless, there are cases in which the heuristics fall short and he does not fully 
recognize the nature of others’ thoughts and feelings. In some of these cases, he does not 
fully appreciate the reasons in virtue of which he should do one thing rather than another. 
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Despite not being able to empathize and not being able to appreciate these reasons, he 
still has the capacity to make a moral judgment. He can judge that an action is wrong, and 
he can base that judgment on what he knows about the moral standing of the action given 
his available resources. Even though his judgment lacks sensitivity to certain reasons in 
virtue of his struggles at appreciating the nature of others’ thoughts and feelings, his 
judgment is still a carefully considered determination about what he ought to do.81 In 
short, we can distinguish the question of whether agents have the capacity to make moral 
judgments from whether they are able to make those judgments based on a deep 
understanding of that which makes something right or wrong.  
Deigh [Forthcoming, 1995] makes a related distinction while discussing 
psychopaths. He argues that if we understand moral judgment as the affirmation or denial 
of a proposition (or something that can be given a propositional structure) with moral 
content, then we can distinguish different forms of knowledge in virtue of which agents 
might make moral judgments. These forms of knowledge correspond to the level of 
sophistication or maturity with which agents understand what is right and wrong. For 
example, a low level of sophistication would involve merely having knowledge of the 
conventional moral standards observed in a community. In contrast, a higher level of 
sophistication would involve understanding the reasons for those standards and the ideals 
that give the standards meaning [1995: 748-49]. Deigh argues that psychopaths can 
                                                
81 Heidi Maibom makes a similar point [2009]. She argues that individuals with frontal lobe damage are 
incapable of empathizing with others. Nevertheless, they are able to understand harm norms and identify 
violations of those norms. She takes this as evidence that empathizing cannot be necessary for making 
judgments regarding such norms. However, Maibom does not consider the relation between harm norms 
and moral reasons, nor does she consider the possibility that there is a class of moral judgments that require 
empathizing.  
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clearly make moral judgments based on less sophisticated forms of moral knowledge. 
They can affirm or deny propositions such as “stealing the candy is wrong.” However, it 
is unclear that they can make judgments based on mature or sophisticated forms of moral 
knowledge. He suggests the apparent failure to do so is connected to their inability to 
empathize.82 Because they cannot empathize with others, they do not fully appreciate 
how other people care about their own ends. This lack of appreciation results in them not 
being able to recognize that others’ ends matter in the same way as their own ends, and 
thereby, they lack a mature understanding by which they take into account the moral 
significance of others’ ends when making moral judgments.   
There is a noteworthy difference between Deigh’s point about psychopaths and 
the point about children and autistic individuals. Similar to psychopaths, children and 
autistics sometimes fail to appreciate the reasons in virtue of which an action is wrong. 
This failure undermines their ability to make judgments based on a sophisticated or deep 
understanding of the moral nature of the action. However, as Kennett and Nichols point 
out, children and autistic individuals often demonstrate a genuine commitment to doing 
the right thing. In contrast to psychopaths, they seem to respect the authority or 
significance of moral reasons even when they do not fully recognize or understand the 
reasons in the particular case. They compensate then by using other resources to support 
                                                
82 As mentioned in Chapter 2 some researchers argue that psychopaths’ inability to show appropriate 
regard for others or others’ ends is a result of emotional and evaluational impairments. They are impaired 
such that they experience the world as affectively and evaluatively flat. As a result, they do not see or 
experience things as mattering in the way neurotypical agents do, and they also cannot reenact others’ 
thoughts and feelings. Because they do not see things as mattering, for themselves or for others, they are 
not moved to show regard. In this way, their emotional and evaluational impairments are prior to their 
empathic impairments, and it is the former that cause the lack of moral regard [e.g., Shoemaker 2015: 161-
62, Prinz 2011b: 221-22]. 
 152 
their understanding of the situation for the purpose of determining what they ought to do. 
For example, they defer to testimony or heuristics, and in doing so they make judgments 
based on morally relevant considerations. The considerations, however, sometimes 
represent a less direct and shallower understanding of the moral landscape of the case. 
For example, a parent’s testimony to a child that an action is wrong reliably indicates that 
something is wrong about the action. If the child judges in part based on that testimony, 
then she is responding to the moral quality of the action but only indirectly. The child’s 
judgment is based on an unsophisticated appreciation of that which makes the action 
wrong.83  
I wish to emphasize two significant points that we have learned so far in our study 
of the literature. First, there are individuals who do not empathize but who still make 
what we want to call moral judgments. This gives us reason to deny that empathy is 
necessary as an analytic condition or as an enabling condition for making all moral 
judgments. However, the second point is that these individuals, because of their cognitive 
condition, sometimes fail to understand or directly appreciate morally relevant 
considerations and this challenges their ability to make some sophisticated moral 
judgments. Based on this second point, empathy appears to be an enabling condition. It is 
something in virtue of which moral agents are able to make some moral judgments or at 
                                                
83 It is significant that we can distinguish what psychopaths are doing when they make moral judgments 
from what children and autistic individuals are doing in cases where they fail to recognize or properly 
understand the relevant moral considerations. One consequence is that we can then resist describing what 
psychopaths are doing as making ‘committed’ moral judgments while being able to describe what children 
and autistic individuals are doing as making ‘committed’ moral judgments. This is beneficial if one is 
hesitant to describe psychopaths as making moral judgments, but one thereby does not want to exclude 
autistic individuals from making moral judgments. See Kennett 2002 for more on this issue.  
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least judgments in a certain kind of way. However, there are different ways of 
understanding how empathy might function as an enabling condition. In particular there 
is one problematic way implied in the literature. The problematic way involves 
understanding empathy as a necessary epistemic precondition for making moral 
judgments in particular situations. The second point, therefore, requires further 
unpacking.   
5.  EMPATHY AS AN EPISTEMIC PRECONDITION FOR MAKING MORAL JUDGMENTS 
Several researchers argue that empathy is an important epistemic resource. Some 
of these accounts are not problematic. For example, Karsten Stueber argues that empathy 
plays a central role in helping us to understand and evaluate the reasons upon which other 
rational agents act. By taking others’ perspectives, we reenact having their beliefs and 
desires about a particular situation, and this helps us to understand and assess how those 
beliefs and desires could result in action. He examines the value of empathy by noting 
how it breaks down in cases of imaginative resistance. He argues that in these cases 
others’ frameworks of belief and value are so different from our own that we cannot 
reenact or “resonate” with their thoughts and feelings [2011: 168]. As a result, in these 
cases we find that we cannot grasp, let alone evaluate, how the beliefs and desires they 
cite as reasons are supposed to support their actions. He claims, “Imaginative resistance 
thus reveals the central epistemic importance that empathy plays for our understanding of 
rational agents in a context where we try to make sense of the moral appropriateness of 
their reasons for acting” [156]. 
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Adam Morton makes a similar point about the epistemic value of empathy. He 
argues that empathizing with others has “explanatory force” because it helps us to 
understand the ways in which others’ are motivated [2011: 318]. He claims, “We need it 
in order to negotiate our way around one another, with our diverse motives and 
characters. It is intrinsic to our efforts to get real explanations of why people do what 
they do” [318-19]. These real explanations, he clarifies, not only capture the agent’s 
desire (i.e., what is moving them to do the action) but also how that desire leads to the 
particular action. Morton argues that in many cases recognizing the agent’s desire is easy. 
It is much more difficult to understand how that desire interacted with other motives or 
had to overcome some psychological barrier such as inhibition in order to result in action. 
Empathy, he argues, helps us to deal with this difficulty. Reenacting another’s thinking 
and feeling about a situation helps us to appreciate the psychological process the agent 
went through in order for her motive to result in an action.84 Morton states, “A has a 
grasp of what lay behind B’s action, based in part on his empathy. So here we have an 
important function for empathy: it can allow us to grasp how a person managed to act on 
the motives that she did…Sometimes, to go in one direction or the other we have to 
overcome some barrier or inhibition, based on fear, sympathy, disgust, or decency. Then 
empathy can be vital in allowing us to understand the barrier and how it was overcome” 
[319-20].  
                                                
84 Morton claims, “A has a grasp of what lay behind B’s action, based in part on his empathy. So here we 
have an important function for empathy: it can allow us to grasp how a person managed to act on the 
motives that she did…Sometimes, to go in one direction or the other we have to overcome some barrier or 
inhibition, based on fear, sympathy, disgust, or decency. Then empathy can be vital in allowing us to 
understand the barrier and how it was overcome” [319-20]. 
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I briefly mention these two accounts in order to draw a contrast with a 
problematic position found in the literature. Stueber and Morton indicate that empathy 
supports interpersonal understanding, and we draw on this understanding when making 
certain judgments about others. In this way they suggest that empathy enables us to make 
moral judgments. However, their accounts do not entail that we need empathy in order to 
make those judgments on any particular occasion. They do not entail that empathy is the 
only means by which we can come to understand others thoughts and feelings such that 
we are able to make any particular moral judgments. By not committing to this stronger 
position, they leave open the possibility that we have alternative epistemic resources, and 
on any particular occasion it is at least possible that we could have come to know the 
morally relevant facts about others’ thoughts and feeling by those other means. In this 
way their accounts stand in contrast to an account offered by Meghan Masto. Masto 
argues—in response to Prinz—that empathy plays a crucial role in our lives because it is 
“epistemically necessary” for making certain moral judgments [2015: 74]. 
Masto begins her argument by highlighting the fact that when we try to determine 
what is the right thing to do we often need to take into account how our actions impact 
others. One of the ways in which our actions impact others is by affecting how others 
think and feel. However, as she points out, in many cases it is difficult to determine how 
actions make or would make others think and feel. She states,  
We face morally difficult decisions all the time: What should I say to a 
friend who has just lost her spouse? Can I bail on my sister whom I was 
 156 
supposed to meet at the movies tomorrow? Is it okay to throw out my 5-
year-old’s artwork? Am I obligated to leave my job so that my partner can 
accept his dream job across the country? Should I give up my career to 
take care of my terminally ill child? In many cases, what makes these 
decisions so difficult is that it is unclear how those involved will be 
affected by our choices…In many cases facts about how people are going 
to feel help determine which act is the right one. Unfortunately, knowing 
how others are going to be affected by our actions is difficult [2015: 83-
84].  
Masto claims that empathizing is something we can do to combat this difficulty. By 
taking others’ perspectives and reenacting how they think and feel (or would think and 
feel) about a situation, we can come to better understand how an action affects (or would 
affect) them. This understanding puts us in a position to make a sound judgment 
regarding what we ought to do. She states, “But empathizing with others can help us be 
more informed and thus, in cases in which we want to do the right thing, make it more 
likely that we will do the right thing” [83]. Masto, however, does not just argue that 
empathy is a beneficial resource. She goes a step further and claims that sometimes 
empathizing is the only means for getting the information by which we can determine (or 
form justified beliefs about) what we ought to do. She states, 
In fact, as most of us have experienced, in some cases, taking on the 
perspective of another is the only way that we could have come by this 
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morally important information. We simply could not have grasped the 
information without having shifted our perspective in this way. Thus, in 
some cases, empathy is necessary for doing the right thing because the 
agent wants to do the right thing, but empathy is epistemically necessary 
for identifying the right action: there is some relevant information (about 
how others feel or would feel if some act were to be performed) that is 
accessible on that occasion only via empathy [84-85, emphasis mine]. 
This position is problematic because it appears to rely on a claim about epistemic 
exclusivity. The position assumes that there are cases in which we can only determine 
what we ought to do if we know certain information and we can only know that 
information by empathizing. In these cases it is for some reason impossible for us to 
access the relevant information using any of our other resources for interpersonal 
understanding. However, on reflection it is unclear what would be the details of such a 
case. Which sort of facts about another’s thoughts and feelings could be morally 
significant but unknowable by any of our other means? Masto offers the following case 
as a putative example: “Denise wants to know whether she should give her friend Ed 
some space or begin organizing a fundraiser for him, empathizing with Ed would provide 
her insight into how Ed would feel if she were to take action” [85]. This brief example, 
however, fails to clarify how a case might involve epistemic exclusivity such that 
empathy is the only way to determine what is the right thing to do. In the case, as 
described, Denise could determine what is the right thing to do in virtue of testimony 
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about Ed’s preferences or by reflecting on similar cases involving Ed. Empathy is not the 
only available means of taking Ed’s attitudes into account. Masto appears to anticipate 
this criticism. For example, she states,  
To be sure, there are some cases in which we might be able to gather the 
relevant information by some other means (by simply theorizing about the 
scenario, for example) but even in such cases, the kind of information we 
can get from empathizing with someone is, at least sometimes, a richer, 
deeper kind of information…In experiencing the affect of the target, the 
empathizer comes to know how it feels to feel like that, and in some cases 
such information is vital to recognizing that a particular alternative is the 
right one [85]. 
This response again fails to clarify why this information is only available by way of 
empathy or why we need this deeper kind of information to make certain moral 
judgments. She provides no examples of cases in which we are only able to make a moral 
judgment because we empathize with a person and come to experience a reenactment of 
how she feels. In the case of Denise and Ed, if someone tells Denise about Ed’s 
preferences, or she infers that he wants to have space based on how he reacted in similar 
situations, then she can make an informed moral judgment. She does not need to feel a 
resembling response in order to judge what is the right thing to do. 
Masto follows up the example of Denise and Ed by discussing how empathic 
impairments can make it more difficult for autistics to understand what others are 
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thinking and feeling. This difficulty, she notes, can make it harder for autistics to 
determine what they ought to do. Masto takes these challenges as further evidence that 
empathy is sometimes epistemically necessary. However, examples of empathic 
impairment do not actually substantiate her thesis. The examples do not show that the 
relevant understanding is only accessible or available by way of empathy; rather, they 
show that empathy is a valuable resource for interpersonal understanding. They show that 
empathy helps agents to make informed moral judgments by helping them to understand 
others thoughts and feelings, and thereby, those who cannot empathize are less well 
equipped to navigate complex social situations. Put otherwise, the following two claims 
are consistent with the examples about empathic impairment: a) empathy is a beneficial 
resource because it better equips us to deal with the challenges of navigating complex 
social situations such that without we would have a harder time making informed moral 
judgments, and b) the understanding empathy provides could be produced by other 
psychological resources. In short, Masto fails to defend the claim about epistemic 
exclusivity.85  
 Moreover, the prospects for defending the claim look grim. We have many 
resources that provide insight into the nature of others’ attitudes. For example, if I have a 
friend who is angry, I can know things about her thoughts and feelings based on 
testimony, my own past experience, inferential thinking, self-oriented perspective-taking, 
                                                
85 A more plausible variation of Masto’s position would be that in some cases empathy is the de facto only 
resource that would help the agent come to a timely understanding of another’s thoughts and feelings given 
the constraints and challenges of the social situation. If this is her intended view, it does not square well 
with what she asserts when she claims that empathy is epistemically necessary for identifying the right 
action. Moreover, even if the position I present here is not in fact her intended view, it is worth clarifying 
what is wrong with such a view. 
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and other such processes. From these resources I could come to know that she is angry, 
what it feels like to be angry, the object of her anger, whether her anger is appropriate, 
what she is motivated to do, and what I can do to make her feel better. If it is possible that 
I could know all of these things without empathizing in the particular case, then it is 
implausible that there are significant features about others’ thoughts and feelings that by 
their very nature are only epistemically accessible by way empathy. In other words, we 
should reject the view that we need empathy as an epistemic precondition for making 
particular moral judgments.86  
The lesson here concerns how we should understand empathy as an enabling 
condition. It is not that we need empathy because it alone can provide access to relevant 
insights on particular occasions. This is too narrow of a scope. Instead, as follows from 
Chapters 1-3, we should understand empathy as required in order for us to be certain 
kinds of moral agents or to participate in the moral community in a certain kind of way. 
Empathy enables us to be the sorts of agents who consistently or in general make moral 
judgments that are based on a deep or sophisticated understanding of the nature of others’ 
thoughts and feelings. In this way empathy is necessary as an enabling condition in a 
diachronic or dispositional sense. To see this point more clearly, consider again the 
qualities that would characterize a virtuoso at moral judgment. A virtuoso would be an 
                                                
86 Masto could try to respond by developing her claim that the phenomenal quality of someone’s attitudes 
is sometimes necessary for making a moral judgment regarding what we ought to do. However, even if that 
is true, it is still unclear why I need to experience a resembling attitude in order to make a judgment that 
takes that phenomenal quality into account. If I believe that an action unnecessarily causes pain to another, 
and that pain is bad, then I could judge that the action is wrong without needing to reenact the experience. 
Consider an analogy. I can pick between two desserts based on which is sweeter without having to taste the 
desserts or having to imaginatively reenact what the desserts taste like. I judge based on the phenomenal 
quality without having an occurrent experience as of the quality. 
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agent who could consistently make sound moral judgments across a variety of social 
situations. She would be able to navigate the complexities and nuances of interpersonal 
interactions such that she tracked the nature of others’ thoughts and feelings and could 
identify the significance of those attitudes. She would be able to do this in cases where 
she had limited time with which to investigate the situation, and she would be able to do 
it in cases where she did not have access to reliable testimony. She would also be able to 
do it in cases where others view the situation in importantly different ways in virtue of 
having their own sets of values, concerns, and expectations. In short, she would be 
proficient at using various psychological resources in order to meet the challenges that 
arise when trying to understand others thoughts and feelings. Empathy is not the only 
resource she could use to gain interpersonal understanding, but it differs from the other 
resources in important respects. It uses her imaginative abilities to entertain alterative 
views of the situation, and it uses her own emotional machinery to provide a reenactment 
of how other people feel given their view of the situation. It provides a rich appreciation 
of others’ mental life, and it can do so on the fly within an unfolding social situation. 
Given the nature of this resource and given the challenges faced by those with empathic 
impairments, we have reason to think that empathy is one of the beneficial resources with 
which the virtuoso would be proficient.87 It would be one of the resources that equip her 
to consistently make judgments that respond directly to that which is morally relevant in 
others’ thoughts and feelings. In much the same way that empathy equips the virtuoso to 
                                                
87 See Chapter 1 for the ways in which empathy is distinct from other psychological phenomena with 
which we respond to others’ thoughts and feelings. Empathy is characteristic in that it reenacts how the 
other person sees and responds to a situation and that the process can operate above the level of cognitive 
awareness.  
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excel at moral judgment, it also equips those of us who are not virtuosos at moral 
judgment. As I argue in Chapters 1-3, it is a resource that enables us to gain a deeper 
understanding of others’ attitudes and how those attitudes are morally relevant. In doing 
so it enables us to make judgments and participate in the moral community in more 
sophisticated ways. 
6.  NECESSARY AS A NORMATIVE CONDITION 
Suppose that one accepts this account of empathy as an enabling condition, that 
person could still question whether we need to participate in the moral community in the 
more sophisticated way. He might deny that we are required to participate in that way, 
and therefore, we do not really need empathy. In this section I argue that we are required 
to try to participate in the moral community in the more sophisticated way, and, 
therefore, we also need empathy as a normative condition. The short version is as 
follows: morality demands that we aim for soundness in our moral judgments; empathy 
better disposes us to make sound moral judgments; therefore, we need to empathize in 
order to satisfy the demands of morality.  
 There are norms that govern our activity as moral agents. In virtue of these norms 
we ought to make moral judgments in certain ways. Not only should we make judgments 
that are true, we should also base our judgments on the right sorts of considerations. For 
example, if we judge that conduct is worthy of moral blame, our judgment should be 
correct and it should be based on the nature of that conduct. This is the case in part 
because of the norms of rationality, but it is also the case in virtue of the nature of 
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morality. Being moral agents involves being subject to moral imperatives that we do well 
or at least aim at doing well when engaging in moral activity. One way in which we do 
well is by attending to the impact of our conduct. If we fail to notice how our behavior 
causes others to experience harm, then we would be blameworthy for our inattentiveness. 
We would also be blameworthy if we do not attend to the quality of others’ conduct. Our 
inattentiveness would indicate a lack of concern for the ways in which agents’ show 
regard for one another. Another way in which we do well is by trying to put ourselves in 
a position as moral agents such that the judgments we make are sound in character. We 
are in the wrong and merit blame if we fail to make such efforts. 
Having a duty to put ourselves in a position where we make sound moral 
judgments is consistent with it being the case that sometimes it is appropriate to withhold 
judgment. For example, if I do not have sufficient understanding of a situation, then it 
might be appropriate for me to abstain from judging the moral worth of an agent’s 
conduct. Even if it is appropriate to sometimes withhold judgment, it is not appropriate or 
psychologically possible to always withhold judgment. Regarding judgments of moral 
worth, we would need to be morally callous or unconcerned about others’ treatment in 
order to remain neutral when faced with someone acting maliciously towards others. 
Moreover, in many cases we do not choose to pass judgment on others; rather we find 
upon reflection that we have already made a judgment. It is important in such cases that 
we are able to correct or confirm our judgments based on the morally relevant features of 
the situation. Regarding judgments of right and wrong, in many cases it is not possible to 
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abstain from judgment because an agent deciding not to act is itself a judgment about 
what to do.  
 There are at least two things that we need to do such that we aim at making sound 
moral judgments. First, we need to employ the resources that we have that put us in a 
position to respond appropriately to morally relevant features of a situation. As 
mentioned earlier, the way in which others’ conduct express ill will, goodwill, or 
indifferent disregard is often relevant to its moral worth. In order to grasp how others’ 
conduct expresses ill will, goodwill, or indifferent disregard we need to appreciate the 
thoughts and feelings involved in the conduct. Similarly, the moral standing of our 
actions often depends on how our actions impact or would impact others. In order to 
grasp how our actions impact others we need to appreciate the nature of others’ thoughts 
and feelings. Empathy, as I have shown, is one psychological resource that enables us to 
appreciate these features such that we gain an understanding of their moral relevance and 
respond appropriately. Therefore, empathy is one of the resources—amongst others—that 
we should turn to when trying to make sound moral judgments. The second thing we 
need to do is bound up with the first. We need to cultivate the psychological resources 
that support moral judgment. Because empathizing helps us to make sound moral 
judgments, we should learn to empathize well. For example, we should learn to recognize 
when empathizing is beneficial, how to identify and mitigate the threat of biases, and how 
to differentiate features of our own standpoint from the standpoints of others. Cultivating 
our empathic abilities will improve empathy’s value as a resource that helps us to make 
sound moral judgments. Therefore, because morality demands that we aim at soundness, 
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and empathy puts us in a better position to make sound moral judgments, empathy is not 
something with which we can do away. We need it in order to satisfy a normative 
condition.  
 My account of the ways in which we need empathy implies that it has a role to 
play in pursuing a virtuous life. It seems plausible that being virtuous requires being 
disposed to make sound moral judgments. If we need empathy when trying to put 
ourselves in a position to make sound judgments, then it appears that we also need 
empathy when trying to become virtuous. This implication, however, faces an issue 
raised by Heather Battaly [2011]. Battaly observes that most people view empathy as 
morally praiseworthy. They think that being empathetic is a characteristic of being 
virtuous. Battaly notes that people have a pre-theoretical approval of empathy that 
resembles approval for virtues such as courage and generosity. However, she argues that 
when we examine the nature of empathy we see that empathy is not like other virtues. 
Therefore, she maintains that there is a tension between the nature of empathy and the 
way in which people praise it as if it were a virtue. This tension calls into question the 
role of empathy in the virtuous life.  
 Battaly identifies three ways in which empathy is unlike a virtue. First, she claims 
that we can choose not to empathize in cases where empathizing improves our moral 
response and still be considered excellent at empathizing [296-97]. In contrast, 
voluntarily abstaining from exercising a particular virtue would count against being 
virtuous in that way. For example, if situations call for courageous acts but we succumb 
to our fears, then we would no longer be considered courageous. She claims, “Failing to 
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perform virtuous acts, when the most salient cause is under one’s control, does show that 
one lacks virtue” [293]. Second, she claims that empathy is different than a virtue insofar 
as we can deliberately make mistakes while empathizing [297-98]. If our goal is 
something other than appreciating the nature of another’s thoughts and feelings, then we 
can intentionally err in imagining things from another’s perspective. This does not show 
that we lack the disposition to accurately take up others’ perspectives and reenact their 
thoughts and feelings. With the virtues, however, we cannot deliberately err when 
engaging in virtuous activity and still possess the virtue. She argues, “one cannot 
deliberately perform cruel acts, simply because one is bored with benevolent acts, and 
still possess the virtue of benevolence” [293]. Third, she claims that unlike with the 
virtues, empathy does not necessarily aim at the good [299]. We can excel at empathy 
and still use it for evil ends. For example, Bernard Williams observes that a sadist might 
be excellent at taking others’ perspectives and use that excellence in order to be a more 
proficient torturer.88 Battaly asserts that the virtues in contrast only manifest in conduct 
that aim at good ends. Based on these three differences, Battaly argues that we should 
think of empathy as a skill rather than a virtue. With a skill, she explains, we can forgo 
opportunities, deliberately err, and aim at bad ends without a diminishment in the skill. A 
skill does not require the upstanding motivation that accompanies virtue. However, 
because possessing a skill is not sufficient for possessing a virtue, Battaly claims that 
                                                
88 Bernard Williams makes this point in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy when criticizing Hare’s model 
of the World Agent. He states, “But one thing must be true is that the insightful understanding of others’ 
feelings possessed by the [empathetic] person is possessed in the same form by the sadistic or cruel person; 
that is one way in which the cruel are distinguished from the brutal or indifferent. But the cruel person is 
someone who has no preference to give help (he is not someone who has a preference to give help but finds 
it outweighed by a preference for enjoying suffering). Yet he certainly knows” [1985: 91]. 
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empathy does not merit the sort of praise we characteristically reserve for virtue. 
Therefore, she concludes that there is a real tension between our ordinary, pre-theoretical 
praise of empathy and its status as a skill. 
 My account can explain away the tension. Empathy helps us to appreciate others’ 
thoughts and feelings and this appreciation helps us to respond directly and appropriately 
to morally relevant considerations. In this way empathy is commendable because it 
enables us to better make sound moral judgments. Moreover, virtuous agents—in 
accordance with the demands of morality—aim at excellence in their moral activities. 
Because empathy puts us in a better position to make sound moral judgments, we need 
empathy in our pursuit of this excellence. Therefore, although empathy is not itself a 
virtue, we should think well of it because it enables us to make judgments that a virtuous 
agent would make and it supports our pursuit of the virtuous life.89   
In short, a close examination of the literature reveals that researchers have 
mischaracterized the significance of empathy. They are right that empathy is not 
necessary as an analytic condition for moral judgment; however, it does not follow that 
empathy is thereby some optional epistemic resource. It is not a tool that some moral 
agents use but that others could justifiably discard. Instead, empathy is necessary as an 
enabling condition and as a normative condition. Taking advantage of empathy as a 
psychological resource puts us in a better position to make sound moral judgments. 
                                                
89 Unlike Battaly, I do not think that we should describe empathy as a skill. It is better categorized as a 
capacity or psychological resource. It is something we can do skillfully, but that does not make the 
phenomenon itself a skill. This becomes clear if we think about individuals who cannot empathize because 
of cognitive impairments. Their problem is not that they are unskilled at empathy; their problem is that they 
lack the capacity to empathize, well or poorly. 
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Moreover, morality requires that we aim at this sort of improvement, therefore, as moral 
agents we need to include empathy in our dealings with others in order to satisfy the 
demands of morality. In this way, for those of us who are capable of empathizing, 
empathy is an indispensable part of moral life.  
7.  WORRIES 
In the previous section I argue that moral agents need empathy both as an 
enabling condition and as a normative condition. There are two sorts of concerns raised 
in the literature that appear to create problems for my view. The first is that there are 
alternatives to empathy that provide similar support for moral judgment. If true, this 
creates a problem because it means that we have other resources that can satisfy the 
enabling and normative conditions identified above. The second sort of concern is that 
individuals who are incapable of empathizing can excel and aim at making sound moral 
judgments. This concern suggests that we do not need empathy in particular in order to 
satisfy the demands of morality. In this section I identify and respond to both sorts of 
concerns.  
7.1  Alternative Resources 
Jesse Prinz and Nancy Snow each deny that we need empathy as moral agents 
because we have alternative resources that can sufficiently match or replace the 
contributions made by empathy. For example, Prinz argues [2011a] that moral sentiments 
can function as evaluations of the moral worth of someone’s actions. When we perceive a 
 169 
bad action we experience an emotion such as guilt, anger, or shame. We experience this 
emotion because we have sentiments of disapprobation that we’ve learned to associate 
with actions of that type. Our emotional responses signal that the action is bad; he thereby 
claims that we do not need to take another’s perspective in order to recognize that the 
action merits disapproval. He claims, “Morally significant actions can be recognized 
without empathy, even if those actions are ones that involve harm. We need not reflect on 
the harm to see that the action is bad…If this is right, then empathy is not a necessary 
precursor to moral judgment” [2011a: 215].  
Snow is more optimistic than Prinz that empathy has a constructive role in moral 
life. For example, she acknowledges that empathy can make us sensitive to the emotional 
states of others, and this sensitivity can help us to respond to others in more nuanced and 
subtle ways. She suggests, for this reason, that empathizing can enable our responses to 
take on greater depth and richness in terms of their moral quality [2000: 74]. However, 
she still denies that empathy is necessary for moral judgment. She argues that we as 
agents can make moral judgments based on an awareness of others’ needs, a familiarity 
with moral principles, and an understanding of how action types impact others’ needs. 
We do not need to take others’ perspectives and experience resembling attitudes in order 
to make these judgments. She asserts that high-functioning autistics—who she claims are 
incapable of empathizing—are able to determine when actions cause harm and transgress 
moral prohibitions. They can do this because they are aware of others’ needs and they can 
identify action types that negatively impact those needs. When they perceive that a 
response is one that negatively impacts others, they appraise it as worthy of blame. 
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Because they can make these appraisals without reenacting others’ experiences, she 
concludes that we should understand empathy as “instrumentally valuable, though not 
necessary or sufficient” for moral judgment [74]. She claims, 
…all that is needed for the exercise of moral duty is perceptual awareness 
of the other’s needs, conjoined with an appropriate moral response. 
Empathy with the other as defined here is neither necessary nor sufficient, 
though it might well enhance the moral quality of the response [77, note 
21]. 
There are issues with both of these accounts. Prinz argues that our moral 
sentiments can replace empathy because we can train ourselves through association to 
respond to certain action-types with attitudes such as anger or guilt. Even if we grant 
Prinz that our emotions can constitute judgments and that we can train ourselves in the 
relevant way, his proposal does not explain how we come to appreciate that someone’s 
attitude or action is as an instance of an action-type that merits a particular moral 
response. For example, I see a colleague give feedback to a student that makes the 
student cry. Did my colleague act inappropriately? The answer depends on features of the 
situation such as whether the colleague gave the feedback with a mean spirit or 
insufficient regard for the student’s psychological health. It is possible in this case that 
other things happening in the student’s life actually explain his reaction. If I do not 
recognize such features of the case, then I won’t be able to determine whether this action 
is wrong or an instance of a type of conduct that merits blame. This sort of case, however, 
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is standard fare in our moral lives. We often encounter complexity and subtlety in social 
interactions that make it difficult to determine whether causing someone to cry is part of 
a morally wrong action. In some of these cases we need to reflect on the agent’s thoughts 
and feelings and the nature of the harm in order to appreciate the morally relevant 
features. Moreover, as Masto points out, even though some action-types are seen as 
morally bad, it does not follow that every instance of that action-type is morally wrong. 
She states, “Consider, for example, lying, stealing, or giving away money. Surely there 
are some tokens of these action-types that are wrong and some that are morally 
permissible” [83]. Prinz’s account lacks the resources to deal with such complexity. His 
account of trained emotional responses could only work if moral life consisted of clear-
cut paradigmatic cases of right or wrong action. Therefore, his account fails to offer a 
legitimate alternative to empathy. Mature moral agents are expected to handle more than 
the simple, straightforward cases. They need to pick up on the nuances that characterize 
particular situations, and these nuances often include subtle aspects of others’ thoughts 
and feelings that are related to their perspectives. 
 Snow’s account is more promising insofar as she recognizes that empathy can 
help moral agents to provide sophisticated responses to complex social situations. She 
actually ends her article by suggesting that we might have an obligation to cultivate 
instrumentally valuable resources such as empathy. She states, “Though this claim cannot 
be substantiated here, perhaps we have moral duties to hone and refine our empathic 
skills so that we are appropriately sensitive to the emotional needs of others. If so, 
empathy has roles to play in moral life that have thus far gone unnoticed by 
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philosophers” [75]. Given this line of thinking, it is possible that Snow would be 
sympathetic to the idea that we need empathy as a normative condition.  
Despite this positive take on empathy, her account still understates the 
significance of empathy as an enabling condition. She appears to understate its 
significance because she focuses on moral judgment in terms of whether agents could 
identify that an action violates a harm norm. She argues that agents can determine 
whether an action violates a norm based on a familiarity with moral principles and an 
awareness of others’ needs and the ways in which action-types impact those needs. 
Although this might be true, it fails to take into account significant aspects of mature 
moral judgment. For example, we not only expect moral agents to identify whether an 
action is permissible or impermissible, but we expect them to appreciate differing degrees 
of moral worth. We also expect them to appreciate the reasons in virtue of which an 
action is right or wrong or merits praise or blame given the particular situation. These 
sorts of activities require that agents have a nuanced appreciation of a situation that goes 
beyond recognizing action-types. For example, some instances of lying are praiseworthy 
partially because of the way in which they involve compassion felt for others. 
Responding soundly to the moral worth of such actions requires us to take into account 
the nature of the agent’s thoughts and feelings. Empathy is something that helps us to 
appreciate the moral significance of others’ thoughts and feelings. For this reason, as I 
argue above, empathy is a resource that enables us to participate in the moral community 
in a more sophisticated way. Therefore, empathy is not just instrumentally valuable. 
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Instead, it is something that makes possible more nuanced forms of moral activity, forms 
of activity that morality requires we try to engage in.  
7.2  Agents Who Cannot Empathize 
Earlier I discussed examples of people who purportedly cannot empathize because 
of their cognitive development. Researchers argue that these individuals make what we 
want to call moral judgments [e.g., Prinz 2011b, Maibom 2010, 2009, Nichols 2004, 
Kennett, 2002, Snow 2000]. In §3 and §4 I claim that these arguments provide reason to 
deny that empathy is necessary as an analytic condition for moral judgment or as an 
enabling condition for making all moral judgments. However, I later argue there are two 
ways in which moral agents do need empathy: they need it to be the sorts of agents who 
make sophisticated moral judgments and to satisfy the demands of morality. At first 
glance, this appears to create a problem for my account. My account seems to imply that 
excelling at moral judgment and satisfying the demands of morality are tied to the ability 
to empathize, and therefore, agents who cannot empathize also cannot aim at excellence 
or satisfy the demands of morality. This implication would be problematic for two 
reasons.  
 First, it violates the principle of ought-implies-can. It suggests that some people 
are morally culpable for failing to do something that they are incapable of doing given 
their psychological capabilities. This would be a significant point against my account. 
Second, it is incongruent with glowing descriptions of the moral efforts made by many 
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high-functioning autistics.90 For example, Jeanette Kennett describes Temple Grandin 
and Jim Sinclair as individuals that make a “heroic” effort to understand and respond 
appropriately to others [355]. She reports that Grandin, one of the leading experts on 
animal rights, carefully built a repository of experiences in her head that she would visit 
in order to catalogue and better understand others’ behavior [351-52]. Grandin uses this 
understanding to improve her efforts at moral judgment and her interactions with others. 
Given her efforts and upstanding character, it would be a bad result if my view implies 
that Grandin is failing to aim at excellence or failing to satisfy the demands of morality.  
 On a closer look, however, my account can avoid this problematic implication. In 
§6 I suggest that we are required to try to put ourselves in a position where we are better 
disposed to make sound moral judgments. I argue that in order to satisfy this normative 
condition we need to empathize because empathy is an available resource that provides a 
sophisticated understanding that helps us to make sound moral judgments. This argument 
rests crucially on the fact that we need to take advantage of available resources that 
enable us to excel. My account, however, is consistent with it being the case that not all 
of us have the same set of available resources. It is also consistent with it being the case 
that not all agents need to satisfy the demands of morality in the same way. It is plausible 
                                                
90 As mentioned earlier, I am following the standard assumption in the literature that high-functioning 
autistics are incapable of empathy. There may be reasons to question this assumption. For example, it is 
difficult to distinguish cases in which individuals are incapable of empathizing from cases in which 
individuals are simply have non-standard reactions to a specific kind of stimulus. However, I take it that the 
assumption lends support to theorists who are pessimistic about the role of empathy in moral life; therefore, 
by granting them the point, I hope to show that even if the assumption is true, it does not create a problem 
for my account. See the dissertation of Dana Fritz for concerns about assumptions in the literature 
regarding the lack of empathic abilities in autistic individuals. However, it should be noted that she has a 
broader conception of empathy than the one I use in this project.  
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that what it takes for moral agents to satisfy the demands of morality depends on their 
psychological capabilities. For example, if I am capable of empathizing and empathy 
improves my efforts at moral judgment, then I am required to include it among the 
resources with which I navigate moral life. If I fail to do so, then I merit criticism. In 
contrast, if my colleague is incapable of empathy, then she does not merit the same 
criticism by not empathizing. Empathy is not an available resource of which she is failing 
to take advantage. Morality still demands of her that she aim at making sound moral 
judgments, and she can do better or worse in satisfying this demand, but the degree to 
which she fulfills her duty and merits praise or blame depends on how she takes 
advantage of the resources that she has given her psychological capabilities.   
 Moreover, it is actually a good-making feature of my account that it creates space 
for acknowledging differences in psychological capabilities. We should resist the 
temptation to create a one-size fits all account of the psychology of moral judgment. Just 
because some agents are incapable of using a resource does not make it the case that the 
resource is something that other agents can dispense with. For those of us who are 
capable of empathy, it helps us do what we ought to do. It provides a rich understanding 
of others’ thoughts and feelings such that we are in a better position to make and correct 
judgments that respond to morally relevant features of situations. This is not a resource 
that is simply beneficial or instrumentally valuable for those who can take advantage of 
it; rather it is required as a resource that enables agents to participate in the moral 
community in more sophisticated ways. Therefore, those of us who are capable of 
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empathy cannot justifiably ignore or try to do away with it. It has an indispensible role to 
play in moral life.  
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On a daily basis we interact with others in a multiplicity of ways. We offer 
compliments and criticism, we share gossip and memories, we intimidate and protect, and 
we deceive and forgive. Although these social interactions are commonplace, they can 
make a significant impact on the quality of people’s lives. As moral agents, we care about 
how these interactions affect others. For example, it makes a moral difference whether an 
action causes someone to experience benefit or harm. It also makes a moral difference 
what agents are thinking and feeling when they interact with others. We expect agents to 
display sufficient regard and goodwill for others, and we demand that conduct not 
express ill will, malice, or indifferent disregard. Thoughts and feelings, therefore, are an 
important aspect of our social interactions. They partially determine the impact of 
someone’s conduct and the character of that conduct, and for this reason, we take them 
into account when we make moral judgments.  
However, we face challenges in taking others’ thoughts and feelings into account. 
Social situations can involve layers of complexity, and agents can respond to those 
situations in subtle, idiosyncratic ways. Moreover, we each have our own sets of values, 
concerns, and expectations that shape the way in which we view social situations, and 
these views can differ significantly from those with whom we interact. Understanding 
others’ thoughts and feelings, therefore, can require that we come to appreciate 
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alternative ways of viewing a situation. This is not always easy or effortless, sometimes it 
requires deliberately considering how and why others’ might view the world differently. 
Further complicating things is that in many cases we do not have limitless time with 
which to investigate how others’ see the situation and sometimes it is not feasible or 
appropriate to ask agents about the nature of their thoughts and feelings. Given these 
challenges, it is sometimes an open question how others’ view a situation and what is the 
nature of their thoughts and feelings. Despite such questions, we still feel compelled to 
make judgments about moral worth and judgments about right and wrong. Sometimes 
upon reflection we also recognize that without conscious deliberation we have already 
passed judgment. Being able to improve our understanding of others’ thoughts and 
feelings, therefore, can help us to make sound judgments and to correct or affirm 
judgments that we have already made. Without such appreciation we would be less adept 
at participating in the moral community in sophisticated ways.  
 I have argued in this project that empathy is a process in which we imaginatively 
take up others’ perspectives such that we see a situation in a similar way and reenact their 
thoughts and feelings about that situation. This process helps us to appreciate how they 
are thinking and feeling and why they have those attitudes about the particular situation. 
The understanding that empathy provides is beneficial for us as moral agents. For 
example, as I argue in Chapter 2, empathy supports our dealings with the reactive 
attitudes such that we are more liable to make sound moral judgments, correct 
inappropriate moral judgments, and to recognize others’ moral judgments. However, not 
all researchers believe that empathy benefits us as moral agents. Several of these 
 181 
researchers raise concerns that call into question whether empathy produces 
understanding that helps us to make moral judgments [e.g., Prinz 2011b, Maibom 2010, 
Goldie 2000]. For example, Goldie argues that empathy can only produce a distorted 
representation of others’ thoughts and feeling, and he suggests that this imprecision 
shows that empathy is not a resource that helps us to make moral judgments. In Chapter 3 
I address three of the prominent concerns in the literature. I show that the concerns about 
imprecision, personal distress, and bias do not give us sufficient reasons to deny that 
empathy is a beneficial resource for moral agents.  
However, there are further questions about how we should characterize the role of 
that resource in moral life. For example, is empathy in some sense necessary for moral 
judgment? Researchers in the literature offer a variety of answers to this question; as I 
show in Chapter 4 many of their answers are instructive but ultimately unsatisfactory. 
Some accounts imply that empathy is necessary as a precondition for moral judgment 
[e.g., Darwall 2011]. However, this entails that individuals who cannot empathize do not 
make moral judgments despite appearances, beliefs, and self-reports to the contrary. 
Meghan Masto asserts that we need empathy to make judgments because on some 
occasions morally relevant information is only accessible by way of empathy [2015]. Her 
argument, however, relies on a dubious claim about epistemic exclusivity. Finally, some 
researchers acknowledge that empathy is instrumentally valuable, but they deny that it is 
necessary or required for participation in the moral community [e.g., Kennett 2002, Snow 
2000]. I argue that these latter accounts are correct in separating the concept of empathy 
from moral judgment and in recognizing that we can make some judgments without 
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empathy. However, the accounts still fail to adequately characterize the significance of 
empathy for moral agents. They fail to acknowledge that empathy enables a more 
sophisticated participation in the moral community and that we are required, if possible, 
to participate in this way.  
Compare the role of empathy in moral life to the role of geometry in carpentry. 
Doing geometry can help carpenters to determine angles such that they know how to cut 
in a way that makes the pieces meet flush. In this way it is a resource that enables them to 
make accurate judgments based on the features of the particular case. Of course 
carpenters do not need to do geometry on particular occasions in order to make these 
judgments. They can use tools such as a speed square in conjunction with rules of thumb 
in order to gauge the approximate angles that are appropriate for the cuts. This often gets 
them close, and they can make additional cuts to fine-tune any noticeable imperfections. 
However, individuals who can do the geometry are able to avoid making approximate 
judgments and using a trial and error approach. It enables them to participate in carpentry 
in a more sophisticated way. This is particularly evident in cases where the situation gets 
more difficult. For example, it is more challenging to determine the appropriate angles to 
cut trim in cases where walls are not square and do not create 90 degree angles. The 
carpenter who uses geometry can more efficiently judge what is the right cut because he 
can base his judgment directly on the particular angles at which the walls meet. This 
point is even more evident in cases where the carpentry involves unique and very detailed 
work, e.g., the spiraling stairs at the Loretta Chapel in Santa Fe. Although it is 
conceptually possible that carpenters could create such a work without doing geometry, it 
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is de facto unfeasible for them to do so. If we wanted a beautiful, spiraling staircase, we 
would need to hire carpenters who are masters of the skills and resources of their trade. 
Their mastery—which involves being able to do geometry—is what enables them to 
participate in their craft such that they could build an excellent, one of a kind staircase.  
In a similar way, empathy is a resource that puts us in a better position to make 
and correct moral judgments. It helps us to appreciate others’ thoughts and feelings such 
that we can respond soundly to morally relevant features of a situation. This is 
instrumentally valuable, but it is also something that enables more sophisticated 
participation in the moral community. However, morality is unlike carpentry in an 
important way. Carpenters are not normatively required to aim at excellence in their 
craftsmanship. It is permissible for them to choose not to learn geometry and to prefer to 
work on less complicated tasks. Morality, in contrast, demands that agents aim at 
soundness in their moral judgments. We are required to use the available resources that 
enable us to better excel at moral life. In this way, for those of us who are capable of 
empathy, it enables us to do what we ought to do. Empathy is not a beneficial resource 
that we can justifiably disregard or try to do away with; rather, it is indispensible for 




Batson, C. Daniel. 2011. Altruism in Humans. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Battaly, H. 2011. “Is Empathy a Virtue.” In Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological 
Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bennett, Jonathan. 1980. “Accountability.” In Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented 
to P.F. Strawson, edited by Van Straaten. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Biggs, Stephen. 2007. “The Phenomenal Mindreader: A Case for Phenomenal 
Simulation.” Philosophical Psychology 20 (1): 29–42. 
Bischof-Köhler, Doris. 2012. “Empathy and Self-Recognition in Phylogenetic and 
Ontogenetic Perspective.” Emotion Review 4 (1): 40–48. 
Blair, R. J. 1995. “A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Mortality: Investigating the 
Psychopath.” Cognition 57 (1): 1–29. 
Bloom, Paul. 2014. “Against Empathy.” Boston Review, September 10. 
https://bostonreview.net/forum/paul-bloom-against-empathy. 
Brownstein, Michael, and Jennifer Saul, eds. 2016. Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 
1: Metaphysics and Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cohon, Rachel. 1997. “The Common Point of View in Hume’s Ethics.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 57 (4): 827–50. 
Coplan, Amy. 2011. “Understanding Empathy.” In Empathy: Philosophical and 
Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Coplan, Amy, and Peter Goldie. 2011. “Introduction.” In Empathy: Philosophical and 
Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Darwall, Stephen. 1998. “Empathy, Sympathy, Care.” Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3): 
261–82. 
———. 2006. The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 185 
———. 2011. “Being With.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1): 4–24. 
Davies, Stephen. 2011. “Infectious Music: Music-Listener Emotional Contagion.” In 
Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan 
and Peter Goldie. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Decety, Jean, and Andrew N. Meltzoff. 2011. “Empathy, Imitation, and the Social 
Brain.” In Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, edited by 
Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Deigh, John. 1995a. “Empathy and Universalizability.” Ethics 105 (4): 743–63. 
———. 1995b. “Empathy and Universalizability.” Ethics 105 (4): 743–63. 
———. 2011. “Reactive Attitudes Revisited.” In Morality and the Emotions, edited by 
Carla Bagnoli. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Donagan, Alan. 1977. The Theory of Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Eisenberg, Nancy, and Janet Strayer. 1987. “Critical Issues in the Study of Empathy.” In 
Empathy and Its Development. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Freedberg, David, and Vittorio Gallese. 2007. “Motion, Emotion and Empathy in Esthetic 
Experience.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (5): 197–203. 
Gert, Bernard. 2016. “The Definition of Morality.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2016. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/morality-definition/. 
Gibbard, Allan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Goldie, Peter. 2000. The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
———. 2002. “Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality.” Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences 1 (3): 235–54. 
———. 2011. “Anti-Empathy.” In Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological 
Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Goldman, Alvin. 2006. Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and 
Neuroscience of Mindreading. New York: Oxford University Press. 
———.  2011. “Two Routes to Empathy.” In Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological 
Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 186 
Goldman, Alvin, and Chandra Sekhar Sripada. 2005. “Simulationist Models of Face-
Based Emotion Recognition.” Cognition 94 (3): 193–213. 
Halpern, Jodi. 2012. “Clinical Empathy in Medical Care.” In Empathy: From Bench to 
Bedside, edited by Jean Decety and William Ickes, 229–44. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Hatfield, Elaine, John T. Cacioppo, and Richard L. Rapson. 1994. Emotional Contagion. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hoffman, Martin L. 2000. Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring 
and Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2011. “Empathy, Justice, and the Law.” In Empathy: Philosophical and 
Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hume, David. 2000. A Treatise of Human Nature. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hutto, Daniel. 2008. “The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Clarifications and 
Implications.” Philosophical Explorations 11 (3): 175–92. 
Iacoboni, Marco. 2011. “Within Each Other.” In Empathy: Philosophical and 
Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Ickes, William. 2009. “Empathic Accuracy: Its Links to Clinical, Cognitive, 
Developmental, Social, and Physiological Psychology.” In The Social 
Neuroscience of Empathy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Ickes, William, and Elliot Aronson. 2003. Everyday Mind Reading: Understanding What 
Other People Think and Feel. 1st Edition. Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books. 
Jackson, Philip L., Eric Brunet, Andrew N. Meltzoff, and Jean Decety. 2006. “Empathy 
Examined through the Neural Mechanisms Involved in Imagining How I Feel 
versus How You Feel Pain.” Neuropsychologia 44 (5): 752–61. 
Kelly, Daniel, and Erica Roedder. 2008. “Racial Cognition and the Ethics of Implicit 
Bias.” Philosophy Compass 3 (3): 522–40. 
Kennett, Jeanette. 2002. “Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency.” The Philosophical 
Quarterly 52 (208): 340–57. 
Klein, Kristi, and Sara Hodges. 2001. “Gender Differences, Motivation, and Empathic 
Accuracy: When It Pays to Understand.” Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 27 (6): 720–30. 
 187 
Lee, Harper. 1960. To Kill a Mockingbird, 50th Anniversary Edition. 50 Anv edition. 
New York, NY: Harper. 
Macnamara, Coleen. 2011. “Holding Others Responsible.” Philosophical Studies 152 (1): 
81–102. 
———. 2015. “Reactive Attitudes as Communicative Entities.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 90 (3): 546–69. 
Maibom, Heidi. 2008. “The Mad, the Bad, and the Psychopath.” Neuroethics 1 (3): 167–
84. 
———. 2009. “Feeling for Others: Empathy, Sympathy, and Morality.” Inquiry 52 (5): 
483–99. 
———. 2010. “Imagining Others.” Les Ateliers de l’Éthique / the Ethics Forum 5 (1): 
34–49. 
———. 2014. “Introduction: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Empathy.” In 
Empathy and Morality, edited by Heidi Maibom. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Masto, Meghan. 2015. “Empathy and Its Role in Morality.” The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 53 (1): 74–96. 
Morton, Adam. 2011. “Empathy for the Devil.” In Empathy: Philosophical and 
Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Nafisi, Azar. 2007. “Mysterious Connections That Link Us.” In This I Believe: The 
Personal Philosophies of Remarkable Men and Women, edited by Jay Allison and 
Dan Gediman. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 
Nichols, Shaun. 2004. Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral 
Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Preston, Stephanie, and Alicia J. Hofelich. 2012. “The Many Faces of Empathy: Parsing 
Empathic Phenomena Through a Proximate, Dynamic-Systems View 
Representing the Other in the Self.” Emotion Review 4 (1): 24–33. 
Prinz Jesse. 2011a. “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality.” In Empathy: Philosophical and 
Psychological Perspectives, edited by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
———. 2011b. “Against Empathy.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1): 214–33. 
 188 
Ravenscroft, Ian. 2010. “Folk Psychology as a Theory.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2010. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/folkpsych-theory/. 
Ruby, Perrine, and Jean Decety. 2004. “How Would You Feel versus How Do You Think 
She Would Feel? A Neuroimaging Study of Perspective-Taking with Social 
Emotions.” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16 (6): 988–99. 
Scheler, Max. 1954. The Nature of Sympathy. Edited by P. Heath. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Press. 
Sherman, Nancy. 1998. “Empathy and Imagination.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 
(1): 82–119. 
Shoemaker, David. 2015. Responsibility From the Margins. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Slote, Michael. 2007. The Ethics of Care and Empathy. London: Routledge.  
———. 2010. Moral Sentimentalism. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Smith, Adam. 1790. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Edited by K. Haakonssen. 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Snow, Nancy. 2000. “Empathy.” American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1): 65–78. 
Sober, Elliott, and David Sloan Wilson. 1998. Unto Others: The Evolution and 
Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Steinberg, Justin. 2014. “An Epistemic Case for Empathy.” Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 95 (1): 47–71. 
Strawson, Peter. 1993. “Freedom and Resentment.” In Perspectives on Moral 
Responsibility, edited by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Stueber, Karsten. 2006. Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psycholgy, and the 
Human Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
———. 2011. “Imagination, Empathy, and Moral Deliberation: The Case of Imaginative 
Resistence.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1): 156–80. 
———. 2014. “Empathy.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by 
Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2014. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/empathy/. 
 189 
Vignemont, Frederique De, and Tania Singer. 2006. “The Empathic Brain: How, When 
and Why?” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (10): 435–41. 
Wallace, R. Jay. 2011. “Dispassionate Opprobrium: ON Blame and the Reactive 
Sentiments.” In Reasons and Recognition, edited by Wallace, Kumar, and 
Freeman. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Walton, Kendall. 1997. “Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime.” In Emotion and the Arts, 
edited by Sue Laver and Mette Hjort. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Watson, Gary. 2004. “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian 
Theme.” In Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Wispé, Lauren. 1987. “History of the Concept of Empathy.” In Empathy and Its 
Development, edited by Nancy Eisenberg and Janet Strayer. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Zahavi, Dan. 2014. “Empathy and Other-Directed Intentionality.” Topoi 33 (1): 129–42. 
 
